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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Victorian-style structures of the McLean psychiatric hospital 
sprawl across more than two hundred acres of gentle, leafy hills, inviting 
a sense of immunity from intrusion. But on August 1, 1983, the eco-
nomic forces that are radically reshaping American medicine intruded 
abruptly. As some of McLean's doctors learned from their car radios 
while escaping to Cape Cod vacation spots, 1 the huge Hospital Corpora-
tion of America (HCA), owner of more than three hundred for-profit 
hospitals, had made an offer to buy the Harvard-affiliated hospital. 
McLean was to retain its Harvard affiliation. However, if the deal were 
approved, it would become a for-profit subsidiary of HCA. Trustees of 
the Massachusetts General Hospital, McLean's corporate parent, viewed 
the offer favorably. 
Many Harvard faculty, at McLean and elsewhere, were astonished 
and outraged. 2 In the ensuing weeks, leading faculty opponents publicly 
cast the proposed involvement with the for-profit sector as an intolerable 
compromise of traditional academic and clinical "values."3 Behind the 
scenes, a group of part-time clinical faculty organized a campaign to pre-
vent the sale by putting legal and other pressure on the trustees. The 
group hired a law firm which discreetly approached the Massachusetts 
State Attorney General with the contention that McLean's 1811 charter 
forbade the transfer, which would accompany the sale, of certain prop-
erty given to McLean in perpetuity.4 The Attorney General privately 
communicated to the trustees her willingness to go into court to block 
the sale-a rare use of her statutory authority to enforce charitable 
trusts. 5 Amidst the vocal faculty opposition and the looming prospect of 
litigation, a committee of senior Harvard Medical School faculty named 
by the school's Dean recommended that the HCA offer be rejected. 6 The 
1. Telephone Interview with Francis deMameffe, M.D., General Director of McLean Hospi-
tal (Nov. 1985). 
2. Barbara J. Culliton, University Hospitals for Sale, 223 SCIENCE 909 (1984); Telephone 
Interviews, on condition of anonymity, with McLean officials (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter Anonymous 
Interviews]. 
3. Culliton, supra note 2. 
4. Anonymous Interviews, supra note 2. These sources said they were not familiar with the 
legal details of the clinical faculty group's argument. I was unable to reach the group's leader for 
comment; nor was I able to learn the identity of the law firm. 
5. /d.; see also infra text accompanying notes 449-462 (discussing the enforcement by state 
attorneys general of restrictions on charitable gifts). 
6. Final Report of the Faculty Advisory Committee on McLean Hospital (Nov. 1, 1983) 
(unpublished report, on file in the Office of the Dean of the Harvard Medical School) [hereinafter 
Faculty Advisory Committee Report]. 
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Massachusetts General Hospital trustees then announced they would not 
pursue the matter further. 7 
The deal with HCA was dead. 8 Yet in urging rejection, the faculty 
panel had given the proposal a remarkably favorable review. In language 
curiously at odds with its negative verdict, the panel's report character-
ized the plan as an imaginative solution to McLean's long-term needs for 
stable income, capital, and administrative expertise. 9 
Managers at major teaching hospitals across the nation watched the 
confrontation in Boston with intense interest. Squeezed between stingier 
third-party reimbursement policies, mounting market pressures, and a 
new austerity in federal support, academic medical centers in the 1980s 
faced a frustrating struggle to meet growing capital and income needs. 10 
The new wealth of the several huge, investor-owned health care corpora-
tions that emerged from intensive merger and acquisition activity during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s11 offered tempting possibilities. 
7. Letter from Francis Burr, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, to Daniel Tosteson, M.D., 
Dean of the Harvard Medical School (Nov. 1, 1983) (on file at the Office of the Dean of the Harvard 
Medical School) [hereinafter Burr Letter]. According to one senior McLean official, fear of adverse 
publicity from litigation over the 1811 charter was decisive for the trustees and the faculty commit-
tee. Anonymous Interviews, supra note 2. But Burr, the trustees' Chairman, and Francis 
deMarneffe, M.D., McLean's General Director, insisted that the faculty opposition itself, not fear of 
a lawsuit by the Attorney General, was the primary factor. Telephone Interview with Francis Burr 
(June 1986); Telephone Interview with Francis deMarneffe, M.D., supra note 1. 
8. The Faculty Advisory Committee also considered a long-term lease in lieu of a sale to 
HCA but rejected this option because it would still involve the operation of McLean on a for-profit 
basis. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, at 14. 
9. Id. This language presaged a less adventuresome step-McLean's entry into a joint ven-
ture with another investor-owned hospital chain, American Medical International (AMI), shortly 
after the HCA deal's demise. McLean and AMI became partners in a new, not-for-profit firm that 
markets mental health services--e.g., substance abuse programs and contract management of psy-
chiatric facilities-to employers and health care providers nationwide. The venture permitted 
McLean to maintain its not-for-profit status while tapping the financial and marketing resources of 
an investor-owned chain. The financial benefits for McLean were not nearly as great as those prom-
ised by the HCA deal, but the plan was more acceptable to McLean's constituencies. Judith Feder & 
Jack Hadley, A Threat or a Promise: Acquisition of Teaching Hospitals by Investor-Owned Chains, 12 
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 325, 338-39 (1987). 
10. See, e.g., David E. Rogers & Robert J. B1endon, The Academic Medical Center Today, 100 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 751 (1984). 
11. See Bradford H. Gray, Overview: Origins and Trends, 61 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 7, 9-17 
(1985) (Keynote Address to 1984 Annual Health Conference on The New Entrepreneurialism in 
Health Care, sponsored by the Committee on Medicine in Society of the New York Academy of 
Medicine). The industry's "big four'' were the Hospital Corporation of America, Humana Inc., 
National Medical Enterprises Inc., and American Medical International Inc. By 1985, the four 
owned more than 750 hospitals in the United States, about eleven percent of the national total. 
Including the nearly 300 additional facilities under management contract, the chains controlled 
about fifteen percent of the nation's hospitals. They achieved their remarkable growth largely 
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Those who feared that by succumbing to this temptation, academic 
centers would sacrifice the ideals of service and scholarship to the profit 
motive were relieved by the McLean deal's collapse. "I was very proud 
of this university," said Arnold Reiman, editor of the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine and a professor of medicine at Harvard. 12 But a year 
later, in November 1984, the first purchase of a university's primary 
teaching hospital by an investor-owned chain was finalized. American 
Medical International Inc. (AMI) paid $99.3 million for Omaha, 
Nebraska's Saint Joseph Hospital, the main teaching facility for the 
Creighton University School of Medicine. 13 
A national association of Catholic hospitals threatened to expel 
Saint Joseph. 14 Some members of the Association of American Medical 
Colleges' Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH) urged that investor-
owned institutions be barred from membership. Yet by mid-1985, inves-
tor-owned chains had become owners of three more academic medical 
centers. 15 Another center had entered a long-term leasing agreement 
with a chain-Humana Inc.-and two medical schools had begun joint 
ventures with HCA to build and operate new teaching hospitals. 16 Ten 
academic centers had signed management contracts with HCA, 17 a step 
that for community hospitals has frequently preceded an outright 
purchase or leasing arrangement. 
At meetings of academic medical leaders around the nation, rumors 
of impending deals circulated. Universities that owned teaching hospi-
tals worried that fiscal troubles at these facilities could become a severe 
through the acquisition of freestanding proprietary (for-profit) hospitals and smaller proprietary 
chains in the South and West. 
12. Culliton, supra note 2, at 911. 
13. Jean Evangelauf, Many Universities Are Weighing Sale of Their Hospitals, CHRON. HIGHER 
Eouc., Feb. 6, 1985, at 1, 20. 
14. Linda Punch, Catholic Providers Undaunted in Wake of Saint Joseph Sale, Moo. HEALTH-
CARE, Nov. 15, 1984, at 69 (Angry officials of the Catholic Health Association (CHA), representing 
628 hospitals and 282long-term care facilities, warn that the Saint Joseph sale jeopardized its CHA 
membership.). CHA president John Curley Jr. declared that a hospital run "primarily for a profit 
motive is contrary to the basic values that have been a part of the Catholic healthcare tradition." !d. 
15. They were (1) the Wesley Medical Center (affiliated with the University of Kansas School 
of Medicine; purchased by HCA); (2) the West Florida Hospital Regional Medical Center (affiliated 
with the University of Florida College of Medicine; purchased by HCA); and (3) the University of 
Southern California Hospital (affiliated with that university's School of Medicine; purchased by 
National Medical Enterprises, Inc.). Marsha F. Goldsmith, Investor-Related Academic Health 
Center: "An Uncertain Courtship?", 253 JAMA 3049, 3051 (1985) (defining an "academic medical 
center'' as "a teaching hospital with medical students and resident physicians, closely related to a 
school of medicine, where research programs are carried on"). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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drain on other academic programs. 18 Religious orders and other 
independent, not-for-profit owners of university-linked hospitals won-
dered whether they could better perform their missions by selling finan-
cially risky hospital operations, and then using the proceeds to create 
foundations for the support of medical education and research, indigent 
care, and other health-related services.19 Managers of financially trou-
bled academic centers that were engaged in talks with for-profit chains 
bristled at claims by Reiman and others that they were flirting with a 
sell-out of fundamental values.20 
At least in the short run, the hopes and fears inspired by the inves-
tor-owned chains proved overblown. In the late 1980s, aggressive public 
and private sector medical cost containment efforts forced the chains into 
a retrenchment mode. The chains proved poorly prepared to cope with 
tighter restraints on Medicare's payments to hospitals, aggressive audit-
ing of clinical care by private insurers, and declining inpatient utilization. 
The industry had anticipated these pressures and fashioned a strategic 
response. In the mid-1980s the three largest for-profit chains developed 
integrated health insurance and service plans in an effort to expand their 
shares of the hospital services market.21 However, this vertical integra-
tion strategy met fierce competition from established insurers, health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), and other prepaid health plans. 
Heavy insurance losses, combined with declining hospital utilization 
rates and increasingly parsimonious reimbursement from third-party 
payers, forced firm managers to abandon their expansionary aspirations 
for the time being.22 
18. Evangelauf, supra note 13, at 20. 
19. Montague Brown & Barbara McCool, Boards Consider Several Factors in Trading Hospital 
for Foundation, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 18, 1985, at 40; Mark Tatge, More Not-for-Profits Mull 
Sellouts to Form 'New Breed' of Foundation, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 18, 1985, at 40. 
20. Defending his institution's willingness to consider selling its hospital to AMI, Ronald P. 
Kaufman, M.D., vice president for medical affairs at George Washington University, characterized 
the attitude of Reiman and other critics as contempt by the "haves" for the struggles of the "have 
nots." "We were not surprised but somewhat disappointed when the editor of the New England 
Journal was quoted as stating 'I look askance at the alliance being proposed at George Washington 
University.' • . . For a profession like ours, steeped in the tradition of inquiry and the scientific 
method, to label any carefully constructed exploration as 'a bad idea' seems, at least to me, to be a 
contradiction of our basic philosophy of enlightened investigation." Kaufman, Remarks to the 
Council of Teaching Hospitals' Annual Meeting (May 18, 1984) (unpublished text on file in the office 
of the Vice President for Medical Affairs at George Washington University). 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 192-227. 
22. Judith Nemes, For-Profit Chains Look Beyond the Bottom Line, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 
12, 1990, at 27. 
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The chains lost interest in buying or leasing additional academic 
centers, 23 and growing doubts about corporate balance sheets led some 
medical schools to withdraw from acquisition and leasing negotiations. 24 
Between 1986 and 1990, the for-profit chains signed no new purchase or 
lease agreements involving academic centers. Instead, the chains focused 
on adapting to leaner times. Two of the three largest aborted their insur-
ance ventures and sold off groups of struggling hospitals to employee 
ownership plans. 25 All tightened their management styles, eliminating 
unprofitable beds and developing cost-conscious utilization review pro-
grams. In 1989, the second and fourth largest chains went private, an 
indication that major new acquisitions were not part of their pared-down 
strategic plans. 26 
The industry's retrenchment and restructuring efforts achieved a 
quick reversal of fortunes. By 1990, financial analysts were characteriz-
ing the chains' adjustments as an impressive success.27 Four of the five 
largest chains reported hefty increases in profits in 1989.28 The industry 
leader, Humana, Inc., which alone stood by its insurance venture despite 
heavy losses, turned the corner to insurance profitability in 1989.29 The 
firm began a new round of hospital and HMO acquisitions with an eye 
toward marketing vertically integrated insurance and health services 
23. Telephone Interview with Michael Bromberg, Executive Director of the Federation of 
American Health Systems (the investor-owned hospital chains' trade association) (Oct. 1990) [here-
inafter Bromberg Interview]; see, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, GWU Hospital Ends Leasing Talks, 
WASH. PoST, Oct. 17, 1986, at F1 (American Medical International's mounting financial problems 
and resulting retrenchment led it to break off negotiations with George Washington University over 
a long-term lease of GWU Hospital to AMI). 
24. See, e.g., Howard Waitzkin et a!., Deciding Against Corporate Managemeflt of a State-
Supported Academic Medical Center, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1299, 1302 (1986) (reporting that 
faculty concern about the financial prospects of American Medical International was critical in the 
University of California's decision not to sell the University of California at Irvine Medical Center to 
AMI). 
25. Nemes, supra note 22, at 33-36. HCA was the nation's largest for-profit chain until it spun 
off 104 struggling acute-care hospitals to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), HealthTrust, 
in 1987 (making Humana, Inc. the largest, HCA the second largest, HealthTrust the third, and AMI 
the fourth). AMI, the third biggest before the creation of HealthTrust, sold 36 hospitals to an ESOP 
in 1988. /d. 
26. /d. at 33, 36. Each executed leveraged buyouts, leaving them with high debt-to-equity 
ratios. 
27. /d. 
28. Jay Greene & Judith Nemes, Survey: Multi-Unit Providers: Quality and Productivity Pro-
grams Pay Off for Leaner Systems, Moo. HEALTHCARE, May 21, 1990, at 21. Only AMI, the fourth 
largest, reported 1989 losses. 
29. Stephen Phillips, Humana Regains that Healthy Glow, Bus. WEEK, May 22, 1989, at 127 
(reporting that the insurance division eked out its first operating profit during the quarter ending 
Feb. 28, 1989). 
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packages nationwide. 30 Other major chains planned selective acquisi-
tions in the mental health, substance abuse, and rehabilitative medicine 
fields. 31 A prominent Wall Street analyst predicted a new round of 
acquisitions of nonprofit hospitals, including teaching centers, in the · 
1990s, 32 and an academic observer of the industry characterized the new 
decade as "an era of incredible opportunity" for the investor-owned 
chains.33 
Meanwhile, through the late 1980s the financial strain on America's 
teaching hospitals intensified. Employers, who were anxious about the 
effect of soaring medical costs on their ability to compete, put unprece-
dented pressure on hospitals to hold down expenses. Academic centers, 
which traditionally charged more than nonteaching hospitals in order to 
pay for education, research, and care for the uninsured, felt the squeeze 
most acutely. Under pressure from corporate clients, private insurers 
objected to hospital charges that included subsidies for academic activi-
ties. 34 Moreover, federal subsidies for teaching hospitals under the Medi-
care program were cut in the late 1980s as Congress and the President 
sought to control entitlement programs, which were perceived as respon-
sible for soaring budget deficits. Payments to all hospitals for clinical 
services to the poor under the Medicaid program fell further behind ris-
ing costs, adding to the strain on teaching facilities with high proportions 
of indigent patients. Federal support for university-based biomedical 
research failed to keep pace with inflation. And as deficit-cutting negoti-
ations between Congress and the President approached a climax in the 
fall of 1990, both sides considered unprecedented Medicare cuts that 
were likely to hit academic centers especially hard. 
The financial future of American academic medicine today appears 
bleak. Growing market pressure from private payers and the prospect of 
long-term federal austerity endanger the health of all academic centers35 
30. Michael Stroud, Humana's Rx: Hospitals+ HMOs =Profits, INVESTOR's DAILY, Apr. 
18, 1990, at 1 (describing Humana's plans to offer integrated health plans in at least six new metro-
politan areas over the next five years). 
31. Highlights of the Wall Street Transcript's Health Care Services Industry Roundtable (Mar. 
8, 1989) (interview with Joyce Albers) [hereinafter Highlights of Roundtable]. 
32. Id. 
33. Nemes, supra note 22, at 27 (quoting Robert Taylor, Director of Graduate Studies in 
Health Administration at Duke University). Expansionary thinking at the other major chains has 
thus far been more restrained. Bromberg Interview, supra note 23. 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 114-20. 
35. Even the most wealthy and prestigious academic centers today face growing pressures from 
cost-conscious payers, aggressive non-academic competitors, and federal and state budgetary auster-
ity. See Glen Kramon, Coaxing the Stanford Elephant to Dance: Squeezed From All Sides, a Giant 
Medical Center Learns to Cut Costs and Compete, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1990, § 3, at 1. 
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and the survival of some. Concerned that hospital ownership in this 
grim environment threatens endowments and the future of nonmedical 
programs, some universities are contemplating divestiture of their hospi-
tals. 36 For medical schools and for the worried owners of their affiliated 
hospitals, the financial, ,marketing; and management strength of the for-
profit health services sector is again attractive. In October, 1990, 
Humana announced plans for the first acquisition of a major teaching 
hospital by an investor-owned chain since 1986.37 The extent to which 
teaching centers will seek out the resources of this vast and growing 
industry is uncertain. But in recent decades academic medical leaders 
have displayed a remarkable capacity to tap new funding sources as eco-
nomic circumstances have changed. 38 Some health care industry observ-
ers predict that hard-pressed teaching hospitals will tum to the investor-
owned sector in the 1990s.39 Many of the leaders of American academic 
medicine, however, remain deeply skeptical about inviting for-profit 
firms into the academic setting. 
This Article explores the potential and the dangers of this novel 
form of collaboration between academic medicine and the for-profit 
world. I focus on those arrangements-purchases and leasing agree-
ments-by which investor-owned corporations operate, for a profit, hos-
pitals that serve as major medical teaching and research sites.40 I begin 
by reviewing how the evolving needs of academic medical centers and 
for-profit hospital chains have generated mutual interest in such arrange-
ments. I then consider some frequently expressed ethical, economic, and 
other public policy objections to the provision of hospital services by for-
profit firms. Opponents of the acquisition and leasing of teaching hospi-
tals by for-profit entities have built their cases upon these objections. I 
36. Julie Johnsson, Politics, Power Struggles, a Part of Divestiture Battle for University Hospi-
tals, HOSPITALS, Feb. 20, 1990, at 46. 
37. In the Fall of 1990, Humana announced an agreement to purchase the Michael Reese 
Hospital and its 240,000 member HMO. Milt Freudenheim, Talking Deals: What Humana Likes in 
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1990, at D2. Michael Reese is a major teaching facility for the Univer-
sity of illinois School of Medicine. The purchase was completed in March, 1991, after Humann 
obtained the necessary regulatory approval. Judith Nemes, llumana Completes Michael Reese 
Acquisition, MoDERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 11, 1991, at 30. 
38. See infra text accompanying notes 42-91. 
39. See, e.g., Highlights of Roundtable, supra note 31 (predicting a new round of acquisitions 
of nonprofit hospitals, including teaching centers, by for-profit chains during the next five years). 
40. Management contracts, by which nonprofit hospitals employ, for a fixed fee, investor-
owned companies to provide administrative services will not be a principle focus of this paper. The 
experience of some academic centers with such contracts, however, will be drawn on in assessing the 
potential benefits and hazards of acquisition and leasing arrangements. 
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argue that on close inspection these objections fail and that the underly-
ing concerns they express do not warrant opposition to the operation of 
teaching hospitals by investor-owned firms. Creative institutional design 
can enable parties to reap the benefits of such arrangements while pro-
tecting-even enhancing-academic centers' ability to perform their mis-
sions of teaching, research, and clinical service. 
I also review in brief some potential legal obstacles to sale and leas-
ing agreements and to full realization of their advantages. In contem-
plating such arrangements, academic managers and their for-profit 
counterparts must pay heed to myriad federal and state restrictions. I 
focus in particular on tax considerations and the dilemmas posed by lim-
its on the use of charitable gifts. With a few possible exceptions, no legal 
problem poses an insurmountable barrier to the execution of a sale or 
lease agreement. Nevertheless, judicious institutional design, sensitive 
and well-planned approaches to regulatory authorities, and even litiga-
tion may be necessary in some cases to effect an arrangement and maxi-
mize its benefits. 
I conclude with some recommendations about (1) the process by 
which an academic medical center should decide whether to enter sale or 
lease negotiations with a for-profit firm, and (2) the contract terms a 
medical school and other involved nonprofit parties should insist upon or 
at least press for in negotiations. The decision process, I argue, should be 
public and should involve representatives of an academic medical 
center's diverse constituencies at an early stage. A public process, open 
to input from many sources, will not only enhance the quality of deci-
sions by increasing decision makers' knowledge of their constituencies' 
problems and preferences; it will also build understanding and support 
by imbuing participants in the process with a sense of shared dilemmas 
and accomplishment. Contractual language, I urge, should specify the 
for-profit firm's financial obligations and establish systems of joint gov-
ernance designed to preserve academic authority over education and 
research. Contract terms should also provide for academic control (or at 
least veto power) over new corporate ventures involving the hospital. 
Finally, contracts should specify procedures for settling disputes between 
the owner or lessor and involved nonprofit parties, and should include 
buy-back or lease cancellation options. 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPING FINANCIAL 
SQUEEZE ON ACADEMIC MEDICAL CENTERS 
The mounting woes of teaching hospitals cannot be seen apart from 
the economic and political forces that are radically altering the structure 
of medical care delivery. For thirty years after World War II, America's 
great academic medical centers expanded unceasingly, thriving on an 
astonishing rise in federal support and on generous third-party payment 
for clinical services. But over the next decade the attitudes and policies 
that had fueled this extraordinary expansion underwent basic changes 
that cast doubt on the dependability of federal and private third-party 
payer support for maintenance, let alone continued growth. 
A. THE YEARS OF FEDERAL LARGESS 
At the end of World War II, private, for-profit enterprises-the 
drug companies-were the dominant institutional actors in medical 
research. They spent an estimated $40 million in 1945 on largely applied 
research at their own facilities.41 Private foundations, institutes, and a 
few elite universities funded other applied work and virtually all Ameri-
can basic biomedical research. In 1945, total support from these sources 
was an estimated $25 million.42 In that year, the National Institute of 
Health (NIH), the chief research arm of the Federal Public Health Ser-
vice, spent only $180,000.43 Students' tuition paid the cost of medical 
education, with occasional help from philanthropic sources. The typical 
clinical department was fortunate to have a single full-time faculty mem-
ber; private practitioners did most of the teaching, in return for the pres-
tige of a medical school affiliation. 
Yet President Roosevelt's unpreced~nted wartime program of feder-
ally sponsored science suggested a new model for the support of civilian 
medical research. The Committee on Medical Research (CMR) of 
Roosevelt's Office of Scientific Research and Development spent $15 mil-
lion during the war years on a crash program that yielded lifesaving 
41. RICHARD H. SHRYOCK, AMERICAN MEDICAL REsEARCH 135-36 (1947). 
42. /d. Several additional sources provided a smaller amount of private support. These 
included professional societies (e.g., the American Medical Association), nonprofit groups interested 
in single diseases (e.g. the National Tuberculosis Association), group medical practices (e.g., the 
Mayo Clinic), and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMA· 
TION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 339 (1982). 
43. STEPHEN R. STRICKLAND, POLITICS, SCIENCE, AND DREAD DISEASE: A SHORT HISTORY 
OF UNITED STATES MEDICAL RESEARCH POLICY 29 (1972). 
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advances against infectious disease and trauma.44 The CMR program 
supported privately employed scientists at independent laboratories, and 
it featured minimal federal control once money was awarded.45 The 
urgent necessities of combat overcame the medical establishment's fierce 
prewar resistance to federal financing of research,46 and the scientific tri-
umphs bought with CMR dollars motivated Congress to expand its sup-
port for medical research in peacetime. 
1. NIH Grants and Covert Cross-Subsidization 
At the war's end, CMR-sponsored work was placed under the aegis 
of the NIH. By 1947, NIH research spending had risen to $4 million.47 
Catalyzed by a savvy lay lobby, a triangular alliance of cooperative 
agency officials, prominent scientists, and well-placed congressional allies 
won an astonishing series of annual NIH spending increases.48 By 1950, 
the agency's budget had soared to $46.3 million.49 To the consternation 
44. These included the first method for the mass production of penicillin, the isolation of 
gamma globulin and other therapeutically useful derivatives from whole blood, and (after Japanese 
military advances had cut off the supply of quinine) the synthesis of an antimalarial agent, atabrine, 
more efficacious than quinine. Between the two World Wars the U.S. Army's incidence of deaths 
from disease dropped from 14.1 to 0.6 per 1000 soldiers. STARR, supra note 42, at 336, 340-41. 
45. !d. at 341. 
46. See, e.g., Editorial, The American Foundation Proposals for Medical Care, 109 JAMA 1280 
(1937) (The American Medical Association demanded "prompt disclaimers" from "the unthinking 
physicians" who endorsed a proposal for public financing of medical research, education, and care 
for the indigent.). 
47. STRICKLAND, supra note 43, at 29. 
48. The lobbying efforts of Mary Lasker, a wealthy and well-connected pioneer in the adapta-
tion of mass-marketing techniques to private fundraising for medical research, played the key role in 
forging this classic Washington, D.C. power triangle. With Florence Mahoney, whose influential 
husband owned the Cox chain of newspapers, Lasker artfully cultivated key members of congres-
sional appropriations committees, reminding them of the public's admiration for medical research. 
Working closely with a cadre of prominent physician-scientists skilled in public relations (cynics 
dubbed them "Mary and her little lambs"), she coaxed reluctant academics to "think big" when 
asked to advise appropriations committees. See RUFUS E. MILES, JR., THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (1974); STRICKLAND, supra note 43, at 32-54. 
NIH officials tacitly played along. Each year the agency's senior administrators prepared 
budget proposals that then moved upward through the Executive Branch bureaucracy. Typically, 
the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) made initial cuts; the 
Bureau of the Budget then imposed more. Congressional appropriations panels proclaimed their 
indignation and invited NIH officials to tell them how much more might fruitfully be spent. Agency 
administrators cooperated in the ritual, providing testimony which became the basis for hefty con-
gressional increases. NATALIE D. SPINGARN, HEARTBEAT: THE POLmCS OF HEALTH REsEARCH 
27-28 (1976). The agency's "budget-busting" behavior infuriated DHEW and budget bureau offi-
cials. But the politically sacrosanct status of health research enabled NIH to serve its growing con-
stituency of researchers and lay backers without retaliation from successive Democratic and 
Republican Administrations. 
49. STARR, supra note 42, at 343. 
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of many scientists, this potent alliance exploited lay concern with partic-
ular diseases, pressing successfully for the creation of research institutes 
organized by disease category instead of scientific discipline. Some 
charged that the burgeoning research program was being shaped more by 
political opportunism than by scientific opportunity,50 but the flood of 
federal dollars submerged such considerations. Writers of NIH grant 
proposals learned to couch their ideas in language that accented potential 
clinical results. The NIH budget rose to $81 million by 1955 and to $400 
million by 1960.51 Federal dollars poured outward from NIH institutes 
to the nation's academic medical centers, fueling an unprecedented 
expansion. 
Direct federal support for medical education was blocked in the 
1950s by the American Medical Association (AMA).52 But generous 
NIH grants, ostensibly limited to the support of research and research 
training, paid the salaries of new faculty who taught medical students, 
trained residents, and cared for patients. NIH money was also channeled 
to support medical school graduates-clinical fellows-who did some 
research while in training for lucrative clinical specialties. Academic 
administrators rationalized this cross-subsidization by arguing that one 
could not become a competent clinical inveStigator without also seeing 
patients and doing some teaching. 53 Such cross-subsidization, as Arnold 
Reiman admitted, "was not intended by Congress, nor was it often 
admitted in public, but deans and department chairmen knew what they 
were doing . . . . [I]f you wanted to build a department, it was the NIH 
or nothing."54 Thus NIH dollars, managed cleverly by academic entre-
preneurs, supported the rapid evolution of academic medical centers into 
"sprawling, complex organizations." Between 1950 and 1960, total full-
time faculty positions almost tripled nationwide, from 4,212 to 11,319.55 
By fiscal year 1965-1966, fifty-three percent of all medical school revenue 
50. Complaints about the politicization of the NIH research agenda by "disease of the month 
club" pleaders have been a recurrent theme. SPINGARN, supra note 48, at 69-91 (discussing tension 
between lay focus on particular diseases and researchers' belief that resources are most efficiently 
used when directed toward fields with the greatest "scie~tific opportunity"). 
51. STARR, supra note 42, at 347 (citing CoNGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESS 
AND THE NATION, 1945-64: A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR YEARS 
1132 (1965)). 
52. STRICKLAND, supra note 43, at 55-74 (describing the AMA lobby's successful opposition to 
initiatives in Congress aimed at increasing the number of medical school places via direct "capita-
tion" grants to medical schools and scholarships for students). 
53. Arnold S. Reiman, Who Will Pay for Medical Education in Our Teaching Hospitals?, 226 
SCIENCE 20 (1984). 
54. /d. 
55. STARR, supra note 42, at 352. 
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came from the federal government, largely through research grants and 
contracts. 56 At some teaching centers, moreover, this support was sup-
plemented during the 1950s and 1960s by direct federal subsidies for hos-
pital construction. 57 
2. Medicare and Medicaid 
Congressional passage in 1965 of the Medicare and Medicaid insur-
ance programs for the elderly, disabled, and indigent opened another 
large-bore infusion line of federal dollars to academic medical centers. In 
an effort to accommodate the hospital industry, legislators and the John-
son administration agreed to a system of Medicare payment for inpatient 
services based on each hospital's costs. Rules for calculating costs 
allowed hospitals to charge, at an accelerated rate, for depreciation on 
their capital assets, including those paid for with philanthropic contribu-
tions and federal construction subsidies. Thus, the Medicare billing 
mechanism offered hospitals an unrestricted new source of capital. 58 
Moreover, Medicare permitted hospitals to name "fiscal 
intermediaries"-usually private insurance carriers-to administer and 
audit billings. Thus, billing and auditing were performed by private enti-
ties that sympathized with hospital interests and lacked any incentive to 
seriously scrutinize hospitals' claimed costs. 
Similarly, Medicare reimbursement for doctors' services was admin-
istered by private insurers, appointed by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (DREW), who lacked any incentive to monitor and 
control costs. 59 Medicare's vague payment standard-reimbursement 
for "customary" and "prevailing" or "reasonable" fees-invited physi-
cians to push fees upward to new "customary" levels. When some did 
so, the administering insurers went along.60 Under this vague standard, 
highly technical procedures became especially lucrative. Fees were set 
56. Reiman, supra note 53, at 20. 
57. Under the Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-
725, 60 Stat. 1040, the federal government disbursed $3.7 billion between 1947 and 1971 to support 
construction of health care facilities. More than three-fourths of this money went to hospitals 
(including some teaching centers), allocated according to a formula based on state populations and 
per capita income. STARR, supra note 42, at 348-50. Hill-Burton was phased out in the early 1970s. 
I d. 
58. Id. at 375. Reimbursement for depreciation made the capital subsidy largest for the new-
est, most costly facilities, thereby creating an incentive for construction out of proportion to market-
determined need for hospital beds. Id. 
59. Id. DHEW generally appointed regional Blue Shield plans, doctor-sponsored systems 
established a few decades earlier to protect physicians from lay-controlled insurers and pre-payment 
plans. Id. at 306-10. 
60. Id. at 385. 
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for many procedures at their moment of introduction, while they were 
relatively complicated and time-consuming for attending physicians. 
Although practitioners typically simplified new procedures over time and 
delegated routine technical details to low-paid house staff and 
paraprofessionals, they maintained or even raised the "customary" 
attending physician fees. 61 
Federal aid to the states for care of the indigent under Medicaid was 
accompanied by stringent eligibility criteria that left many poor people in 
a purgatory between Medicaid and private or Medicare coverage. 62 But 
Medicaid dollars were a windfall for hospitals burdened by bad debt 
from indigent care. 
B. PERMISSIVE THIRD-PARTY PAYMENT AND CREATIVE CLINICAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
1. Rapid Growth and Mounting Dependency 
Academic medical centers moved quickly to tap the vast potential of 
the new federal programs and to take advantage of a parallel rise in pri-
vate coverage offered by employers. Entrepreneurial academic adminis-
trators and clinicians set up faculty practice plans that won new cadres of 
patients and a new pool of potential hospital admissions. Operating in an 
environment free from meaningful cost control, academic centers set 
prices for outpatient and hospital care high enough to provide large 
cross-subsidies for clinical research, education, and-in many cases-
inefficient bureaucracy. Usually, these prices were much greater than 
those of non-academic competitors. As Reiman acknowledges, the fed-
eral government and private insurers 
had not explicitly agreed to support education and research in the 
teaching hospitals. . . . [W]e privately justified our higher hospital 
charges by the quality of the tertiary care given ... and by our convic-
tion that the teaching hospitals were an essential national resource ... , 
[but] we never argued this publicly and therefore never had the explicit 
agreement of the payers or the public. 63 
The new clinical entrepreneurship met with spectacular success just 
as growth in NIH allocations began to slow. Between 1965 and 1982, 
total patient care income at American medical schools jumped from $49 
61. Id. at 386 (citing coronary bypass surgery as a glaring example). 
62. Id. at 374. 
63. Reiman, supra note 53, at 21. 
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million to $2.14 billion,64 a forty-four-fold increase. This represented a 
rise from 5.6 percent of all medical school income to thirty percent. 
Meanwhile, the percentage of total income derived from federal pro-
grams (largely research grants and contracts) other than Medicare and 
Medicaid dropped from fifty-three to twenty-eight. 65 Medical schools 
assembled large faculties in the clinical specialties66-especially those 
specialties that performed lucrative technical procedures and were 
responsible for high volumes of hospital admissions. These faculty mem-
bers were expected to generate the income necessary to support their own 
salaries, benefits, and clinical research programs. 67 Academic centers 
responded to their environment's economic incentives as any frankly 
profit-seeking enterprise might, and grew explosively.68 As they 
expanded, they became more and more vitally dependent on a continua-
tion of the federal and private third-party payer largess that had powered 
their remarkable growth. 
The extraordinary national commitment to medical care rested on 
Americans' rarely challenged faith that technological medicine was the 
surest means of pursuing health. Through the 1950s a series of advances 
in highly effective, relatively low-cost technologies, especially drug thera-
pies and vaccination, 69 lent support to this faith. Well into the next dec-
ade, health policy debate focused almost exclusively on questions of 
64. !d. (citing figures (not adjusted for inflation) supplied by the Association of American 
Medical Colleges). 
65. Id. This drop masks a more-than-four-fold rise in this category of federal support, from 
$465 million to $2.0 billion (calculated from the cited figures). 
66. Between 1960 and 1977, the number of full-time medical school faculty in the United 
States rose nearly four-fold, to 44,762. Most of this rise occurred in the clinical specialties. Lu ANN 
ADAY ET AL., HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: EQUITABLE FOR WHOM? (1980). 
67. Leighton E. Cluff, Economic Incentives of Faculty Practice: Are They Distorting the Medical 
School's Mission?, 250 JAMA 2931 (1983). 
68. For example, in the 1960s leaders in the emerging field of community medicine urged the 
creation of neighborhood centers to provide comprehensive, prevention-oriented ambulatory health 
care and education in low-income areas. During the late 1960s Congtess allocated funds to DHEW 
and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) for the development of demonstration centers. 
Faculty at many medical schools helped to organize and staff these centers, which often went beyond 
the bounds of reactive, treatment-oriented medical care. In the early 1970s, when federal dollars for 
the centers dried up, the medical schools' commitment to the centers cooled. In the face of evidence 
that the centers' preventive and educational efforts improved community health and cut hospital use, 
KAREN DAVIS & CATHY SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 173-200 (1978), academic 
medical centers put their indigent care efforts into more traditional services, such as hospital-based 
outpatient clinics and high-technology inpatient care, which was paid for by Medicaid. See STARR, 
supra note 42, at 370-72. 
69. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, EcONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 
16 (1974). 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1052 1991-1992
1052 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1035 
access and distribution of medical care; 70 its value was presumed. In the 
late 1960s, however, this consensus began to unravel. 
2. The Rise of Cost-Consciousness 
Within a few years of the start-up of Medicare and Medicaid, a new 
medical care cost explosion captured public attention. Per capita medi-
cal costs, up thirty-nine percent from 1960 to 1965, rose seventy percent 
during the next five years, with hospital costs leading the way. Between 
1965 and 1970, federal and state health expenditures almost tripled, 
jumping from $10.8 billion to $27.8 billion.71 Economists and others 
debated the relative significance of several factors-liberal third-party 
payment (mostly by the federal govemment72), technological advances, 
and higher wages won by restive labor unions representing hospital sup-
port staff. By 1970 total medical care expenditures had risen to 7.3 per-
cent of the gross national product, up from 4.5 percent in 1950/3 and 
politicians and the press spoke of a health care "crisis."74 
The rhetoric of "crisis" invited newly intense scrutiny into whether 
medical care dollars were buying health. Under close examination medi-
cal practice fared poorly. A series of studies by economists and health 
service researchers suggested that wide differences in physicians' use of 
surgery, drugs, and hospitalization for many ailments had little impact 
upon health outcomes. 75 The use of many costly diagnostic and thera-
peutic modalities correlated more closely with the availability of third-
party payment and technology-oriented specialists. 76 Differences in mor-
bidity between subpopulations in the United States seemed more closely 
linked to environmental, genetic, and behavioral factors than to medical 
care.77 
70. STARR, supra note 42, at 335-78. 
71. See id. at 384 (reporting that per capita expenditures rose from $142 in 1960 to $198 in 
1965, then to $336 in 1970). 
72. FucHs, supra note 69, at 81. 
73. STARR, supra note 42, at 335. 
74. /d. at 381. 
75. See FUCHS, supra note 69, at 56-60. 
76. Economist Martin Feldstein estimated in 1971 that each additional specialist induced 
$39,000 more in hospital expenditures per year, without proven health benefit, than would an addi-
tional general practitioner. Martin S. Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price 
Dynamics, 61 AM. EcoN. REv. 853, 871 (1971). 
77. FUCHS, supra note 69, at 6. For example, interstate variations in infant mortality rates did 
not correlate significantly with the number of physicians per capita after differences in income, 
schooling, and other environmental variables were accounted for. /d. at 36-37 (citing VICTOR R. 
FUCHS & MARCIA J. KRAMER, DETERMINANTS OF EXPENDITURES FOR PHYSICIANS' SERVICES IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1948-68 (1972)). In contrast, infant mortality correlated strongly with race 
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The evidence supported many health economists' developing belief 
that the medical care cost explosion was a demand-side phenomenon-
the product of (1) an open-ended third-party payment system and (2) the 
willingness of physicians-as patients' purchasing agents 78-to spend 
insurers' dollars without regard for whether the spending contributed 
demonstrably to patients' well-being. 79 Martin Feldstein and others 
noted that the hospital industry, though largely nonprofit in form, 
reacted like a group of classic, income-maximizing firms, increasing price 
and supply in response to greater demand. 80 
3. Regulatory Failure and the Preservation of Cross-Subsidies 
Concern about escalating costs and uncertain benefits kept cost con-
trol near the top of the national health policy agenda through the 1970s. 
Though most economic analyses identified demand as the engine driving 
the system, a series of state and federal regulatory initiatives primarily 
attempted to control price and supply. Many state legislatures enacted 
rate regulation and certificate-of-need programs that required hospitals 
to obtain the approval of state administrative agencies before raising 
charges or making major capital investments.81 From August 1971 
through Aprill974 the Nixon administration's wage-price controls held 
medical inflation to an annual rate below that for the rest of the service 
(the black rate was almost twice the white rate), schooling, and income (though above a threshold 
income level, thought to assure adequate nutrition, shelter, and sanitation, there seemed to be no 
further decline in mortality). Id. at 34-36. 
78. The peculiar role of physicians in the health care economy has both demand and supply 
side aspects. As patients' purchasing agents, doctors create demand, yet they also supply some of 
the services they "purchase." Their incentives as suppliers-e.g., fees, gratification from patients' 
trust and reliance, and learned ideals of good "workmanship," FucHS, supra note 69, at ~may 
influence their decisions as purchasing agents. Herein may lie a source of the controversy over 
whether medical inflation is driven by demand or supply. While demand-oriented explanations 
focus on the doctor's role as a purchasing agent with broad discretion, id. at 57-60, supply-oriented 
theories tend to conceive of the clinician as provider of technically indicated services (rather rigidly 
determined by scientific principles of practice) in response to patients' needs. 
79. Some physicians bristle at this interpretation, perceiving in it a charge of self-aggrandize-
ment at the patient's expense. This interpretation, of course, need not imply anything so nasty. The 
classic Hippocratic ethic of undivided commitment to the individual patient prescribes, when third 
party payment protects the patient from the costs of his individual care, a clinical policy of doing all 
that might conceivably help, without regard for the scarcity of social resources. 
80. See, e.g., Feldstein, supra note 76, at 853-54 (concluding that "despite the nonprofit nature 
of the hospital industry, hospital cost inflation can be explained by a model of dynamic price adjust-
ment to excess demand," and explaining the components of inflation-e.g., higher wages and more 
costly technology-as consequences of the increased demand generated by insurance and technol-
ogy-oriented specialists). 
81. STARR, supra note 42, at 398-99. 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1054 1991-1992
1054 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1035 
economy.82 In 1972 Congress allowed DHEW, when calculating cost-
based reimbursement rates for hospitals and nursing homes under Medi-
care, to ignore capital investments not approved by state planning agen-
cies. 83 In the same legislation, Congress empowered DHEW to contract 
with panels of physicians-termed "Professional Standard Review Orga-
nizations" (PSROs)-which were to screen inpatient clinical records 
with an eye to denying Medicare reimbursement for unneeded services. 84 
The most ambitious federal regulatory initiative-the National Health 
Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974--called for a nation-
wide web of state and federal planning agencies that were to limit and 
coordinate capital spending by health care institutions. 85 
Perhaps regulation could have worked had legislation been crafted 
with sufficient force and clarity to actually restrain supply and price. But 
the reform initiatives of the 1970s were adulterated products, under-
mined by the many compromises necessary to placate entrenched inter-
ests. 86 Facing physician resistance, Congress limited PSRO review of 
·Medicare billing to inpatient care and barred consumers and non-M.D. 
health professionals from becoming PSRO reviewers. 87 Under pressure 
from hospitals as well as doctors, the Congress that enacted the National 
Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974 did not 
empower the Act's planning agencies to set rates, shut down existing care 
82. /d. at 399, 406. Health services inflation averaged 4.9 percent during this period, com-
pared with 5.2 percent for all other services. But after controls were lifted, the medical inflation rate 
rebounded to its more characteristic three point margin over the rates for other services and for the 
overall economy. /d. at 406. 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1988). 
84. 42 u.s.c. § 1395y(g) (1988). 
85. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3799 (1987). 
The Act required states to enact certificate-of-need legislation and to establish "Health Planning and 
Development Agencies" and "Statewide Health Coordinating Councils." It also created within 
DHEW a new "Bureau of Health Planning and Development" and a "National Health Planning 
Advisory Council." A network of two hundered regional "Health Systems Agencies (HSAs), feder-
ally funded and directed by boards composed mostly of consumers, was to review all proposed capi-
tal spending by institutions and to develop three-year "Health System Plans." The HSAs, which 
themselves lacked authority to block capital expenditures, were to submit their recommendations to 
state and federal planning agencies. See STARR, supra note 42, at 401-02. 
86. See Robert R. Alford, The Political Economy of Health Care: Dynamics Without Change, 2 
PoL. & Soc'y 127 (1982) (arguing that health care institutions are so "enormously resistant to 
change" that reform proposals cannot succeed politically without compromise that "successfully 
shields the funding, powers, and resources of the producing institutions from any basic structural 
change"). 
87. Earlier versions had called for consumer and non-M.D. professional membership on review 
teams as well as inclusion of outpatient care within the scope of review. STARR, supra note 42, at 
399-400. 
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facilities deemed unnecessary, or effectively control new capital spend-
ing.88 DHEW's development of proposed PSRO review regulations, 
which took two years, spawned a reprise round of paralytic litigation. 89 
Meanwhile, as Medicare and other permissive insurance schemes fed the 
system, medical expenditures more than tripled in the 1970s, climbing to 
9.4 percent of the GNP by 1980.90 
Thus, despite a series of regulatory initiatives, academic medical 
centers were able in the 1970s to continue setting prices high enough to 
provide large cross-subsidies for research and education. As the NIH 
budget leveled off, teaching centers became increasingly dependent on 
vast clinical care enterprises to support academic activities. 
C. THE MARKET REACTS: FROM ABUNDANCE TO CRISIS 
In the 1980s, however, economic forces unleashed by the medical 
system's unrestrained growth increasingly endangered this support. The 
new threat developed along several lines, on both the supply and demand 
sides of the medical economy. 
1. New Tertiary Care Competitors 
First, by permitting the proliferation of subspecialty training pro-
grams during the 1960s and 1970s, the academic centers gradually 
undermined. their own role as clinical meccas-regional referral centers 
for patients with particularly complex or severe problems. Graduates of 
these subspecialty programs diffused into surrounding communities. 
They easily persuaded community hospital boards to invest in the tech-
nology necessary to provide lucrative tertiary care services. Increasingly, 
community hospitals and their developing networks of highly skilled sub-
specialists became the great academic centers' competitors.91 
2. Private Action to Contain Costs 
Meanwhile, on the demand side, an aroused private sector emerged 
in the 1980s as a potent countervailing power to the suppliers of medical 
care. Through the regulatory battles of the 1970s the large employers, 
labor unions, and insurers that paid the bills remained relatively passive 
88. See id. at 401-02. 
89. Id. at 406-07. 
90. OFFICE OF RESEARCH STATISTICS & TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, HEALTH: UNITED STATES, 263 (1981). 
91. Leighton E. Cluff, Medical Schools, Clinical Faculty, and Community Physicians, 247 
JAMA 200 (1982). 
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while providers wielded their clout to thwart government control. But as 
medical costs escalated unremittingly and American businesses faced 
mounting competitive pressures, corporate cost cutters became newly 
attentive to their health care bills.92 Giant employers, sometimes work-
ing in concert with union leaders, began to use their economic power to 
negotiate less permissive arrangements with medical care providers.93 
Insurers scrutinized cost- and charge-based reimbursement claims more 
clos~ly, aware that automatic pass-through of costs to health plan buyers 
undermined the competitiveness of insurance plans. In short, America's 
large private purchaser~ of medical care began to impose their restraining 
will upon the doctor-patient alliance that had once been the exclusive 
arbiter of demand. 
3. Prepaid Health Plans and Prospective Hospital Reimbursement 
A new entrepreneurship in health care responded creatively to the 
emerging private sector demand for spending restraint. Insurance com-
panies, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), groups of physicians, 
and consortiums of hospitals developed myriad financing schemes that 
had in common the concept of a prepaid annual allocation for compre-
hensive clinical services. 94 These prepaid plans95 vied with each other for 
contracts with large employers, offering bulk discounts in an effort to fill 
92. See, e.g., Harry B. Wolfe et al., Health Care Cost Containment: Challenge to Industry 
(1980) (unpublished monograph prepared by the management consulting firm of Arthur D. Little, 
urging executives to redesign employee benefits packages, develop self-insurance and prepaid health 
services plans, upgrade information systems, and exercise their influence with hospital boards and 
government regulatory bodies). 
93. See N.R. Kleinfield, When the Boss Becomes Your Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. S, 1986, § 3 
(Business), at 1 (reporting on attempts by many companies to trim their health insurance costs by 
imposing stricter requirements for reimbursement, often at the expense of physician and patient 
autonomy). 
94. In the early 1970s an unlikely coalition of preventive medicine activists and conservatives 
concerned with cost control argued that federal policy should encourage the private development of 
comprehensive, prepaid health care systems. Proponents of such systems reminded policy-makers 
that the financial incentives of fee-for-service care penalized health preservation and cost-effective 
therapy. See, e.g., Paul M. Ellwood et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291 (1971). 
In 1973, with Nixon administration support, Congress enacted a scheme of federal subsidies for the 
start-up of prepaid programs, which became known as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 
However, the scheme included strict minimum benefit and enrollment requirements, and the 
unenthusiastic response disappointed HMO advocates. Although studies showed that HMOs cut 
costs substantially by dramatically reducing hospitalization, only four percent of Americans had 
enrolled in HMOs by 1979. STARR, supra note 42, at 407-08, 415. 
In the late 1970s, however, Congress passed a series of amendments that increased subsidies and 
cut qualifying requirements. Id. at 415. HMO entrepreneurship increased dramatically. By 1985 
national HMO enrollment approached ten percent. Robert Blendon, The Major Forces Affecting the 
Academic Health Centers in the 1990s, in THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER 
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excess service capacity. By assuming the risk of inpatient expenses, the 
prepaid schemes gave themselves ample incentive to reduce hospital utili-
zation. Meanwhile, insurers restructured conventional cost- and charge-
based insurance plans to shift some of the risk of inpatient expenses to 
subscribers. 96 
In 1983 the nation's largest insurer, Medicare, pioneered a system of 
payment to hospitals based on diagnostic categories rather than services 
rendered. Under the new system, each hospitalized Medicare patient is 
assigned to a "Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)'' based on clinical diag-
nosis, major procedures performed, complications, and age.97 Regardless 
of the costs actually incurred, the admitting hospital receives a lump sum 
AND MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN CoURTSHIP 17, 21 (1986) (proceedings of a 1985 con-
ference jointly sponsored by the American Hospital Association, the American Medical Association, 
and the Association of American Medical Colleges). 
95. Prepaid plans vary widely in their organizational design. At one extreme are HMOs, 
which provide a full range of outpatient and inpatient services under one corporate rubric and are 
thus able to impose cost-minimizing decision rules regarding hospitalization and the use of diagnos-
tic and therapeutic procedures. HMO physicians, as employees, have relatively little freedom to 
make clinical decisions contrary to these rules. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). Under the 
PPO model, subscribers make annual prepayments into an insurance pool and in return are entitled 
to a defined set of services from participating physicians (the "preferred providers") in private prac-
tice. Participating physicians agree to accept discounted fees and to cooperate with the insurer's 
utilization review and managed care programs. In return, physicians gain access to a reliable stream 
of patients. Some PPO schemes also include hospital services. The insurance pool pays participat-
ing physicians on a fee-for-service basis. Because the physicians are independent practitioners, not 
employees, the insurer has less authority over their clinical decisions than would an HMO. 
However, unlike traditional fee-for-service practice with third-party payment, under which an 
outside insurer bears the risk (or "moral hazard"), some forms of the PPO model put participating 
physicians collectively at risk by restricting their aggregate reimbursement (for services to subscrib-
ers) to the amount available in the common pool. The higher the aggregate use of services, the lower 
the pool's reimbursement rates for individual services. These reimbursement adjustments can be 
administered in various ways-e.g., by withholding a portion of physicians' anticipated fees until the 
end of each fiscal year, then making adjustments based on utilization for the year. The PPO can 
thereby internalize, albeit collectively, the moral hazard of insurance. A participating clinician, in 
his or her role as the patient's purchasing agent, could in theory "cheat" at colleagues' expense by 
using services more liberally than they do. But group discipline-and the ultimate sanction of expul-
sion from the PPO, with consequent loss of this portion of the offender's practice-renders "cheat-
ing" unlikely so long as non-subscriber demand is insufficient to replace the physician's subscriber 
practice. 
96. See Blendon, supra note 94, at 22 (reporting a recent rise from thirty to sixty-three percent 
in the proportion oflarge employers that require their health insurance packages to include hospital 
deductibles). In contrast to the prepaid comprehensive care model, which targets physician incen-
tives as the key to cost control, this approach aims to give patients sufficient incentive to become 
active and critical counterweights to their doctors' judgment. 
97. See YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, HEALTH SYS-
TEMS MANAGEMENT GROUP, THE NEW ICD-9-CM DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS CLASSIFICA-
TION SCHEME (1981). 
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payment based on the reimbursement rate for the patient's assigned 
DRG. Hospital management thus has a powerful incentive to minimize 
length of stay and use of costly ancillary services such as laboratory tests. 
Some private insurers are following the federal government's lead in 
developing DRG-based hospital reimbursement schemes.98 
Initially, the new Medicare system generated a handsome subsidy 
for academic centers' research, teaching, and other clinical activities, 
thanks to adjustments awarded by Congress to teaching hospitals. 99 
During the first year of the new system, the nation's teaching centers 
enjoyed a twenty-three percent profit margin on their Medicare busi-
ness. 100 But Medicare's DRG payment rates failed to keep pace with 
hospital cost inflation in the 1980s.101 By the end of the decade, teaching 
centers' overall Medicare profit margin had dropped to twelve percent. 102 
In 1990, the Bush Administration proposed a further, drastic reduction 
in this twelve percent subsidy. Noting that the nation's nonteaching hos-
pitals enjoyed a Medicare profit margin of only one percent, the adminis-
tration's senior health official declared that the subsidy was "far in 
excess" of what Medicare ought to provide. 103 An eleventh-hour budget 
compromise drafted by congressional Democrats and accepted by the 
98. Interview with Edward Neuscler, Deputy Director of the Department of Policy Develop· 
ment and Research at the Health Insurance Association of America (Feb. 1992). 
99. In enacting legislation setting up the DRG-based reimbursement system, Congress granted 
teaching hospitals an 11.59% across-the-board bonus plus additional adjustments based on each 
hospital's number of interns and residents. Cynthia Wallace, Many Teaching Hospitals Fare Well 
Under Prospective Payment • •. For Now, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 1, 1984, at 34, 38. With these 
adjustments, major teaching centers realized Medicare revenues twenty-three percent greater than 
Medicare-allowed costs during the first year of prospective payment. After the first three years, 
teaching hospitals continued to realize more than double the average profit margin of non-teaching 
hospitals from Medicare patients. Carl J. Schramm & Jon Gabel, Prospective Payment: Some Retr(r 
spective Observations, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1681 (1988). 
100. /d. 
101. From fiscal year 1984 through fiscal year 1988, DRG rates rose by less than half of the 
sixteen percent increase in the ''hospital market basket" cost during that period. Carol M. McCar· 
thy, DRGs-Five Year.s- Later, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1683, 1684 (1988). 
102. Press Briefing by Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services (Jan. 29, 1990) (transcript on file with Federal Information Systems Corp.). 
103. /d. (proposing a one billion dollar reduction in Medicare payments to teaching hospitals). 
The administration's proposal for legislation to reduce the subsidy came as the Health Care Finane· 
ing Administration (HCFA) proposed new reimbursement regulations for teaching hospitals, pursu· 
ant to section 9202 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA 
1985), that would reduce their Medicare reimbursement by $400 to $600 million annually and limit 
future increases in Medicare's payment adjustment for teaching centers to rises in the Consumer 
Price Index. Patrick K. O'Hare, Medicare GME Regulations: A Challenge for Teaching Hospitals, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Feb. 1990, at 68. 
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President in October, 1990 left the subsidy largely intact.104 However, in 
view of mounting pressure on Congress and the President to reduce 
domestic entitlement spending, its future is hardly secure. 105 
4. Physician Payment Reform 
The newest threat to clinical income is the federal government's bid 
to reduce payments to specialized physicians for technology-intensive 
services. In 1989, Congress enacted legislation instructing the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCF A) to develop a Medicare fee 
schedule for physicians' services. 106 The new law eliminated the vague 
"customary" and "prevailing" or "reasonable" fee standard that had 
allowed physicians free rein to charge high fees for technology-oriented 
services.107 In its place, Congress instructed HCFA to construct a fee 
schedule that would substantially reduce the disparity between Medi-
care's payments for technology-intensive procedures and for physicians' 
"cognitive" time (history taking, counseling, treatment planning, and so 
forth). 108 
The schedule, to be phased in from 1992 to 1996, will be based on a 
relative value scale for physician services developed for HCFA in the 
1980s via a multistage process of consultations and negotiations between 
doctors representing each clinical specialty. 109 Private third-party payers 
104. Aside from a reduction in "disproportionate share" payments made to hospitals with 
heavy uncompensated care burdens in accordance with section 9105 of COBRA 1986, the final 
budget package for fiscal year 1991 left Medicare's adjustments for teaching hospitals unscathed. 
Interview with James Bentley, Vice President for Clinical Services, Association of American Medical 
Colleges (Nov. 1990). 
105. The subsidy is especially vulnerable because it is funded through the Medicare program's 
regressive tax-a 1.45 percent levy on incomes up to $130,200 per year, [1992 Index] Stand. Fed. 
Tax Rep. (CCH) 1]114-rather than through general tax revenues. In view of the tax fairness issue's 
growing political appeal, future congressional protection for the subsidy seems less likely. 
106. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA 1989), Pub. L. No. 101-239 tit. IX, 
103 Stat. 2106. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
108. John K. Iglehart, The New Law on Medicare's Payments to Physicians, 322 NEw ENG. J. 
MED. 1247 (1990). 
109. The process was administered by researchers at the Harvard University School of Public 
Health, under contract from HCFA. The researchers enlisted the cooperation of the American 
Medical Association and the nation's medical specialty societies in a collective effort to develop a 
scale of valuations based on participants' conclusions about the time, technical skill, effort, judg-
ment, and stress involved in providing particular clinical services. William C. Hsiao et al., Results 
and Policy Implications of the Resource-Based Relative Value Study, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 881 
(1988). As currently envisioned, the relative value scale will reduce Medicare payments to some 
specialists-such as radiologists and chest surgeons-by up to twenty percent while raising pay-
ments to primary care physicians-such as family practitioners and internists-by up to thrity-seven 
percent. Iglehart, Payments to Physicians, supra note 108, at 1247. 
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are expected to follow Medicare's lead in adopting fee schedules that 
reduce payments for technology-intensive services. 110 The fee schedule 
legislation was designed to be neutral in its overall impact upon Medicare 
spending for physician services. 111 But the fee schedule is likely to 
reduce the income-generating ability of academic physicians because they 
are disproportionately concentrated in highly specialized, technology-
intensive specialties. 112 
5. The Resulting Financial Crisis 
Within academic medical centers, these changes are inspiring a 
growing sense of crisis. Competition from community hospitals and new, 
entrepreneurial health plans, along with less permissive third-party pay-
ment and the countervailing power of corporate buyers of medical care, 
increasingly threaten the profitability of academic centers' patient care. 
Declining utilization and downward pressure on rates endanger the 
cross-subsidies from hospital services and faculty practice upon which 
the centers now rely to support training, 113 clinical research, and indi-
gent care. 114 Academic leaders today face mounting current-account and 
110. Spencer Rich, Radical Change Ordered in Medicare Doctor Fees, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 
1991, at Al; Martin Tolchin, Changes Urged in Payments to Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1988, 
§A, at 18. 
111. Iglehart, supra note 108, at 1248. 
112. Marybeth Burke, Hospitals Anticipate Pitfalls of Physician Payment Reform, HosPITALS, 
Feb. 20, 1990, at 38. 
113. Academic medical leaders commonly assert that the training of interns and residents is a 
major contributor to teaching hospitals' higher costs-and to their need for cross-subsidies from the 
care of insured patients. See, e.g., Reiman, supra note 53. Those who benefit from today's medical 
care, academic physicians argue, ought to support the maintenance of the human capital base that 
makes possible the continuing provision of medical services. But it is hardly clear that interns and 
residents, or even medical students serving on hospital wards, are responsible for highet costs. 
Interns and residents do their clinical learning while working extraordinary hours-up to one hun-
dred or more per week-at very low pay (often much lower, on an hourly basis, than that of nurses 
and other paraprofessionals). For a wide range of routine services, they are cheap substitutes for 
allied health professionals. They also perform many tasks that would otherwise require more attend-
ing physician time. 
This latter benefit accrues in part to hospitals, which are able to spend fewer salaried attending 
physician hours on clinical care, and in part to private attendings, who are able to see more patients, 
perform more procedures, and achieve higher billing totals than they could without the helping 
hands of house staff physicians. A major teaching hospital once unsuccessfully tried to "tax" its 
affiliated private attendings for this benefit. RAYMOND S. DUFF & AUGUST B. HOLLINGSHEAD, 
SICKNESS AND SOCIETY 58 (1968). The proliferation of house staff programs in community hospi-
tals during the last few decades suggests that interns and residents may actually be cost-savers. 
What Are Teaching Hospitals' Costs?, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Aug. 1, 1984, at 34. 
114. In 1982, according to the American Association of Medical Colleges, teaching hospitals 
provided 47.2 percent of all free care while accounting for only 5.6 percent of the nation's acute care 
beds. Cynthia Wallace, supra note 99, at 34, 38. 
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capital-acquisition difficulties as they seek to maintain the vast enter-
prises their predecessors created with once-plentiful dollars from NIH 
and third-party payers. 
No beneficent source of funds looms on the horizon as an alterna-
tive. A renewed surge in federal support, via either NIH or some other 
mechanism, is exceedingly unlikely given the current mood of alarm over 
unprecedented deficit spending. 115 Perhaps for good reason, 116 academic 
medicine today lacks the public support and political clout necessary to 
win a vast new federal commitment to high-cost, high-technology clinical 
methods. 117 Private philanthropy, once a principal source of support for 
clinical care and research, now covers barely two percent of American 
medical costs and is unlikely to reverse its decline in relative signifi-
cance. 118 And for budget-minded corporate and third-party payers, the 
social benefits of medical teaching, research, and care for the indigent are 
externalities for which they have little incentive to pay.U9 Academic 
centers, in short, must fend for themselves. 
115. Biendon, supra note 94, at 27. 
116. Disillusion with the promise of new technology has some empirical basis. See, e.g., John 
Bailar & Elaine Smith, Progress Against Cancer?, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1226 (1986) (epidemiologi-
cal study concluding that massive investment in high-technology cancer therapies has failed to 
reduce cancer mortality and morbidity). 
117. See Rogers & Blendon, supra note 10, at 751, 752 (noting the public perception of aca-
demic centers as villains responsible for training expensive subspecialist physicians increasingly fasci-
nated by technology and more concerned with high income than with human needs). 
Political implausibility, though, has not prevented a proliferation of proposals for a federal 
bailout. See, e.g., P. Douglas & C. Thomas Smith, Financing Graduate Medical Education in a 
Competitive Atmosphere: A Proposal to Create a Fund Underwriting This Vital Aspect of Health Care, 
HOSPITALS, May 16, 1984, at 93 (proposing a vast new federal fund for the support of all residency 
training, to be allocated among institutions and specialties by panels of medical professors, in the 
manner of NIH peer review). To the extent that interns and residents actually save money and time 
for hospitals and attending physicians by providing cheap labor, see supra note 113, this plan would 
amount to a federal subsidy for physicians' incomes and teaching hospital expenses unrelated to 
residency training. Moreover, it would grant a single, intensely interested group broad power to 
make political judgments about the nation's needs for different kinds of clinical training. This "fox 
guarding the chicken coop" factor is hardly likely to endear the proposal to legislators aware of 
public doubts about the selflessness of highly paid subspecialists. 
118. Blendon, supra note 94, at 27, 28. Between 1968 and 1981, the proportion of hospital 
construction dollars derived from private philanthropy dropped from twenty-four to four percent. 
Jo Ellen Mistarz, Capita/: A Crisis?, 58 HOSPITALS 79 (1984) (citing AMERICAN HOSPITAL Ass'N, 
1984 SURVEY OF SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR HOSPITAL CoNSTRUCTION). 
119. Former Johns Hopkins Hospital President Robert Heyssel, M.D. warns that corporate 
managers "are voting increasingly with their companies' dollars" against paying academic centers 
for anything beyond patient care services. "They are looking for the best price for employee health 
benefits," says Heyssel, and if that is inimical to academic medical centers, "so be it" as they see 
things. Donald E.L. Johnson, Teaching Hospitals Seek New Funds, New Roles in Education, Moo. 
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 1984, at 81. 
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III. ACADEMIC CENTERS' SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS: THE 
ATTRACTIONS OF SELLING OR LEASING OF 
HOSPITAL OPERATIONS 
In this competitive and uncertain environment, academic medical 
managers are becoming reluctant entrepreneurs. To the chagrin of 
some, 120 academic medical managers are increasingly thinking like busi-
ness executives, weighing clinical services in terms of their economic via-
bility and fashioning innovative institutional arrangements. 121 The 
hospital management literature of the last several years is replete with 
articles urging nonprofit hospital administrators to adopt income-maxi-
mizing capital investment122 and pricing123 policies. Teaching hospitals 
120. See, e.g., Robert Cunningham, Entrepreneuria/ism In Medicine, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1313 (1983) (arguing that "entrepreneurial values" and "bottom-line consciousness" threaten "the 
personal care quality of the hospital environment"); Rashi Fein, What Is Wrong with the Language 
of Medicine?, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 863 (1982) ("The attitudes and methodology of economics" 
and cost-benefit analysis undermine patient trust and confidence.); David Hilfiker, A Doctor's View of 
Modem Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1986, Magazine, at 44 (scathingly criticizing nonprofit hos-
pitals, academic and otherwise, that consider patients' insurance status when making admissions 
decisions). 
121. Miles Shore & Harry Levinson, On Business and Medicine, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 319 
(1985). Shore and Levinson dismiss the notion that the new business consciousness threatens the 
clinical endeavor's "quality of caring." This view, they argue, is rooted in a "misunderstanding of 
the characteristics of successful business organizations." They draw upon the literuture on the 
importance of corporate values and identity in building the public confidence necessary for business 
success. See TERRENCE DEAL & ALLEN KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES (1984); THOMAS 
PETERS & ROBERT WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE (1982). In the new era of eco-
nomic competition between medical care providers, Shore and Levinson assert, the ultimate winners 
will be those that preserve an "identity as caring institutions," not those willing to sacrifice this 
identity for short-term profits and expediency. 
Cf Arthur, Delivering Care: Profit or Service?, MED. NEWS & INT'L REP., Apr. 14, 1986, at 1, 
11 (quoting warnings from health care marketing consultants that hospitals which promote new 
services strictly for short-term gain-e.g., filling empty beds-without regard for demonstrable com-
munity needs will eventually lose the confidence of patients and third-party payers). 
122. See, e.g., Douglas A. Conrad, Returns on Equity to Not-For-Profit Hospitals: Theory and 
Implementation, 19 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 41 (1984). Conrad makes a theoretical argument 
which casts fundamental doubt on the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in an era 
when capital expenditures are financed largely through debt, and philanthropic contributions to cap-
ital budgets are becoming vanishingly small. He notes that only creditors have an explicit claim to a 
nonprofit hospital's income, and that property rights to residual income after creditors are paid are 
ill-defined. Such income is typically plowed back into new capital investments or distributed in the 
form of programs, perquisites, or other benefits to managers and employees, trustees, staff physi-
cians, and the community. But as nonprofit hospital capitalization approaches one hundred percent 
debt, the problem of ill-defined property rights to net income diminishes to the vanishing point. For 
the purpose of figuring management's fiduciary responsibility, creditors (increasingly at risk as the 
proportion of debt rises) effectively become equity-holders, obliging management to maximize 
income-and undermining the distinction between the for-profit and nonprofit forms. 
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are entering into a variety of multi-institutional arrangements124 to nego-
tiate for bulk purchasing discounts and to share managerial expertise. 
Academic administrators are huddling with attorneys and management 
consultants to plan profit-making subsidiary ventures in a range of 
closely and remotely related businesses. 125 Administrators, sometimes in 
concert with medical staffs, 126 are developing vertically integrated enti-
ties incorporating HMOs, ambulatory surgical centers, and other outpa-
tient services. 
The selling or leasing of hospital operations to investor-owned 
health care chains represents the most dramatic expression of this trend. 
A long-term lease or outright sale, followed by partnership between med-
ical school and for-profit corporation, offers academic institutions a 
unique array of advantages. These advantages fall into four classes: insu-
lation from risk to other academic programs; new support for hospital 
operations; new support for teaching and research; and expanded aca-
demic program opportunities. 127 
123. E.g., Daniel Sullivan, Profit Maximization and Hospital-Based Outpatient Services, J. 
AMBULATORY CARE MGMT., Feb. 1983, at 16 (urging income-maximizing strategy for setting inpa-
tient and outpatient prices, taking into account varying price elasticities of demand for different 
services and different third-party payment schemes); cf Irwin David, Why Tax-Exempt Hospitals 
Need Profit, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 1982, at 46 (arguing, based on computer simulations, 
that hospitals need profit for asset replacement in an inflationary environment). 
124. Linda Punch, Consortium Makes Effort to Surmount Difficulties, Aid University Hospitals, 
Moo. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 1984, at 84 (reporting on activities of the University Hospital Consor-
tium, a group of twenty-three university-owned teaching hospitals formed in 1984 to coordinate 
purchasing, joint venture development, and some management functions); see also Ronald Werft, 
Multi-Institutional A"angements: Multihospital A"angements Hold Promise for Teaching Hospitals, 
HoSPITALS, July 16, 1982, at 87; Donald Wegmiller, Financing Strategies for Nonprofit Hospital 
Systems, HEALTH AFF., Summer, 1983, at 48 (urging increased management, marketing, purchas-
ing, and financial coordination among facilities). 
125. Leland R. Kaiser, Survival Strategies for Not-for-Profit Hospitals, HosP. PROGRESS, Dec. 
1983, at 40, 42. The ventures range from such hospital-linked services as laundry and data process-
ing to the rental of office space and even the development of shopping centers, restaurants, and bars. 
126. See, e.g., id. at 40 (describing subsidiary corporations formed jointly by hospitals and medi-
cal staffs to co-venture new health services products, averting competition between hospital and 
physician-owned enterprises). 
127. The discussion in this section considers the benefits of sale and leasing arrangements from 
the perspective of academic medical institutions. To the extent that the benefits to academic pro-
grams translate into net gains for society as a whole, the analytic vantage point adopted herein 
approaches an overall social welfare perspective. Potential differences between the social welfare 
perspective and the vantage point of academic medical centers arise from (1) the possibility that for-
profit hospitals have pernicious effects that do not affect academic programs but that ought to count 
negatively in the social welfare calculus, and (2) the possibility that some academic programs aided 
by for-profit operation of teaching hospitals-for example, technology-oriented tertiary care activi-
ties-impose social costs in excess of their clinical and other benefits. The first possibility is consid-
ered infra Part V. The second possibility, an important concern in view of academic medicine's 
tendency to emphasize costly, high-technology therapies over inexpensive (and possibly more cost-
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A. INSULATION FROM RISK TO OTHER ACADEMIC PROGRAMS 
Increasingly concerned about the potential for huge operating losses 
and the difficulty of raising even maintenance capital, owners of teaching 
hospitals are tempted by the ultimate option-divestiture. Universities 
that own hospitals ,could be forced into devastating expenditures of 
endowment principal or cutbacks in other academic programs should 
their hospitals run big operating deficits. To insulate themselves from 
potential liability, several universities have already reconstituted their 
teaching hospitals as independent, nonprofit corporations. 128 Religious 
and fraternal orders that own hospitals face a similar risk to their other 
programs. Moreover, the overwhelming challenge of raising the capital 
needed to maintain a modem, tertiary care hospital threatens to divert 
attention from other development needs. Hospital ownership thus poses 
a mounting threat to other valued activities. Sale or leasing to a for-
profit chain is one way to opt out of this danger. 
B. NEW SUPPORT FOR HOSPITAL OPERATIONS 
The human resources, market power, and financial strength of the 
investor-owned chains have the potential to improve substantially a 
teaching hospital's competitive posture in the medical marketplace. This 
translates into a greater likelihood that the hospital's medical school 
partner will be able to maintain or enhance the quality of its clinical 
teaching and research. Financial and marketing expertise, strategic plan-
ning and management skills, and economies of scale are among the 
advantages most often touted. 129 Observers generally believe that the 
leading for-profit chains tend to attract and retain superior management 
personnel. 13° Comparative studies of investor-owned and nonprofit com-
munity hospitals, matched for demographic factors and the clinical com-
plexity of patients' illnesses, suggest that the for-profits' pricing strategies 
effective) primary care and health promotion activities, merits consideration, but it lies beyond the 
scope of this Aritcle. 
128. Blendon, supra note 94, at 39 (citing the Universities of North Carolina, West Virginia, and 
Maryland); Julie Johnsson, Politics, Power Struggles a Part of Divestiture Battle for University Hospi· 
tals, HOSPITALS, Feb. 20, 1990, at 46. 
129. See, e.g., Richard H. Egdahl, A"angements Under Investor-Owned Partnerships: Some 
Guidelines for Teaching Hospitals, in THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH Ci!NTER AND 
MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN COURTSHIP 41, 44-45 (1986); John G. Larson, Factors in 
the Success of the Investor-Owned Hospitals: Implications for the Not-For-Profits, HosP. & Hi!ALTH 
SERVICES ADMIN., March/April 1983, at 43. 
130. Richard Siegrist, Wall Street and the For-Profit Hospital Management Companies, in THE 
NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 
35, 43-44 (Bradford H. Grayed., 1983) (Most Wall Street analysts specializing in the health care 
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and collection programs are more effective at maximizing reimbursement 
from cost- and charge-based payers.131 
The verdict is not yet in, however, on whether the for-profits' man-
agement skills give them a similar edge in controlling costs under pro-
spective payment and prepaid health service plans. Industry observers 
say the centralized management style of the largest investor-owned 
firm-Humana-played a critical role in that company's successful 
development of vertically integrated, prepaid health plans. Aggressive 
oversight of physicians' treatment decisions sufficiently contained hospi-
tal costs to make Humana's prepaid plans profitable by the end of the 
1980s.132 But Humana's principal competitors were less aggressive in 
industry are highly impressed with the investor-owned chains' quality of management.). Industry 
observers interviewed during the preparation of this Article generally expressed the belief that inves-
tor-owned chains attract harder-working, more able managers than do most nonprofit hospitals. 
On the other hand, Stanley Bergen, Jr., President of the University of Medicine and Dentistry 
of New Jersey, painted a sharply different picture. In 1983, Bergen's institution, which is state-
owned, signed a hospital management contract with HCA. The deal's main appeal, Bergen said, was 
that it enabled the university to evade a state cap on administrative salaries which had made the 
hiring of qualified managers exceedingly difficult. For political reasons, according to Bergen, the 
state was "willing to hide [higher] salaries within the management contract, but not to pay greater 
salaries openly. If we had our choice, we probably would have hired our own." The university paid 
HCA a $600,000 yearly fee, and the corporation brought in several managers at salaries well above 
the state cap. 
Their performance, Bergen said, was disappointing. Insensitivity to academic needs was not a 
problem. Poor management was. Bergen cited indecisiveness, failure to reorganize biiling proce-
dures in preparation for DRG-based Medicare reimbursement, and poor handling of relations with 
community and minority constituencies. Several million dollars in savings promised by HCA before 
the contract was signed failed to materialize. HCA's corporate headquarters, Bergen charged, "did 
not keep an eye on this job the way they should have." Bergen said that while the for-profit chains 
may once have had an edge over the nonprofits in hiring high-quality managers, they are having 
difficulties now. "There are not a lot of top people out there." The chains' salaries have become less 
competitive compared with those in other private sector management fields, and the increased stress 
of health care management in today's austere environment is making the field less attractive to new 
entrants in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Interview with Stanley Bergen, Jr., in Newark, 
N.J. (Jan. 1986). 
131. See, e.g., LEWIN & AssOCIATES, INC., STUDIES IN THE CoMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF 
INVESTOR-OWNED AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT HoSPITALS (1981) (revealing a pattern of generally 
higher charges by investor-owned hospitals for anciilary services such as laboratory tests); Robert 
Pattison & Hallie Katz, Investor-Owned and Not-For-Profit Hospitals: A Comparison Based on Cali-
fornia Data, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 347 (1983). 
132. Interview with Michael Bromberg, Executive Director of the Federation of American 
Health Systems (Oct. 1990). 
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monitoring physician decision making and thus less successful in control-
ling costs during the 1980s.133 Humana's success suggests that the cen-
tralized management capability of an investor-owned chain is a 
potentially powerful cost-control tool. But to the extent that firm man-
agers achieve cost control by constraining clinicians' discretion, aca-
demic physicians are likely to resist "successful" management practices. 
Nor has it been conclusively demonstrated that the investor-owned 
chains achieve unique economies of scale in the purchase or use of facili-
ties and equipment. 134 However, there is evidence that the chains 
employ personnel more efficiently than do free-standing nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals. 135 Moreover, the chains' sheer size is likely to give 
the chains greater fiscal resilience by enhancing their borrowing power 
and enabling them to spread local losses. The major chains survived 
unprecedented cost-control pressures in the late 1980s136 although they 
entered this period in a highly leveraged financial position137 and sus-
tained heavy losses by their prepaid health plans. Meanwhile, many free-
standing nonprofit hospitals were forced to close, while others were 
driven into dire states of indebtedness from which they have not yet 
133. /d.; see also Nemes, supra note 22, at 27-30 (reporting a poor response by investor-owned 
chains to Medicare's introduction of prospective payment and to pressure on costs created by devel-
opment of prepaid health plans). Inability to control costs adequately led Humana's major investor-
owned competitors to abandon their fledgling prepaid health services ventures in the late 1980s. 
134. But cf. Siegrist, supra note 130, at 43 (Wall Street analysts believe investor-owned chains 
benefit significantly from economies of scale in purchasing, service and equipment use, specialized 
design and construction assistance, and centralized functions such as accounting, data processing, 
risk management, and internal consulting.). 
Some health administration specialists, though, argue that nonprofit hospitals can capture such 
economies of scale by forming their own multi-institutional networks. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 
125, at 46; Larson, supra note 129, at 45, 49. Several studies suggest that any operating efficiencies 
and economies of scale achieved by the chains' centralized managements are more than offset by 
corporate headquarters' costs. See, e.g., J. Michael Watt et al., The Comparati•·e Economic Perform-
ance of Investor-Owned Chain and Non-For-Profit Hospitals, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89, 95 (1986); 
Pattison & Katz, supra note 131, at 352, 353; Lawrence S. Lewin et al., Investor-Owned and Nonprof-
its Differ in Economic Performance, HOSPITAlS, July 1, 1981, at 52. 
135. Dan Ermann & Joy Gabel, Multihospital Systems: Issues and Empirical Findings, 3 
HEALTH AFF. 50, 56-58 (1984). 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 21-33. 
137. See Robert J. Buchanan, The Financial Status of the New Medical-Industrial Complex, 19 
INQUIRY 308, 311, 313-14 (1982) (comparing debt/equity ratios for sixteen industry groupings, 
including the for-profit hospital chains; in 1980 the aggregate long-term debt/common equity ratio 
for thirteen of the largest hospital chains was 2.03, compared with a composite ratio of 0.269 for all 
the industries examined). This highly leveraged position reflected the intensive merger and acquisi-
tion activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s from which the major chains emerged. 
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recovered. However, a causal link between chain size and fiscal resilience 
has not been empirically demonstrated. 138 
It is unquestionable, however, that some investor-owned chains have 
an edge in obtaining capital. High debt burdens, a shortage of assets 
available to pledge for secured credit, investor uncertainty about future 
reimbursement patterns, and a continuing relative decline in health phi-
lanthropy in comparison with other revenues handicap the nonprofit hos-
pitals' efforts to obtain capital from traditional debt and donor sources. 
Moody's and Standard & Poor's have been unforgiving of nonprofit hos-
pitals' financial weaknesses and uncertain revenue prospects. The result-
ing high interest rates for prospective bond issues have offset the 
advantage of tax exemption. 
In contrast, most of the major investor-owned chains enjoy confi-
dence in the financial markets even in the wake of the difficulties they 
endured in the late 1980s.139 The industry leader, Humana, has 
impressed the financial community with the success of its vertical inte-
gration strategy140 and achieved bond ratings in the BBB+ to A-
range, 141 which ensure ready access to public sources of capital. How-
ever, two other chains that executed leveraged buy-outs in 1989 are now 
awash in debt and weighed down by "junk" bond ratings. 142 And the 
days when the imagined predictability of revenues from Medicare and 
other third-party payers justified highly leveraged financial positions in 
the minds of credulous Wall Street analysts143 are gone. Not all of the 
major investor-owned chains today possess the financial strength and 
138. Many complications would make such a demonstration difficult; I note only a few here. 
First, chain-owned hospitals tend to be located in areas less affected by the adverse hospital reim-
bursement developments of the 1980s than nonprofit hospital markets. Thus a direct comparison of 
closure rates or financial data would be meaningless. Also, distinguishing between the resiliency-
enhancing effects of chain size and chain managment practices is likely to be difficult. 
139. See Highlights of Roundtable, supra note 31 (predicting that hospital chain stocks will be 
above-average market performers in the early 1990s and making "buy" recommendations for 
several). 
140. Stroud, supra note 30 (quoting leading analyst's glowing praise for Humana's debt-to-
equity ratio and success in the HMO market). 
141. Other for-profit chains-such as National Medical Enterprises and Charter Medical Cor-
poration-have won similar confidence from the financial markets through their success in develop-
ing specialty hospitals. 
142. They are Hospital Corporation of America and American Medical International. 
143. Siegrist, supra note 130, at 42. This perception of predictability reflected expectations of 
steady demand for hospital services, confidence that Medicare and Medicaid virtually guaranteed 
half the chains' revenue, and the companies' past ease in passing through expense increases via cost-
and charge-based reimbursement mechanisms. Id. Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), the 
largest chain in the early 1980s, was for a time the nation's most highly leveraged "A"-rated indus-
trial corporation. Id. (citing both Moody's and Standard and Poor's). In 1984, HCA was able to 
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credibility to tap the public debt and equity markets on behalf of aca-
demic medical centers' needs. 
Vertical integration and market power are additional assets that an 
investor-owned chain can bring to bear on the management of teaching 
hospitals. Chain-owned commuriity hospitals, nursing homes, and other 
medical facilities located near a newly acquired teaching center provide a 
ready-made patient "feeder" network for the center's beds and other ter-
tiary care services. HMOs and other prepaid plans offered by the acquir-
ing chain can become additional sources of patients. 144 Within the limits 
of emerging antitrust doctrine, 145 such a regional "hub and feeder" net-
work is, by virtue of its market power and comprehensive "in-house" 
referral services, well poised to negotiate mutually favorable terms with 
large corporate buyers of health care. 146 
C. NEW FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TEACHING AND REsEARCH 
Sale proceeds or lease income, the most visible benefit of a deal with 
an investor-owned firm, are in theory available for any use. But if a sale 
agreement includes a "buy-back" option14~ (to protect the seller against 
boast that its interest rate on a three-year financing was less than one half a percent above compara-
ble federal obligations. HOSPITAL CoRP. OF AMERICA, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1985). 
In 1983, while the Massachusetts General Hospital weighed HCA's offer to purchase McLean 
Hospital, a Harvard Medical School official calculated that McLean's projected need for $35 million 
in capital could be met by HCA at a cost of $23 per patient day, compared with $36 if financed by 
tax-exempt debt. Telephone Interview with Ann Schwind, Director of Planning, Harvard Medical 
School (Oct. 1985); Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6. A senior HCA executive 
estimated in 1986 that one dollar in net earnings had the potential to generate $30 in capital for the 
investor-owned chains, compared with only three dollars for the nonprofit sector. Egdahl, supra 
note 129, at 45 (quoting HCA Vice President and Treasurer Samuel Howard). Egdahl argues that 
the for-profit chains' greater potential for capital formation is by far their greatest attraction for 
academic centers. Id. 
144. Humana has demonstrated the "feeder" potential of prepaid plans. In 1989, its hospital 
admissions rose by 4.6 percent in markets where its prepaid plans compete; by contrast, Humann 
hospital admissions in markets without Humana prepaid plans were down by 1.2 percent. Valeri 
Oliver, HCA, Humana Have Different Outlooks, NASHVILLE Bus. J., Nov. 13, 1989, § 1, at 20. 
145. See infra text accompanying notes 396-411. 
146. Cf. Jeff Goldsmith, A Radical Prescription for Hospitals, HARV. Bus. REV., May/June 
1989, at 107 (predicting that the economically successful hospital of the future will function as a 
critical-care hub for a dispersed network of clinical and social services tied together by health insur-
ance plans). 
147. For example, the agreement by which American Medical Intemational, Inc. (AMI) 
acquired the St. Joseph's Hospital, Creighton University's principal teaching facility, grants either 
the university or a foundation created from sale proceeds the right to repurchase the hospital if AMI 
reneges on certain commitments to academic activities and indigent care. Richard L. O'Brien, The 
Decision-Making Process, in THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER: AN UNCER· 
TAIN COURTSHIP 192, 199 (1986). 
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subsequent developments it deems inimical to the teaching hospital's aca-
demic mission 148), the sale principal must be preserved in order to main-
tain the option's credibility.149 Still, income from the principal can be 
applied to the support of mission-related activities, 150 either by employ-
ing the proceeds as new university endowment or, in the case of a 
non university seller, creating an independent foundation. 151 
Another basis for financial gain is less visible. Ownership or lessor-
ship of a major teaching hospital has certain unique economic advantages 
for an inveStor-owned chain 152-advantages not realizable by a free-
standing nonprofit owner such as a university. A nonprofit seller or les-
sor, however, can obtain additional consideration from its for-profit 
negotiating partner in exchange for these advantages. This consideration 
can take the form of a commitment to provide direct financial support for 
academic activities-by endowing faculty positions, 153 providing a yearly 
subsidy for teaching and research, or simply paying a higher rent or sale 
price. 
In addition, a university seller or lessor can enrich its revenue 
stream from faculty practice by bargaining for a corporate commitment 
to a faculty role in the provision of clinical consultation services to the 
chain's other facilities. 154 Moreover, faculty can generate a new revenue 
148. See infra text accompanying notes 569-82. 
149. See Egdahl, supra note 129, at 49 (warning that depletion of principal could make it impos-
sible to both execute a buy-back and fund the missions not maintained by the for-profit firm); PhiliP 
Birnbaum, Dean for Administrative Affairs, George Washington University Medical Center, 
Remarks at Symposium (Feb. 20-22, 1985), in THE INVESfOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH 
CENTER AND MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN CoURTSHIP 63 (1986) (Spending of sale prin-
cipal threatens the "ability to maintain flexibility."). 
150. Some warn, however, that failure to apply income toward the accrual of a larger corpus 
could endanger the viability of a buy-back option in the event of high inflation. See, e.g., Stanley 
Bergen, President, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Remarks at symposium 
(Feb. 20-22, 1985), in THE INVESfOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL EDU-
CATION: AN UNCERTAIN COURTSHIP 65 (1986). 
151. Tatge, supra note 19. 
152. See infra text accompanying notes 171-228 (discussing the usefulness of teaching hospital 
operations in horizontal and vertical expansion strategies). 
153. For example, in its 1983 proposal to purchase McLean Hospital, HCA offered to perma-
nently endow five psychiatry professorships at McLean. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra 
note 6, at 8. 
154. See Dennis S. O'Leary, Practice Plan, Allied Health Professions Education, and Continuing 
Medica/ Education, in THE INVESfOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL 
EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN CoURTSHIP 94, 96-105 (1986) (discussing prospects for increased 
faculty referrals if an academic medical center develops into a regional hub within a vertically inte-
grated, for-profit system). 
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stream for the support of teaching and research 155 by selling technology-
transfer services to other chain facilities-for example, by offering con-
tinuing medical education and allied health training programs at these 
sites. 
D. EXPANDED ACADEMIC PROGRAM OPPORTUNITIES 
New research and teaching opportunities do not appear to be a 
major motivating factor for teaching centers interested in sale and lease 
arrangements. But participation in a large, vertically integrated health 
care system offers academic managers some attractive possibilities. One 
obvious asset is a new pool of academically "interesting" referral 
patients. Additionally, a chain's network of community hospitals, long-
term inpatient facilities, and ambulatory care sites offers a diverse array 
of opportunities for student and resident training outside the traditional, 
tertiary care setting. 156 There are tempting research possibilities as well. 
Corporate commitment to developing an academic center as a tertiary 
care "flagship" would likely bring a new influx of capital for the acquisi-
tion of advanced technology, creating new investigative opportunities. 
Access to a for-profit chain's vast patient database and sophisticated, 
multicenter clinical data management system would be an invaluable tool 
for large-scale clinical and epidemiologic studies. 157 Moreover, patients 
throughout a for-profit system could be included in research protocols 
designed at the teaching center. 158 
In short, for financially troubled teaching centers facing an uncer-
tain environment, the sale or lease of hospital operations to an investor-
owned chain is ali appealing, albeit not economically risk-free, option. 
But there are also some serious nonfinancial risks for the maintenance of 
academic missions within the context of the resulting partnership. These 
risks arise from inevitable tensions between the concerns of corporate 
managers and those of academic leaders. Some argue that conflicts of 
interest are irreconcilable-and so serious that such unorthodox partner-
ships ought never to be formed. These critics hold that the very presence 
of for-profit enterprise in health care delivery, especially in association 
with medical teaching and research, is objectionable. Moreover, sale or 
155. Id. at 95-96. O'Leary warns, however, that such a technology transfer program, along 
with expanded faculty practice, could unduly divert faculty attention from teaching students and 
doing research. Id. at 96, 102. 
156. !d. at 102-03. 
157. See, e.g., Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, at 8 (extolling the value of 
HCA's clinical database and data management system for psychiatric research at Harvard). 
158. /d. 
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lease of a teaching hospital to a for-profit corporation raises numerous 
legal and regulatory questions. 
Before addressing these issues, however, I will consider the needs 
and management strategies which have led the major investor-owned 
hospital chains to become interested in leasing and acquiring teaching 
hospitals. Armed with an understanding of the for-profit hospitals' 
objectives, one can better assess both the hazards of such arrangements 
for academic centers and the potential of negotiations to reduce the risk. 
IV. THE NEEDS AND STRATEGIES OF THE INVESTOR-
OWNED HOSPITAL CHAINS 
A. BACKGROUND: EXPLOSIVE GROWTH AND FUTURE 
EXPECTATIONS 
The phenomenal growth of the big, for-profit health care delivery 
corporations is largely a product of permissive third-party payment for 
hospital services. Prior to the rapid expansion of cost- and charge-based 
insurance coverage in the 1960s and 1970s, proprietary hospitals had 
long played a role in the American health care economy by virtue of their 
ability to respond more quickly than nonprofits to rises in demand. 159 
Typically, they were transitional forms, founded by physicians or other 
small investors where population growth generated demand in excess of 
nonprofit hospital capacity. 160 They had an edge over nonprofit hospitals 
in meeting rising demand because their ability to pay a return on equity 
enabled them to raise capital more quickly. But where demand stabi-
lized, nonprofit hospitals seemed to have a competitive edge, perhaps 
because of patient and physician distrust for the profit motive. 161 Thus, 
typically, for-profit facilities in areas with stable demand sold out to non-
profit entities. 162 As the nation's population growth slowed, proprietary 
hospitals' market share ebbed, from more than a third of all hospitals in 
1928 to eleven percent by 1968.163 But the inception of Medicare and the 
proliferation of private insurance in the 1960s triggered a nationwide 
demand explosion and transformed the proprietary hospitals' fate. 
159. Bruce Steinwald & Duncan Neuhauser, The Role of the Proprietary Hospital, 35 L. & CoN-
TEMP. PRODS. 817, 824 (1970). 
160. Id. at 82. 
161. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 941, 950 (1963). 
162. Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 159, at 825. 
163. Id. at 819. 
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Suddenly, they became very lucrative businesses, especially in states 
where many patients carried charge-based commercial insurance164 and 
legislatures had not enacted rate regulation. Perceptive entrepreneurs 
began acquiring free standing proprietary hospitals, usually by offering 
stock to the owners of target facilities. By 1970, twenty-nine corpora-
tions owned two or more hospitals. The largest of these owned thirty-
one. 165 When some of these firms floated public equity offerings, investor 
confidence in the dependability of third party payment sent their stock 
prices soaring. This enhanced the ability of the nascent chains to acquire 
independent proprietaries in exchange for new stock. The chains grew 
rapidly, yet their expansion was confined almost exclusively to the for-
profit sector.166 By 1977, corporate chains owned ninety percent of all 
for-profit hospitals. 167 But trustees and managers of financially success-
ful voluntary hospitals had little incentive to sell-and thereby give up 
their own authority and autonomy. Financially troubled nonprofit hos-
pitals, meanwhile, were unattractive takeover targets. 
The larger chains, though, maintained their explosive growth, some-
thing the investment community had come to expect, by turning in the 
late 1970s to acquisitions of other multihospital systems.168 By 1981, 
after an intense round of often unfriendly takeover activity, three huge 
firms-HCA, Humana, and American Medical International (AMI)-
stood astride the for-profit field, controlling nearly seventy-five percent of 
all chain-owned beds. 169 Analysts were predicting continued rapid 
growth, 170 and the firms' stock prices reflected these expectations. 
164. Cf Carson W. Bays, Patterns of Hospital Growth: The Case of Profit Hospitals, 21 MED. 
CARE 850 (1983) (reporting that data for 1971 to 1977 show strong correlations between regional 
rises in for-profit hospitals' market share and growth in commercial hospital insurance and in the 
size of the Medicare-eligible population). 
165. Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 159, at 831. The twenty-nine owned 207 hospitals, 
about a quarter of the country's proprietaries. The largest, at thirty-one hospitals, was American 
Medicorp, Inc. (subsequently swallowed up during a round of mergers and acquisitions). HCA 
owned twenty-three. ld. 
166. Gray, supra note 11, at 10-11. 
167. Bays, supra note 164, at 856 (citing American Hospital Ass'n data). 
168. Siegrist, supra note 130, at 45-47. 
169. Donald E.L.Johnson & Vince DiPaolo, Multihospital System Survey, Moo. HEALTHCARB, 
Apr. 1981, at 80. 
170. STARR, supra note 42, at 435 (quoting predictions that the for-profit chains would double 
in size during the 1980s despite little growth in the hospital industry overall). 
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B. HORIZONTAL EXPANSION STRATEGIES 
By the early 1980s, however, the chains had largely exhausted the 
possibilities of horizontal integration within the for-profit sector. More-
over, they had made only minimal progress toward penetrating the vol-
untary and public sectors. 171 They could continue their horizontal 
growth only by moving beyond the existing for-profit field. The nation's 
religious and secular voluntary hospitals, facing mounting competitive 
pressures, seemed the next logical takeover targets. The chains were also 
drawn to the development of new inpatient facilities specializing in psy-
chiatric illness, substance abuse, and rehabilitation medicine-fields for 
which third-party payment to hospitals remained generous relative to 
actual inpatient care costs. 
Some advocates of competition in health services predicted at the 
time that market forces, abetted by procompetitive reform, would even-
tually transform the hospital industry into a predominantly for-profit 
endeavor. 172 They envisioned that one day a few nationwide, investor-
owned systems would dominate the health services market, opposing 
each other within different localities by means of competing networks of 
"feeder" physicians, specialty and community hospitals, and tertiary care 
"hubs." The market, they believed, would accomplish the economic 
rationalization of health care173-a goal that had eluded federal and state 
health planning agencies. 
The second half of the 1980s proved these predictions wrong, at 
least in the short term. Under competitive conditions in which market 
enthusiasts had expected investor-owned systems to thrive, the for-profits 
failed to sustain their prior rates of growth.174 They responded slowly to 
mounting cost-control pressures from thir4-party payers, suffered hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in losses when they began offering prepaid 
171. Investor-owned firms, however, had management contracts with more than one hundred 
acute care voluntary hospitals (and eighty publicly owned acute care facilities) by the end of 1981. 
Jeffrey Alexander & Bonnie L. Lewis, The Financial Characteristics of Hospitals Under For-Profit 
and Nonprofit Contract Management, 21 INQUIRY 230, 233 (1984). The firms' management con-
tracts with freestanding proprietary facilities have often preceded acquisitions. Id. 
172. See, e.g., David A. Stockman, Premises for a Medical Marketplace: A Neoconservative's 
Vision of How to Transform the Health System, 1 HEALTH AFF. 5, 16 (1981). 
173. See Christopher Pollitt, Corporate Rationalization of American Health Care: A VISitor's 
Appraisal, 7 J. HEALTH PoL., PoL'Y & L. 227 (1982) (critiquing federal policies that, through regu-
latory and market-oriented means, have pursued bureaucratic "rationalization" of medical care by 
private sector organizations). 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22 (discussing poor performance in the face of Medi-
care's prospective payment system, competition between prepaid health plans, and mounting pres-
sure from large employers concerned about medical costs). 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1074 1991-1992
1074 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1035 
health plans, and saw their stock prices dip sharply175 as investors aban-
doned expectations of continuing rapid growth. 176 Managers took two of 
the four largest chains private via leveraged buyouts, incurring massive 
"junk" debt that precluded major acquisitions before the early to mid-
1990s.177 All but one of the major chains abandoned their nascent pre-
paid plans. 
But by 1990, the major chains had weathered the storm and were 
again eyeing horizontal growth opportunities. Humana, the firm that 
had stood by its vertically integrated, prepaid plans, had become the 
industry leader and was looking to enter new markets. 178 National Med-
ical Enterprises (NME), which had sustained increases in profits through 
the 1980s due to its success with specialty hospitals, continued to build 
and buy psychiatric and rehabilitation facilities. 179 The two firms that 
went private--HCA and AMI-were meeting their leveraged buyout 
debt obligations. Financial analysts predicted that the two would retire 
this debt ahead of schedule and be in position by the mid-1990s to pursue 
new acquisitions. 180 
1. The Problem of Credibility 
The explosive growth enjoyed by the for-profit systems from the late 
1960s through the early 1980s is unlikely to resume. Renewed horizontal 
growth in the 1990s will probably be more selective. Humana's success 
with prepaid health plans and its interest in new markets indicate one 
likely avenue for such growth: acquisition of community hospitals well 
situated to support vertically integrated plans in new markets. 181 The 
success of NME and other chains in the specialty hospital field suggests 
another: continued construction and acquisition of psychiatric, substance 
abuse, and rehabilitation medicine facilities. Recent legislation in some 
175. Humana, the industry leader today, saw its share price drop from the mid-thirties in 1986 
into the teens in 1987, after a seventy-five percent drop in net earnings in 1986. Stroud, supra note 
thirties, at 1. 
176. /d. 
177. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 29-JO. 
179. See Green & Nemes, supra note 28, at 37. 
180. See Nemes, supra note 22. 
181. Humana is likely to pursue such acquisitions. Should other for-profit systems seek to 
duplicate Humana's successful vertical integration strategy, acquisitions of community, nonprofit 
hospitals by investor-owned systems could become an important industry trend in the 1990s. 
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states requiring employers to include minimum psychiatric and sub-
stance abuse benefits in their employee health insurance packages182 has 
enhanced growth opportunities for investor-owned systems in these 
fields. 
More speculatively, the chains might move to acquire a substantial 
number of nonprofit community hospitals outside the framework of ver-
tical integration strategies if Congress acts to make health insurance 
more broadly available. Several comprehensive, federally supported 
insurance plans now under congressional consideration183 would trans-
form many community hospitals now struggling under the burden of 
uncompensated care into profitable ventures attractive to investor-owned 
chains. Should Congress find the high cost of universal coverage plans 
prohibitive, 184 more modest measures-such as expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility and benefits185-would still be a boon for hospitals with high 
percentages of indigent patients. 
182. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47(b) (West 1991). In addition, recent court 
decisions have construed private health insurance contracts to require more generous reimbursement 
for some inpatient psychiatric services than had traditionally been provided. See, e.g., Arkansas 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a plaintiff 
with bipolar disorder could recover benefits provided by an insurer for physical conditions rather 
than being limited to the lesser reimbursement for mental conditions); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life 
Ins. Co., 898 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff's autistic son was entitled to 
recover from the insurer the amount in excess if the limit for "mental conditions"). 
183. Congressional Democrats have proposed several competing universal health insurance 
models. Two such plans call for a single-payer government insurance program modeled on the 
Canadian approach. S. 1146, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1300, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
A second model, commonly known as the "pay or play" strategy, would require employers to either 
provide their employees with health insurance or to contribute a percentage of their payrolls to a 
public insurance program. The public plan would then provide coverage to the employees of con-
tributors and to the unemployed. E.g. S. 1227, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3205, 102d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1991). The "pay or play" proposals now pending in Congress are variations on the univer-
sal insurance plan proposed in 1990 by the U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health 
Care (Pepper Comm'n). PEPPER COMM'N, A CALL FOR ACTION (1990). 
184. The Pepper Commission's universal insurance plan would have required an additional $24 
billion in new federal revenues in 1990, id. at 69, a tax bite exceedingly unlikely to inspire enthusiasm 
among legislators preoccupied by the difficulties of federal deficit reduction. 
185. Senate Republicans have proposed incremental reform of the existing health care system as 
an alternative to a universal insurance plan. The Health Equity and Access Improvement Act of 
1991, sponsored by Senator John Chafee, offers tax credits to families whose total income is less than 
thirty-two thousand dollars per year. The plan also proposes tax deductions for those who are 
required to buy their own health insurance. Because persons currently receiving health insurance as 
part of their employment compensation package are not required to pay taxes on monies contributed 
by their employers toward insurance premiums, allowing individuals who do not receive insurance 
through their employers to deduct the premiums would lead to greater equity in the tax code. The 
proposal would also create a public program for those not eligible for Medicaid but with income 
levels below two hundred percent of the federal poverty level. S. 1936, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
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To pursue these horizontal growth opportunities, investor-owned 
chains must gain the confidence of a range of actors critical to the success 
of new inpatient ventures. These include community hospital board 
members, local community and political leaders, hospital unions, corpo-
rate health benefits managers, physicians, and potential patients. Their 
support will be essential to for-profit systems' efforts to gain hospital 
board approval for leasing or acquisition deals, to obtain necessary regu-
latory approvals, and to market new services. The investor-owned sys-
tems have looked to involvement with academic medicine as a means for 
achieving credibility in the eyes of these important decision makers. 
2. An Answer: The Appeal of Academic Affiliation 
The for-profit chains' interest in acquiring or leasing teaching hospi-
tals arose in the early, and mid-1980s as the firms searched for ways to 
sustain their extraordinary growth. The chains saw two classes of advan-
tage in owning or operating teaching facilities in partnership with aca-
demic institutions: (1) enhanced prestige and (2) the ability to offer 
specialized services and expertise. Although the major chains now har-
bor more selective .ambitions for horizontal growth, these advantages 
retain their strategic appeal. 
a. Enhanced prestige: During the early years of the twentieth cen-
tury, scores of profit-making, low-budget medical schools flourished in 
an unregulated environment, turning out large numbers of poorly trained 
graduates. Concerned about the profession's low prestige and earning 
power, the American Medical Association (AMA) embarked in 1904 on 
a campaign to raise standards sufficiently to put these enterprises out of 
business. Armed with a scathing 1910 report by the elite Carnegie Foun-
dation (the Flexner Report) documenting inadequate facilities and ram-
pant fraud at the proprietary schools, the AMA won wide acceptance 
among the states for its proposed minimum accreditation standards. 
Unable to upgrade their facilities and still turn a profit, proprietary 
schools closed down en masse. Some were acquired by nonprofit, univer-
sity-affiliated colleges of medicine. Between 1906 and 1922, the number 
of medical schools declined by half. 186 
The proprietary schools bequeathed to medicine a lingering percep-
tion of the for-profit form as associated with mediocrity or worse. This 
186. STARR, supra note 42, at 116-23. By 1922, the number of American medical schools had 
dropped to eighty-one, from 160 in 1906. /d. 
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image has been reinforced by the stereotype of the small proprietary hos-
pital founded by physicians who are unable to obtain admitting privileges 
elsewhere. 187 Today's investor-owned chains are heirs to this stigma. 
But by making a commitment to support academic excellence in 
medicine, the chains can project a powerful contrary image. Arguably, 
the chains could accomplish this through a program of large philan-
thropic contributions to nonprofit academic centers. Philanthropy alone, 
however, cannot convey the message about excellence the chains would 
most like to get across-that the for-profit form, in its modem, corporate 
incarnation, can breed its own excellence within. A chain can deliver this 
message directly by making a long-term commitment to academic excel-
lence within its operating system-for example, by owning or leasing a 
major teaching center and maintaining or even enhancing its quality. 
Announcement of such a commitment can yield some short-term 
public relations value, particularly if the academic program concerned 
has national or regional prestige. 188 But the targeted recipients of the 
message-voluntary hospital trustees, physicians, and civic leaders 
whose confidence is essential for chain expansion into the nonprofit sec-
tor-are unlikely to be won over by public relations alone. Entrusting a 
community hospital to a for-profit chain is not an impulsive decision eas-
ily influenced by an advertising pitch; it is the outcome of a process of 
considered judgment, involving multiple constituencies potentially 
affected by the change.189 If corporate commitment to research and 
teaching is to affect this judgment, it must be serious over the long 
haul-serious enough to withstand the critical scrutiny of potential sell-
ers or lessors, and of constituencies with influence over their decision. 
187. Bays, supra note 164, at 850. 
188. The outstanding example is Humana's Jarvik-7 artificial heart program. Humana 
"acquired" the financially struggling program from the University of Utah in 1984 by luring surgeon 
William DeVries with a promise to fund up to one hundred implants so long as the program yielded 
"scientific progress." HUMANA, INC., HUMANA AND THE ARTIFICIAL HEART (1985). The result 
was an unprecedented period of publicity for Humana as reporters from the television networks and 
leading newspapers flocked to Louisville to receive daily progress briefings on the Humana Heart 
Institute's first several implant patients. Humana has hardly been shy about its motives. David 
Jones, the firm's chairman and chief executive officer, recently boasted to investors about the implant 
program's importance for the firm's promotional strategy-winning recognition for the name 
"Humana" as "a national brand." Presentation by David Jones to the A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
Conference on Investing in the Midwest (Oct. 2, 1985) (on file with the Humana, Inc., Dept. of 
Public Affairs) [hereinafter Presentation by David Jones]. 
189. See Jessica Townsend, When Investor-Owned Corporations Buy Hospitals: Some Issues and 
Concerns, in THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE 
ENVIRONMENT 51 (Bradford H. Grayed., 1983) (presenting a study of decision-making processes 
and concerns of affected parties for four voluntary and county-owned community hospitals 
purchased by investor-owned chains in 1981). 
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Key decision makers must be convinced that the commitment is an 
expression of corporate personality, 190 not merely a public relations 
facade. 
b. Specialized services and expertise: When it operates a major 
teaching hospital, a chain has at its disposal a large reservoir of highly 
specialized expertise. The chain can draw upon this expertise in develop-
ing programs for its community hospitals and other facilities. Possibili-
ties include clinical consultations, specialized laboratory services, and 
continuing education programs for community physicians and allied 
health professionals. For physicians and hospital board members consid-
ering a sale or lease, access to such programs may be an added attraction. 
For the chain, concentration of certain costly, highly specialized, and 
infrequently used clinical services in a single place-the teaching hospi-
tal-is a cost-effective way to provide them for local facilities that might 
otherwise have to do without them. 191 
Similarly, well-established access for particularly ill or complicated 
patients to a teaching hospital's tertiary-care beds may strengthen a com-
munity hospital's ability to serve its locality's needs. 192 This could 
appeal both to potential sellers and to those community physicians who 
have a choice about where to hospitalize their patients. When a chain 
operates both community and tertiary care hospitals within a region, it 
can rationally place patients in the least costly facility that meets their 
needs. This is a powerful attraction in the new world of prospective pay-
ment and integrated, prepaid health plans. 
C. THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION STRATEGY 
In the early 1980s, Humana became the first of the chains to reori-
ent its growth strategy away from hospital acquisitions toward vertical 
integration. Sensing that cost control pressure from employers, private 
190. Cf. TOM PETERS & NANCY AUSTIN, A PASSION FOR EXCELLENCE: THE LEADERSHIP 
DIFFERENCE 98-106 (1985) (Passionate, consistent organizational commitment to quality across-the-
board is vital for preserving high morale and engendering customer confidence.). 
191. See Jeff Goldsmith, A Radical Prescription for Hospitals, HARV. Bus. REV., May/June 
1989, at 104 (urging health care organizations to economize by concentrating tertiary, acute care 
services in a small number of regional, high technology centers). 
192. Of course, community hospitals can forge such links with tertiary care centers without 
becoming part of for-profit, multi-hospital systems. Major teaching centers typically maintain loose 
ties with a network of free-standing community facilities. These ties, often sought by community 
hospitals interested in enriching their educational programs, frequently lead to patient referrals. 
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insurers, and the federal government placed new demands on provid-
ers-demands most effectively met by vertically integrated organiza-
tion 193-the firm began to refashion itself as a network of comprehensive 
care delivery systems. 194 To lay the groundwork, Humana negotiated 
affiliations with doctors along the lines of the "Preferred Provider Organ-
ization" (PPO) model. 195 The company promoted its hospitals, other 
facilities, and affiliated physicians as an integrated service system;196 it 
then marketed an insurance vehicle with a national brand name, 
"Humana Care Plus," to employers at rates below those for traditional 
insurance. 197 Humana Care Plus permitted subscribers to choose nonaf-
filiated hospitals and doctors, but it provided much more liberal benefits 
for patients who selected Humana hospitals and plan-affiliated 
physicians. 
Humana's major investor-owned competitors put similar prepaid 
plans on the market in 1985.198 These plans lacked Humana's intensive 
monitoring of clinical decisionmaking, which was considered necessary 
by industry observers to keep costs competitive, 199 and they were aban-
doned within a few years. But Humana's eventual success200 with this 
193. Some health services researchers predicted in the 1970s that the cost control imperative 
would catalyze a switch to vertical integration. Horizontal expansion, they argued, was a rational 
response to the incentives of cost-plus reimbursement, but it had little potential to produce the sav-
ings demanded by the new cost control ethos. Only vertical integration and the introduction of 
comprehensive, prepaid medical care plans could produce substantial cost reductions. See, e.g. Ste-
phen M. Shortell, The Researcher's View, in HOSPITALS IN THE 1980s: NINE Y1EWS (1977) (collec-
tion of articles published by the American Hospital Association). The demonstrated ability of 
HMOs to cut costs substantially by holding down hospital use supported Shortell's prediction, 
assuming a rational market response to cost control pressure. But some, including Paul Starr, cau-
tioned that health care organizations threatened by cost control pressure could obtain, in the polit-
ical arena, protections that would obviate the need to economize. STARR, supra note 43, at 442. 
194. Jennifer Bingham Hull, Medical Turmoil: Four Hospital Chains, Facing Lower Profits, 
Adopt New Strategies, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1985, at 1. 
195. Under the PPO model, doctors in private, fee-for-service practice agree to provide services 
at a discount for subscribers to a health insurance plan. Though subscribers may choose either 
affiliated or non-affiliated physicians, the plan's fee-for-service reimbursement schedule pays higher 
rates to affiliated doctors (who are contractually obligated not to bill subscribers for amounts greater 
than the fees set by the PPO). The affiliated physician who agrees to the plan's discounted fee 
schedule gains access to the PPO's patient pool. For the plan, the market power flowing from large 
numbers of subscribers make possible the purchase of fee-for-service care at a discount. 
196. Presentation by David Jones, supra note 188. 
197. Hull, supra note 194. 
198. Martin Tolchin, Private Hospitals Are Now Offering Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
1985, § A, at 1. 
199. See supra text accompanying note 132-34. Besides Humana, the only vertically integrated 
health services organization to achieve such cost-containment on a national scale is Kaiser 
Permanente, a nonprofit chain of HMOs. Stroud, supra note 30, at 1. 
200. Success was hardly immediate; Humana's prepaid plans suffered huge losses during their 
first several years, including a $129 million loss in 1986. Id. 
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concept2°1 has proven its tremendous potential. Thus far, Humana's suc-
cess and ambitious plans for future vertical growth have not inspired 
rivals to try again. But one or more may, particularly if Congress acts to 
require expanded employer or public financing (or both) for health 
services. 
1. The Potential Role of Academic Medical Centers 
For the vertically oriented approach, long-term commitments to 
teaching hospitals, via purchase or leasing deals, offer advantages similar 
to those for horizontal growth strategies. By integrating programs of 
academic excellence into their vertical systems, the chains can nurture 
perceptions that their "brand names" represent quality and prestige. 
Moreover, by including a teaching center's specialized capabilities within 
a prepaid health plan, a chain can extend the savings of vertical integra-
tion to tertiary services-such as inpatient referrals, clinical consulta-
tions, and specialized laboratory studies-for which it might otherwise 
need to hire (on a fee-for-service basis) outside consultants and contrac-
tors. A teaching center's potential as a source of training programs for 
medical and allied health personnel is attractive under vertical and hori-
zontal growth strategies. 
However, the marketing role of teaching center involvement may 
differ significantly under horizontal and vertical approaches. The differ-
ence lies in the identity of the actors whom the firm's promotional efforts 
aim to influence. Promotional strategy for horizontal growth must target 
(1) those with a role in a free standing hospital's decision to sell, and (2) 
those who determine which hospital an inpatient selects (typically, fee-
for-service physicians). For a vertical approach, the critical targets are 
the buyers of comprehensive, prepaid plans-generally employers, who 
may be influenced by feedback from employees. The targets of the hori-
zontal strategy, nonprofit hospital trustees and administrators, commu-
nity leaders, and physicians, are likely to scrutinize a chain's claims 
closely, with a sophisticated eye toward distinguishing between genuine 
commitment to quality and promotional facade. 202 The managers of 
employers in the market for prepaid, comprehensive plans may be less 
able or inclined to investigate, preoccupied as they are by the imperatives 
of cost reduction. They may thus be more vulnerable to a hospital 
chain's exploitation of an academic program's prestige for promotional 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90. 
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purposes, without real commitment to maintaining that program's 
excellence. 
In the long run, however, it would be strategically unwise for a 
chain to milk an academic program's prestige without preserving its 
quality. Given the outspokenness of academics,203 the word would ulti-
mately get out and the chain's reputation (and marketability) would be 
sullied. But under the immediate pressure of today's wide-open competi-
tion between prepaid plans, a chain could succumb to short-term tempta-
tion.204 A teaching center's leadership ought to be aware of this hazard 
as it negotiates postsale or postlease protections for academic programs. 
Yet the center's negotiators should also remain aware that an 
acquiring chain's long-term interests are best served by serious and sus-
tained commitment, not economic rape, even in the new climate of 
intense competition between prepaid plans. To take full business advan-
tage of an academic center's prestige and expertise, an investor-owned 
chain must win, then hold, the confidence of its faculty. Chain execu-
tives at least claim to understand this.205 In presentations to academic 
administrators, they have emphasized their willingness to subsidize terti-
ary services that operate at a loss. They have argued that this makes 
good financial sense because these services provide clinically necessary 
support for a profitable, vertically integrated, comprehensive care system 
within a region. 206 
This kind of pragmatic business rationale will dictate chain deci-
sions about teaching hospital acquisitions. Though some observers in the 
mid-1980s predicted a large wave of teaching center takeovers, a limited 
number of highly selective purchase and leasing bids is more likely.2°7 
203. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 2-6. 
204. It might even be economically rational in the long run for a chain to pursue such an 
exploitative marketing strategy. If quick, disingenuously-achieved success in the promotion of its 
prepaid plans drove significant competitors out of its markets, a chain could then pare costs (and 
boost profits) by reducing support for academic programs, without risk of losing subscribers unless 
significant competitors re-entered its markets. 
205. See, e.g., Remarks by David Rollo, Humana, Inc., Senior Vice President for Medical 
Affairs, reprinted in THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL EDU· 
CATION: AN UNCERTAIN CoURTSHIP 120 (1986) [hereinafter Remarks by Rollo]. 
206. See, e.g., id. at 134; Remarks by David Williamson, HCA Executive Vice President for 
Development, reprinted in THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL 
EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN CoURTSHIP 133 (1986). 
207. ·Five years ago, when the for-profit systems' expansion plans were more ambitious than 
they are today, John Moxley, a senior AMI executive responsible for his firm's arrangements with 
academic centers, predicted that by 1995 the chains would become involved (via purchase or lease) 
with no more than twenty major teaching hospitals by 1995. Remarks by John Moxley, AMI Senior 
Vice President and Director of Corporate Strategic Planning and Alternative Services, reprinted in 
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Academic centers, like any other acquisitions, will need to fit into the 
vertical integration strategy.208 
2. The AMI Paradigm 
In the mid-1980s, AMI developed a comprehensive approach to the 
problem of reconciling an academic center's needs with the imperatives 
of vertical integration. The firm created a separate unit concerned exclu-
sively with relations between the firm and academic centers, 209 cultivated 
a benevolent image with teaching hospital administrators, and stated its 
intention to make teaching centers into "regional hubs" in a nationwide, 
comprehensive care network. 210 Even more, AMI indicated an interest 
in making teaching centers its partners in the design, development, and 
staffing of regional care delivery systems. 
AMI articulated this approach most fully during talks with George 
Washington University in 1985 about a possible purchase or lease of the 
university's hospital. AMI urged that any sale or lease be made part of a 
broader arrangement between the university and the company for the 
THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN UNCER· 
TAIN CoURTSHIP 114, 117 (1986). 
There are about 150 to 175 major teaching hospitals (institutions with residency programs in 
most fields and more than one hundred house stafi) affiliated with the nation's 127 medical schools. 
About sixty are owned by universities (both public and private); the remainder are owned by a 
variety of government and private entities. Ruth Hanft, For-Profit Hospitals: The Implications for 
Teaching and Research (Oct. 4, 1984) (unpublished paper, presented to the George Washington 
University 1984 Harold and Jane Hirsh Symposium, on file at the Institute of Medicine, Division of 
Health Care Services). 
208. See, e.g., Remarks of Marvin Dunn, AMI Vice President for Academic Medical Centers, 
reprinted in THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL EDUCATION: 
AN UNCERTAIN CoURTSHIP 168 (1986) (AMI's plan in the mid-1980s for a single major tertiary 
care center in each region-"an academic medical center is a perfect example"-to "anchor" the 
company's "vertically integrated health care system" within the region). Although AMI's insurance 
losses in the late 1980s and a subsequent leveraged buyout by management cut short its vertical 
integration program, the role AMI envisioned for academic centers represents a model for vertical 
integration in the 1990s. 
209. The unit is headed by two former medical school deans, John Moxley III, Senior Vice 
President and Director of Corporate Strategic Planning and Alternative Services (formerly Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and Dean at the University of Maryland and University of 
California at San Diego Schools of Medicine); and Marvin Dunn, Vice President for Academic Med-
ical Centers (formerly Dean of the University of Texas Medical School at San Antonio). 
210. See, e.g., Letter from AMI Senior Vice President John Moxley III & Group Vice President 
Keith Weikel to Philip Birnbaum, George Washington University Medical Center (GWUMC) Dean 
for Administrative Affairs app.III at 19 (Sept. 20, 1984) (on file at the GWUMC Office of the Dean 
for Administrative Affairs) [hereinafter AMI Letter]. This document, part of a joint AMI/ 
GWUMC study of the feasibility of a purchase or leasing deal, stated that "AMI's principal strategic 
thrust over the next five years" would be the development of a network of such "regional hubs," 
each linked to community hospitals and a variety of ambulatory care facilities. /d. 
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joint development of a vertically integrated system.211 Initially, the sys-
tem was to include a faculty-staffed HM0212 and area community hospi-
tals operated by AMI. AMI envisioned the eventual joint development 
of an expanded ambulatory care network, a home care project, and new 
teaching and referral links with the region's community hospitals.213 
With promotional and financial support from AMI corporate headquar-
ters, the system was to market a variety of prepaid, comprehensive care 
plans to employers and individuals in the Washington, D.C. metropoli-
tan area. AMI proposed to delegate operating authority over the system 
to a seven-member governing board with a four to three university 
majority.214 The university agreed in principle to the concept of a 
regional network and the governing board arrangement. 215 
After inviting competing proposals from other investor-owned sys-
tems, the university entered a second round of more intensive and 
detailed talks with AMI.216 Company officials spoke of George Wash-
ington as a model for the relationships the firm hoped to develop with 
teaching centers elsewhere--relationships that would make academic 
centers the keystones of AMI's vertical integration strategy. But in 1986, 
in the face of mounting financial difficulties, AMI began to reevaluate its 
vertical integration plans. The firm broke off negotiations with George 
Washington in late 1986217 and abandoned the vertical integration con-
cept a year later.218 Nevertheless, the AMI paradigm retains promise for 
investor-owned systems interested in vertical integration. 
For teaching hospital administrators, the AMI model holds promise 
as a way to benefit from the financial, management, and marketing 
211. /d. at 2, app. III at 10-11. 
212. The university had owned and operated the HMO for twelve years. In an action which 
university officials characterized as "separate" from their talks with AMI about possible sale or lease 
of the hospital, the university issued a "Request for Proposals" for purchase or development of a 
joint venture with the HMO. AMI's efforts to broaden its discussions with George Washington 
included a bid on the HMO and an expression of interest in the university's highly successful faculty 
practice plan. O'Leary, supra note 154, at 96-97. 
213. AMI Letter, supra note 210, app. III at 10-11. 
214. /d. app. I at 8. The Board was to be chaired by George Washington University's Vice 
President for Medical Affairs and to include the medical school's three deans for Administrative, 
Clinical, and Academic Affairs, plus three AMI executives. 
215. Remarks by Philip Birnbaum, George Washington University Medical Center Dean for 
Administrative Affairs, reprinted in THE INVESfOR·RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND 
MEDICAN EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN COURTSHIP 53, 54-55 (1986). 
216. /d. at 55; Interview with Philip Birnbaum in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1985). 
217. Michael Abramowitz, GWU Hospital Ends Leasing Talks, WASH. PoST, Oct. 17, 1986, at 
Fl (attributing termination of talks to AMI's worsening financial problems and consequent loss of 
interest in leasing or buying the hospital). 
218. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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strengths of an investor-owned chain while retaining the authority to 
protect (or add) desired research and teaching programs, as well as 
related tertiary services. The AMI approach could provide access to 
research and teaching opportunities throughout an integrated, regional 
medical services system. Whenever cost considerations and academic 
aspirations conflict (as must occur often whether a hospital is investor-
owned or not-for-profit), the joint governing board mechanism provides a 
forum for dialogue and compromise. 
As of this writing, only Humana, the industry leader, is aggressively 
pursuing vertical integration. 219 Humana's acquisition of a major teach-
ing center and its affiliated HMO in Chicago in October, 1990Z20 suggests 
that academic centers may play an important role in the company's cam-
paign to develop prepaid health plans in new markets. But the place of 
teaching hospitals in Humana's growth program remains undefined. 
Governance arrangements for Humana's embryonic Chicago area net-
work have not yet been worked out. Humana, generally considered the 
most centralized of the chains, 221 has not thus far embraced the AMI 
paradigm of academic centers as regional hubs with a central role in fash-
ioning integrated service systems. In 1983, the Louisville-based company 
signed a long-term leasing agreement with the commonwealth of Ken-
tucky to operate the University of Louisville School of Medicine's princi-
ple teaching affiliate, which the firm renamed "Humana Hospital-
University." But unti11990, Humana did not consumate another leasing 
or purchase deal involving an academic center.222 
Meanwhile, the company has pursued a parallel tertiary care track, 
unlinked to academic medicine. In 1982, Humana began its "Centers of 
Excellence" program, a systematic effort to develop a "network of 
regional referral and consultation centers" within company-owned hospi-
tals not tied to medical schools.223 By early 1985, the firm had desig-
nated (by subspecialty) fourteen centers at twelve hospitals in eight 
states.224 Through August 1984, the tax-exempt "Humana Foundation" 
had channeled $661,000 to these centers for so-called "clinical research 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201. 
220. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
221. Siegrist, supra note 130, at 45. 
222. A 1984 agreement between Humana and the Chicago Medical School to build and operate 
a new teaching hospital was abandoned in 1988 after Humana failed to obtain the necessary regula-
tory approval. See supra note 379. 
223. HUMANA, INC., CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE 2 (1985) (promotional pamphlet). 
224. ld. at 7 (three for cardiovascular disease, three for diabetes, and one each for bums, pulmo-
nary disease, spinal injuries, complicated neurological problems, orthopedics, ophthalmology, and 
obstetrics and gynecology). 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1085 1991-1992
1992] CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF TEACHING HOSPITALS 1085 
and medical education,',225 including trials of potentially income-produc-
ing treatments and training programs for community physicians and 
allied professionals. 
At the University of Louisville School of Medicine, "Centers of 
Excellence, and other Humana research and referral programs have 
aroused concern. Dean Donald Kmetz, chief of staff at Humana Hospi-
tal-University, complained publicly about Humana•s decision to base 
its high-profile artificial heart program226 at another Humana hospital in 
the Louisville area.227 Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and 
additional sophisticated, tertiary care technologies were also first 
awarded to other area facilities instead of to Humana Hospital-Univer-
sity. Instead of "a great networking of Humana hospital services, in 
Louisville, with the company-run teaching hospital as the referral hub, 
there has been fierce competition between Humana•s facilities in the 
region.228 For the University of Louisville, ambivalence at corporate 
headquarters about whether to rely wholly on academic centers for terti-
ary services or to develop tertiary capacities at non-teaching facilities has 
meant fewer resources and a less diverse patient base for teaching and 
research. Other academic institutions contemplating alliances with 
Humana would do well to bargain vigorously for governance structures 
similar to the one proposed by AMI during its talks with George 
Washington. 
V. THRESHOLD OBJECTIONS: MORALITY AND 
ECONOMICS 
At fiscally troubled academic centers around the nation, the poten-
tial economic benefits of alliance with the investor-owned health services 
sector have generated interest among trustees and administrators. But a 
strong current of opinion within academic medicine holds that such alli-
ances ought to be avoided. Adherents to this view assert that the very 
presence of for-profit enterprise in health care is so objectionable in prin-
ciple that medical academia ought to eschew involvement with it. Even 
225. Id. at 37. 
226. See supra note 188. 
227. Donald R. Kmetz, The Investor-Owned Hospital in an Academic Medical Center, in THE 
INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN 
COURTSHIP 172, 178-79 (1986). The implant program was given to Humana Hospital-Audubon's 
"Humana Heart Institute International," one of the company's designated "Centers of Excellence." 
I d. 
228. Id. 
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if investor-owned hospital chains must be tolerated as a distasteful inevi-
tability, these critics contend, chain ownership or lessorship of a teaching 
hospital (1) sets an undesirable example and (2) poses intolerable dangers 
for the hospital's academic missions. 
Though often passionately stated, these threshold objections tend to 
be incompletely articulated. The reasoning behind them is often frag-
mentary. Opponents of any role for investor-owned enterprise in aca-
demic medicine express a mixture of moral, economic, and other 
concerns. I will examine these concerns by reconstructing and assessing 
the premises and reasoning behind them. 
A. MEDICAL CARE AS A RIGHT 
Those opposed in principle to the delivery of hospital services by 
investor-owned firms must at the outset face an obvious problem-the 
great bulk of our goods and services are provided for a profit without 
provoking widespread outrage in our society. Thus, if their argument is 
to remain within the moral mainstream of a capitalist culture, 229 it must 
start with the proposition that what hospitals do is somehow different-
so different that the profit motive in conjunction with market mecha-
nisms is incapable of generating and distributing hospital services in a 
manner tolerable to our communal values. 230 However, some state this 
proposition as though it were self-evident. Satisfied with their own insis-
tence that medical care is vital for health and therefore a right, mor-
ally231 if not legally, 232 they declare without explanation that its sale for a 
229. It need not, of course; some who oppose the sale of health services for a profit do so 
because they reject the capitalist approach to distribution of goods and services more generally. 
Their objections do not specifically target medical services and thus lie beyond the framework of my 
analysis here. 
230. For a discussion of the importance of medical resource allocation decisions to the evolution 
of our communal life, and of the consequent hazards of making medical allocative choices that break 
with cherished (even if mythic) moral norms, see Richard A. Burt, The Ideal of Community in the 
Work of the President's Commission, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 267 (1984). 
231. The idea of a right to medical care, deducible from a right to health, won wide cultural 
acceptance in the 1970s. See STARR, supra note 42, at 389. But in the 1980s the language of rights 
played a diminished role in advocacy efforts by scholarly commentators and political leaders com-
mitted to making medical services universally available. In 1983, the President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research concluded that 
society has an "ethical obligation" to ensure all citizens of access to "an adequate level of care 
without excessive burdens." In doing so, the commission explicitly eschewed the concept of a 
"right": 
Discussions of a right to health care have frequently been premised on offering patients 
access to all beneficial care, to all care that others are receiving, or to all that they need-or 
want. By creating impossible demands on society's resources for health care, such formu-
lations have risked negating the entire notion of a moral obligation to secure care for those 
who lack it. 
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profit is repugnant to our values.233 But an explanation is essential in our 
social context, because other goods that are equally vital-including 
food, clothing, and shelter-are provided for a profit, via market mecha-
nisms, without arousing widespread moral indignation.234 
The commission also concluded that society's "ethical obligation" to ensure access to care is "bal-
anced" by "individual obligations" to pay a "fair share" of one's medical costs and to reduce health 
risks. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 1-6 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]. 
The Commission's (and others') avoidance of rights language has been sharply criticized by 
right-to-health care advocates. See, e.g., John D. Arras, Retreat from the Right to Health Care: The 
President's Commission and Access to Health Care, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 321 (1984); Ronald Bayer, 
Ethics, Politics, and Access to Health Care: A Critical Analysis of the President's Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 6 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 303 (1984). But the Commission's approach is consistent with emerging notions of commUIIal 
obligation as the basis for public provision of services to the needy. See MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICES 64-94 (1983); Joel Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modem/ 
Postmodem Search for Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 999 (1988). 
232. American courts have not recognized a right to health care, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 317-318 (1980) (stating that the U.S. Constitution confers no entitlement to government-sup-
ported medical services), except in the case of statutory entitlements such as Medicaid, and for 
involuntarily confined persons. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment requires that prisoners be given 
medical care); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (The Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment confers right to treatment upon psychiatric patients hospitalized against their 
will.). 
Attempts to establish a common law right to emergency treatment in some circumstances, by 
creating exceptions to the tort principle that an actor has no duty to rescue others in distress, have 
met with limited success. See GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 57-63 (1990). 
Moreover, some judges have said that government administrative action touching upon health and 
medicine may merit especially close scrutiny for procedural fairness and analytic thoroughness 
because health interests have "always had a special claim to judicial protection," Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.) (not explicitly 
invoking the Due Process Clause), but no court has employed this argument to constrain govern-
ment action in the health care delivery sphere. 
233. Even if medical care is a right, it hardly follows that the sale of medical services, whether 
for a profit or for compensation not conceptualized as including a profit, is contrary to our values. 
The claim that one ought to have a right to receive health services (even if one cannot pay for them) 
can be satisfied through public subsidies that enable anyone in need to purchase care. 
234. Margaret Jane Radin has made the most comprehensive recent attempt to articulate a way 
of distinguishing between goods that should and should not be exchangeable for money (not quite 
the same as distinguishing between things that should and should not be sold for a profit). See 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987). Rejecting market-
failure analysis of restrictions on the alienation of goods and services, Radin argues that our beliefs 
about what should and should not be alienable (completely or with some restraints) are tied to our 
sense of these things' importance to the "personhood" of the potential seller. Id. at 1903. Goods 
that are central to the prospective seller's personhood according to an ideal "conception of human 
flourishing" should be inalienable, although certain "nonideal circumstances" may justify limited 
alienability. Id. at 1904. Radin's examples of such goods include sexuality and the bearing of chil-
dren. By this measure, the alienability of virtually all health services should not be objectionable. 
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Government and private entities, it is true, provide subsidies or 
otherwise modify market mechanisms in order to enable poor individuals 
to purchase some minimum amount of these vital goods. Such modifica-
tions reduce to a socially tolerable level the negative moral externalities 
generated by the distribution of vital goods via the marketplace to con-
sumers with unequal wealth. 235 The fact that market modifications can 
make the provision of many vital goods for a profit tolerable illustrates 
the need for opponents of the for-profit hospital chains to distinguish 
hospital services from other vital goods in order to make a coherent case 
against the chains. 
B. ARNOLD RELMAN'S CRITIQUE 
More sophisticated critics of the chains attempt to make such a dis-
tinction. Within the academic medical community, Arnold Reiman, 
until recently the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, has 
emerged as the most active and prominent foe of investor-owned care. I 
will therefore focus most closely on Reiman's critique, both because of its 
influence and because it represents the most serious attempt to articulate 
a rational basis for opposition to the for-profit form in health care. 236 
Reiman does not challenge the legitimacy of for-profit enterprise for the 
supply of most goods and services. 237 He finds "nothing particularly 
worrisome" about the provision of pharmaceuticals and medical equip-
ment for a profit,Z38 though surely they play a vital role in the delivery of 
clinical care. But he contends that there is a critical distinction between 
235. These external costs-the affront to our respect for the lives of individuals regardless of 
their lot-may be separated into two categories: (I) the "costs of costing" (the insult to our respect 
for life which results from an explicit assignment of a dollar value to "some precious activity integral 
to life") and (2) the insult to egalitarian values which results from the differential availability of a 
"precious activity integral to life" among purchasers with unequal distributions of wealth. GUIDO 
CALABRESI & PHILLIP BOBBIIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 32-34 (1978). These negative externalities are 
incidental to market distribution of such "precious activity" by either for-profit or non-profit suppli-
ers. But they are greatly magnified in the for-profit setting by the contrast between a purchaser's 
vital dependence on the "precious activity" and the presence of a class of individuals-investors-
frankly motivated to exploit this vulnerability for maximum personal gain. 
236. Another reason for focusing on Reiman's critique is that his intuitions are widely shared in 
the medical profession. No other author, in my judgment, has so eloquently captured physicians' 
anxiety about the emergence of large, investor-owned hospital corporations. My emphasis on 
Reiman's work represents an acknowledgment of his singular success in articulating the unstated 
concerns of many physicians. 
237. American College of Physicians, The Medical-Industrial Complex, URBAN HEALTH, July 
1984, at 30, 51 (debate between ArnoldS. Reiman and National Medical Enterprises President John 
Bedrosian) [hereinafter Reiman-Bedrosian Debate]. 
238. Arnold S. Reiman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 963 
(1980). 
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the supply of drugs or equipment and the provision of medical services by 
investor-owned enterprise.239 
In support of this claimed distinction, Reiman repeats the refrain, 
unhelpful to his case for the reasons just discussed, that health care is "a 
basic right of all citizens."240 But he then proceeds to make several addi-
tional arguments in support of the distinction: (1) health services are a 
"public good" and thus cannot be left to the marketplace; (2) consumers, 
when they become patients, demand medical care "virtually without con-
cern for price," rendering "the classic laws of supply and demand" inop-
erative; and (3) patients' dependence upon their physicians' judgment 
renders them unacceptably vulnerable to abuse by for-profit health care 
providers.241 As a basis for objecting to the entry of for-profit entities 
into the market for hospital services, each of these arguments collapses 
on close inspection. 
1. Medical Care as a Public Good 
Reiman's claim that medical services are a public good and there-
fore should not be left to market mechanisms is an apparent allusion to 
the conventional welfare economics principle that private firms under 
competitive conditions tend to supply public goods in quantities below 
socially optimal levels. The normative implication of this principle is 
that government-along with private, not-for-profit providers242-ought 
to step into the breach and provide public goods at optimal levels. 
Because for-profit firms, driven by market incentives, will inevitably 
undersupply public goods, conversion of a hospital from nonprofit to for-
profit status will lead to the shutdown of services necessary for optimal-
ity, according to Relman.243 
However, Reiman's allusion to the welfare economics concept of 
public good misapprehends its meaning. A service or commodity is a 
public good in the economic sense to the extent that its consumption by 
any one actor does not reduce the quantity available to others in a given 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 966. 
241. Id. at 966-67. 
242. See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR (1977) (contending 
that the primary economic role of nonprofit organizations is to fill gaps in government provision of 
public goods). 
243. Reiman does not explicitly state this; he merely declares that health care "is a public rather 
than a private good" and claims that public subsidies for medical care are "in recognition of this 
fact." Reiman, supra note 238, at 966. This fragment of reasoning, though, makes little sense except 
as an allusion to the welfare economics theory of public goods in support of his claim that for-profit 
hospitals will fail to provide many socially needed services. 
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community. In other words, a good is "public" to the degree that pro-
viding it for any one consumer makes the good available to all without 
additional cost. 244 Some theorists also impose the condition that provi-
sion of the good to any one consumer is not possible without supplying it 
to others-that is, nonpaying consumers cannot be excluded. 245 
Although other analysts allow the possibility of excluding nonpaying 
consumers, they point out that there are costs involved in excluding 
nonpayers and determining prices that will achieve optimal provision of 
the good.246 Either way, commercial firms will lack sufficient incentive 
to provide public goods in quantities that maximize social welfare. 
Classic examples of public goods include lighthouses, radio broad-
casts, and clean air. Biomedical research results are also a public good 
when reported in accessible journals. However, medical care is not a 
public good. Provision of clinical care to one patient does not make that 
care available to others without additional cost. For any given level of 
aggregate medical services expenditure, caring for one patient reduces 
the services available to others. Moveover, exclusion of nonpaying 
patients poses little administrative difficulty.247 Thus, conventional pub-
lic goods analysis does not support the prediction that for-profit firms 
will supply hospital services at a level below the social optimum, given an 
acceptance of the current distribution of wealth and of consumers' mar-
ginal rates of substitution for medical care relative to other goods. 
Yet a variant of the public goods concept has great relevance for the 
welfare economics of medical care. Consumption of any private good 
evokes emotional responses among members of the consumer's commu-
nity. Though not readily quantifiable in dollar terms and rarely the sub-
ject of economic analysis, these responses can be conceptualized as 
244. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 539 (2d ed. 1980). 
245. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 49-80 (2d ed. 1976). 
246. See, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 244, at 541-43. The expense of excluding free riders 
may for some goods involve a calculable package of transaction costs (e.g., for television broadcasts, 
the expense of developing and administering a system for scrambling signals), while for other goods 
it may be incalculable (e.g., for scientific research, the affront to free speech values and the inhibition 
of future progress that would result from restrictions on publication), or even inconceivable (e.g., in 
the case of clean air). 
The cost of setting optimal prices is primarily that of monitoring consumers' marginal rates of 
substitution in consumption, since optimal provision of the good requires price discrimination in 
accordance with these marginal rates. /d. at 541-42. 
247. The moral cost of excluding nonpayers-the affront to our respect for human life, dignity 
and equality-is another matter. 
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externalities, and they can significantly affect social welfare. These exter-
nalities may be negative for consumption of certain goods by certain con-
sumers-for example, purchase of a Mercedes Benz by a twenty-five-
year-old investment banker-or positive, as when a critically ill twenty-
five-year-old obtains lifesaving medical care. Complex interplays occur 
between conflicting feelings, such as envy and empathy, which are rooted 
in cultural norms and individual character. 
More than for almost any other good in our secular culture, the net 
emotional externality generated by medical care is strongly positive. Our 
belief that others are receiving needed care gratifies our empathic needs 
and fulfills our respect for human life and dignity. In this sense, medical 
care has a public-good dimension. 248 Provision of needed care to any one 
patient contributes to the welfare of others at no additional cost. Exclu-
sion of nonpayers from this utility gain is impossible. 
If all consumers were willing and able to buy the amount of health 
care that society perceives as needed, market mechanisms would be ade-
quate to satisfy, to a close approximation, consumers' aggregate desire to 
believe that everyone receives needed care. 249 But pure market mecha-
nisms ~annot provide all the care needed (according to social consensus) 
by consumers unable or unwilling to purchase it. 250 Thus, the market, 
unaided, will undersupply (relative to the social optimum) the public-
good or positive-externality aspect of medical care-the gratification 
derived from the belief that all in the community are receiving needed 
care. 
Whether organized as for-profit or nonprofit corporations, hospitals 
driven by market forces will therefore tend to undersupply clinical serv-
ices relative to the social optimum as defined by citizens' subjective sense 
of their needs.251 Biomedical research, more classically a public good, 
248. Public goods are a species of beneficial externality. HtRSHLEIFER, supra note 244, at 539. 
249. In theory, medical services would still be undersupplied, because market mechanisms pro-. 
vide no opportunity to mediate the positive emotional externality aspect of medical care. But this 
undersupply should not be particularly large, because (1) marginal preferences for medical care (rel-
ative to other commodities), in both its private and public good aspects, ought to drop precipitously 
to zero for care in excess of each individual's sensed need, and (2) demand for medical care at levels 
beneath consumers' sensed need is likely to be relatively inelastic. 
250. American political institutions periodically restate this consensus (although they have yet 
to fully implement it) by insisting that society has an obligation to provide medical care to all who 
need it. See, e.g., Pepper Commission, supra note 183; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 231. 
251. This characterization is so even though market-driven institutions may oversupply clinical 
services, judged by the criterion of substantial biological efficacy, because consumers (or their physi-
cian purchasing agents) perceive a need for some clinical services that may actually possess only 
minimal biological efficacy. 
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will also be performed by purely market-driven institutions at socially 
suboptimal levels. 252 
But this is hardly a convincing rationale for objecting to the entry of 
investor-owned institutions into the market for medical care or research. 
The optimality gap can be filled by governm~nt action abetted by private 
philanthropy. That action can take several forms, including (1) direct 
provision of care or performance of research by government or philan-
thropic institutions;253 (2) government or philanthropic subsidies for pri-
vate sector health care and research institutions;254 and (3) government 
or philanthropic subsidies for purchasers of clinical services from private 
sector providers. 255 Investor-owned institutions, meanwhile, can con-
tinue to operate, enabling society to take advantage of their efficiencies 
while publi~ policy and private philanthropy correct for the market fail-
ures discussed above. 
Reiman accurately observes that investor-owned hospital chains 
exploit government action-in particular, publicly-funded medical 
research and development-for their own gain. 256 Without explanation, 
he takes umbrage at this fact, as though there is some essential immoral-
ity in selling hospital services for a profit. But investor-owned firms in a 
vast range of industries benefit in one way or another from government 
spending. Air carriers take advantage of government support for air-
ports and traffic control; farmers receive huge federal subsidies; and 
defense contractors exploit federal research and development outlays. 
The activist liberal state subsidizes not only public goods but myriad pri-
vate goods employed as factors of production by for-profit firms. Inves-
tor-owned pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies, about 
which Reiman finds "nothing particularly worrisome,"257 rely heavily 
upon publicly funded research in developing and promoting new prod-
ucts. 258 Reiman's objection to the for-profit hospital chains' similar reli-
ance on government-sponsored research is out of synchrony with the 
252. Reiman makes this point, albeit selectively for investor-owned institutions. Reiman, supra 
note 238, at 966-67. Economists would not dispute him, though the point is applicable to all market· 
driven institutions, whatever their legal form. 
253. Municipally-owned hospitals for the indigent and the NIH intramural research program 
are examples. 
254. The Hill-Burton grant program for community hospital construction and NIH grants to 
researchers at private institutions are examples. 
255. Medicare and Medicaid are the outstanding examples. 
256. Reiman-Bedrosian Debate, supra note 237, at 34 (Reiman's comments). 
257. Reiman, supra note 238, at 963. 
258. Indeed, because investor-owned hospitals benefit from publicly-sponsored research which 
is generally garnered by use of technologies purchased from pharmaceutical and medical equipment 
providers. The pharmaceutical and equipment firms' exploitation of such research is more direct. 
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realities of the modern, activist state and inconsistent with his toleration 
of public spending for other capitalist enterprise. 
2. The Price-Auction Model and Consumer Insensitivity to Cost 
Reiman contends that because patients demand medical care "virtu-
ally without concern for price," the "classic laws of supply and demand" 
do not operate in the health care market. Consumers of clinical services, 
Reiman notes, tend to be quite insensitive to cost. Even when paying 
their own way, without insurance, worried patients facing hard choices 
about their care are likely to deviate from the classic price-auction model 
of the perfectly prudent, discriminating consumer. When insurance 
enters the picture, in either the cost-based or prospective payment form, 
consumers' cost-discriminating inclinations diminish further; they recede 
to the vanishing point when all expenses are covered.259 Thus, says 
Reiman, reliance on profit-seeking firms for the provision of hospital 
services is fraught with "obvious ... possibilities for abuse and for distor-
tion of social purposes. " 260 
a. Imperfect cost discrimination: Though fragmentary in form, 
this critique of the classic price-auction model in the medical care con-
text is on target. Faced with the threat of illness, a rational, self-paying 
consumer must balance the benefits of seeking an optimal price-quality 
trade-off position against the costs of "shopping around"-for example, 
real and feared dangers that an illness may progress and psychic discom-
fort from prolonging critical decisions. Such a balancing process may 
result in some heuristically planned cost-saving efforts.261 But unless 
competing providers of care can make market information so readily 
available to patients (or their purchasing agents) that their cost of gather-
ing it is negligible, patients will discriminate imperfectly in their medical 
care consumption choices. They will thus be vulnerable to financial 
exploitation by providers. 
Imperfect cost discrimination is encouraged by insurance. Insur-
ance shifts the financial cost of imperfect discrimination from each indi-
vidual patient to the group covered by a given plan. Within a covered 
group, in other words, insurance externalizes the negative internalities 
259. See Reiman, supra note 238, at 966. 
260. Id. at 967. 
261. Cf. LESTER C. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF EcONOMICS 226 (1983) 
(A "realistic model of 'rational' choice will take into account a strategic view of the world where 
there is not enough time to maximize on every margin."). 
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created by each insured's imperfect cost discrimination in the consump-
tion of medical care. 262 The result, assuming an insurance plan with so 
many subscribers that externalization of the loss from each consumer's 
imperfect discrimination virtually eliminates individual loss, 263 is that a 
patient's incentive to discriminate with respect to cost diminishes in 
inverse proportion to his or her coverage.264 
Thus, the disciplinary power of consumers' cost discrimination is 
sharply attenuated in the medical care market. The resulting potential 
for exploitation means that the market will not necessarily maximize 
welfare. 265 
b. Unstable consumer preferences: Reiman's observation that 
patients facing the threat of illness are disinclined to shop for the best 
price points toward another more basic problem with applying the price-
auction model of welfare maximization to medical care. 266 The price-
auction model presumes that each individual possesses a set of stable and 
exogenous preferences267 that determine consumption and production 
decisions. Whatever the virtues of this simplifying assumption in other 
economic settings, 268 it is at sharp variance with consumers' actual 
262. This is more frequently referred to as the "moral hazard" of insurance, a term I have 
avoided because of its normative tone. 
263. That is, externalization of an individual's loss does not lead to a significant rise in that 
individual's insurance premium or health plan prepayment. 
264. This is so for HMO-type plans as well as for conventional cost- and charge-based insur-
ance. Cost savings in HMO-type plans are achieved not by changing the incentives of sick patients 
but by influencing providers' incentives and thus their clinical decisions and advice. 
265. Arguably, medical care consumers who discriminate imperfectly with respect to cost could 
still maximize welfare if only the system could be corrected for insurance's "externalizing of inter-
nalities." Imperfect cost discrimination might be viewed as the product of rational, utility-maximiz-
ing consumers' attempts to balance the advantages of a thorough search for the best deal against the 
costs of such a search (for example, sustained fear and other psychic discomfort, the real risk that a 
disease may progress, and lost opportunities). But even the most rationally-minded consumer can-
not meaningfully weigh unknown costs and benefits. And a consumer cannot know the value of 
forgone benefits-or costs-from alternatives he or she has not explored. These information imper-
fections render implausible the notion that price-auction mechanisms maximize welfare in this set-
ting. Moreover, health care providers concerned about generating income might be expected to be 
aware of consumers' imperfect cost discrimination and to set prices accordingly higher. 
The problem of imperfect cost discrimination is greatly compounded by the typical patient's 
uncertainty about the outcome of particular clinical services in his or her case and his or her inabil-
ity, as a non-expert in a highly technical field, to competently assess the probabilities. See infra text 
accompanying notes 279-81. 
266. Reiman does not explicitly raise the problem considered here. 
267. THUROW, supra note 261, at 22, 115. The model assumes, in other words, that life experi-
ence (including illness) does not influence preferences. 
268. However attractive mathematically, the assumption is at wide variance with reality. See id. 
at 115, 176, 219-20, 222-26 (Preferences are shaped by social context and continually change with 
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health care market behavior. Faced with the imminent threat of dread 
disease, patients seem willing to spend vast resources to achieve slight 
marginal decreases in probabilistic morbidity. In the absence of such a 
threat, consumers' relative preferences (or marginal rates of substitution 
in consumption) for the same marginal reduction in morbidity tend to be 
much lower.269 This tendency is evinced by consumers' unwillingness to 
make relatively minor lifestyle changes that can lead to large reductions 
in probabilistic morbidity. Given this quirk of human nature, it is not 
axiomatic that an unfettered market economy for clinical services will 
maximize welfare. Indeed, the state might achieve a much greater wel-
fare gain by acting to change lifestyle preferences and thereby inexpen-
sively effect major reductions in morbidity not attainable solely through 
deference to the clinical marketplace. 
c. The price-auction model's flaws and the nonprofit/for-profit dis-
tinction: When applied to health services, the competitive market is con-
ceptually problematic as a model for optimizing well-being. Its flaws 
raise serious doubts about the simple competitive ideal that has animated 
some recent legislative proposals for health care reform, 270 and about the 
increasingly competitive character of the medical care industry even 
without such reform. 271 For Reiman and other critics, investor-owned 
hospital chains have become the prime focus of these doubts.272 In con-
trast, these critics have looked approvingly upon the income-seeking 
behavior of nonprofit hospitals and even investor-owned pharmaceutical 
and medical equipment providers. 273 The basis for such a distinction is 
hardly compelling. 
ongoing economic and social activity; advertisers, psychiatrists, and others consume prodigious 
resources in attempts to change preferences.). 
269. One might also describe this tendency as a reflection of risk aversion. 
270. See Eli Ginzberg, Procompetition in Health Care: Policy or Fantasy?, 60 MILBANK MEMo-
RIAL FUND Q. 386 (1982) (critiquing the market model and procompetitive health care reform pro-
posals). But see Alain C. Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health Plan for the 
1990s, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 29 (1989); Alain C. Enthoven, The Competition Strategy: Status and 
Prospects, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 109 (1981) (discussing market-oriented reform proposals and 
offering a more sophisticated procompetitive approach featuring selective regulation and subsidies 
designed to compensate for market imperfections). 
271. See supra text accompanying notes 91-112. 
272. See, e.g., Leon Eisenberg, The Case Against For-Profit Hospitals, 35 HosP. & CoMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 1009 (1984). 
273. See, e.g., Reiman-Bedrosian Debate, supra note 237, at 32-33 (Reiman attempts to distin-
guish between the income-seeking behavior of for-profit and voluntary hospitals on the ground that 
only the voluntaries exist to serve "needs."). Reiman finds for-profit drug and medical equipment 
companies acceptable because "there are no practical alternatives" to private production of these 
products. Reiman, supra note 238, at 963. 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1096 1991-1992
1096 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1035 
A few sociologic studies indicate organizational differences between 
investor-owned and nonprofit hospitals that may reflect a greater com-
mitment by the former to generating income. 274 In addition, one careful 
study of nonprofit entrepreneurship suggests that administrators drawn 
to nonprofit organizations tend to be motivated, to a greater degree than 
their for-profit counterparts, by a variety of nonpecuniary aspirations 
that in turn distinguish the behavior of nonprofit from for-profit enter-
prises. 275 However, economic pressures on all hospitals are narrowing 
any gap between nonprofit and for-profit organizational behavior. 
Even before Medicare, as Henry Hansmann notes, nonprofit hospi-
tals had evolved from their nineteenth century status as charitable insti-
tutions-"sickhouses for the poor"-into primarily "commercial" 
institutions-providers of service to paying customers.276 No longer able 
to rely on donative support for more than a tiny fraction of their 
expenses, 277 they were compelled to support themselves, like any other 
business, by selling a product. Under mounting pressure from payers to 
hold down costs, nonprofit hospital administrators today are increasingly 
274. See, e.g., William A. Rushing, Profit and Nonprofit Orientations and the Differentiations-
Coordination Hypothesis for Organizations: A Study of Small General Hospitals, 41 AM. Soc. REV. 
676 (1976) (For-profit hospitals have higher correlation than do nonprofits between the complexity 
of their operations and the author's operationally defined measure of administrative activity; the 
author suggests that this reflects the for-profits' clearer "criteria for assessing operations" -the profit 
motive.). 
275. DENNIS R. YOUNG, IF NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT/ (1983) (arguing that entrepreneurs 
of different motivations and styles sort themselves otit by industries and economic sectors in a way 
that matches the preferences of these entrepreneurs for wealth, power, intellectual or moral purposes 
with the opportunities for achieving these goals in different parts of the economy). 
But cf. JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 128-58, 166-78 (2d ed. 1972) 
(Large, for-profit organizations pursue a variety of goals other than profit maximization, including 
survival, autonomy, growth, and technical virtuosity; these goals reflect individual employees' pur-
suit of their own pecuniary and non-pecuniary objectives.). 
276. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 866-67 (1980). 
Hansmann separates nonprofit organizations into two groups: "donative" (who receive most of their 
income from grants or donations) and "commercial" (who receive the bulk of their income as com-
pensation for services rendered). He subdivides each of these groups into "mutual" (controlled by 
patrons) and "entrepreneurial" (free from control by patrons, usually by virtue of a self-perpetuating 
board of directors) categories. /d. at 840-42. Within this conceptual scheme, hospitals have evolved 
from "donative, entrepreneurial" status into "commercial, entrepreneurial" entities. See also RoSE· 
MARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH 17-51 (1989) (tracing the transformation of Ameri-
can nonprofit hospitals into organizations primarily supported by revenues from paying patients). 
277. From 1962 to 1966, philanthropy accounted for only 2.4 percent of hospital revenues. Id. 
at 866 n.89 (citing statistics from the U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare). 
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thinking and acting like corporate managers, 278 sacrificing values tradi-
tionally associated with nonprofit health care.279 Whatever the differ-
ences in personal motivation between nonprofit and for-profit managers, 
competitive pressures appear to be forcing a convergence of institutional 
behavior. Reiman's selective assault on the for-profit segment of the hos-
pital industry is not a coherent response to the larger problem of welfare 
losses caused by the emergence of new, more competitive industry norms 
in the absence of government action to correct for major market 
imperfections. 
3. Market Discipline and the Patient's Dependence on Physician 
Judgment 
Reiman asserts that patients are unacceptably vulnerable to abuse 
by for-profit health care providers because of their dependence upon phy-
sicians' judgment. He separates this claim from his argument that the 
market for health care does not conform to the classic price-auction 
model because consumers do not act as perfectly prudent, discriminating 
purchasers. But it is in fact a closely related claim. The patient is so 
dependent upon physician judgment because of an extreme informational 
inequality: superior technical knowledge makes the doctor much better 
able than the patient to understand and assess the risks and benefits of 
alternative diagnostic and therapeutic measures. 280 This information 
278. See, e.g., Rashi Fein, What is Wrong with the Language of Medicine, 306 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 863 (1982) (sharply criticizing an emerging "bottom line" consciousness among health care 
managers); Irwin T. David, Why Tax-Exempt Hospitals Need Profit, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., 
Sept. 1982, at 46 (urging nonprofit hospital administrators to aim for operating surpluses, as a substi-
tute for philanthropy, in order to cover the cost of asset replacement); Ronald Copeland & Philip 
Jacobs, Cost of Capital, Target Rate of Return, and Investment Decision Making, 16 HEALTH SERV-
ICES RES. 335, 340 (1981) (debating whether a nonprofit hospital's managers should evaluate invest-
ments in terms of possible benefits for society or merely in terms of potential cash flows to the 
institution). 
279. David Hilfiker, A Doctor's View of Modem Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1986, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 44 (noting the increasing avoidance of indigent care by nonprofit university and commu-
nity hospitals). A variety of subterfuges are regularly used by nonprofit hospitals to avoid admitting 
patients who are unable to pay. One is the intake of insured or otherwise self-paying emergency 
patients through elective admission channels, bypassing sicker indigent patients waiting in the emer-
gency room, in order to avoid the appearance of preferential treatment for those able to pay. Per-
sonal communications, on condition of anonymity (1986). 
280. In economic language, the cost of acquiring state-of-the-art market information (that is, 
the physician's technical knowledge) is prohibitive for the patient. However, dependent patient 
behavior is occasionally beneficial: the temporary release of a sick person from the responsibilities of 
autonomous living may have a positive therapeutic effect. See TALCOTI PARSONS, THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM 428-47 (1951) (discussing the "sick role" and its benefits and hazards). 
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deficit renders the patient unable to independently make the discriminat-
ing demand decisions essential for discipline in a truly competitive 
market. 
Instead, the patient relies upon his or her physician as a virtual 
purchasing agent for more than seventy percent of his or her medical 
expenditures.281 Reiman invokes Kenneth Arrow's classic argument 
that traditional limits on physicians' self-aggrandizing behavior represent 
a welfare-optimizing adjustment for such heavy dependence. 282 Reiman 
asserts that for-profit hospital care violates these limits, risking "distor-
tion of social purposes."283 But this negative conclusion about for-profit 
hospitals does not follow logically from Arrow's argument about physi-
cians. A brief review of Arrow's reasoning makes this plain. 
a. Kenneth A"ow: Physicians' altruistic norms and the economics of 
clinical uncertainty: Arrow begins from the premise that consumer 
uncertainty about the efficacy of medical treatment is inevitable. He 
notes that entrepreneurs under competitive conditions theoretically 
could offer insurance against this uncertainty-that is, insurance against 
a failure to benefit from medical care. 284 Such "ideal insurance" would 
optimize social welfare in the face of uncertainty. In the absence of 
"ideal insurance,"285 the patient "wants to have some guarantee that at 
least the physician is using his knowledge to the best advantage."286 The 
medical profession, Arrow contends, has responded to this preference by 
281. ArnoldS. Reiman, The Allocation of Medical Resources by Physicians, 55 I. MED. Eouc. 
99 (1980). 
282. Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. 
REv. 941 (1963). 
283. Reiman, supra note 238, at 966-67; cf. Ginzberg, supra note 270 (invoking Arrow's analysis 
as a basis for opposition to legislative proposals for procompetitive health care reform). 
284. Such insurance might take the form of payment to the physician in accordance with the 
degree of benefit-that is, a transfer of the risk from the patient to his or her doctor-but the individ-
ual physician would surely be intensely averse to such risk-bearing. Risk-averse patients und doctors 
create room for entrepreneurship: insurance carriers could contract with either physicians or poten-
tial patients to pool individuals' risks of failure to benefit from medical care. Under such an "ideal 
insurance" program, Arrow notes, welfare would be optimized because "medical care will always be 
undertaken in any case in which the expected utility, taking account of the probabilities, exceeds the 
expected medical cost." The patient, in theory, would "have no concern with the informational 
inequality between himself and the physician, since he would only be paying by results ••. , and his 
utility position would •.. be thoroughly guaranteed." Arrow, supra note 282, at 964-65. 
285. Arrow makes no attempt to explain the non-existence of insurance against failure to benefit 
from medical care. Presumably, the answer has much to do with the difficulty of reliably assessing 
benefit and of placing a dollar value upon it. Benefits from medical care-whether through recovery, 
relief of discomfort, or slowing of deterioration-are intensely subjective things, in contrast to the 
financial cost of delivering care. 
286. /d. at 965. 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1099 1991-1992
1992] CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF TEACHING HOSPITALS 1099 
proclaiming its adherence to a set of ethical precepts intended to invite 
patient trust and confidence.287 The common theme behind these 
precepts is avoidance of "the obvious stigmata of profit-maximizing."288 
Physicians commit themselves to a concern for their customers' welfare 
rooted in a genuine "collectivity orientation" that differs from the typical 
business person's pursuit of self-interest.289 A doctor's advice is sup-
posed to be divorced from his or her financial or other self-interest. 
Commitment to these values and obligations is "part of the commodity 
the physician sells. "290 
b. The irrelevance of Arrow's reasoning for hospitals: Arrow writes 
that the predominance of nonprofit over proprietary hospitals reflects the 
same departure from the profit motive. Yet he struggles unsatisfyingly 
with the difficulty of applying to hospitals his explanation for physicians' 
professed deviation from Adam Smith-type ideals. He points presciently 
to the potential of for-profit hospitals to arouse admitting physicians' 
"suspicion and antagonism."291 But without explanation he stops short 
of invoking his own "collectivity orientation" model of physician behav-
ior to explain this antagonism. Instead, he proposes this model's polar 
opposite. For-profit hospitals, he suggests, "will tend to control total 
287. Though Arrow's argument is ahistoric, it has a historical parallel. During the years 
between the Civil War and the Great Depression, American medicine achieved huge gains in its 
"cultural authority"-and in its practitioners' economic status-by enforcing diagnostic and thera-
peutic consensus and by establishing strict limits on self-promoting behavior. STARR, supra note 42, 
at 79-144. 
288. Arrow, supra note 282, at 965. 
289. /d. at 949 (drawing upon Talcot Parsons's distinction between the business norm of self-
interest and the "collectivity-orientation" of medicine and other professions). 
290. /d. at 965. Arrow's interpretation here of physicians' altruistic professional norms as a 
response to consumer preferences-that is as market-driven behavior-is somewhat at odds with the 
general thrust of his argument. Elsewhere in the same article, he characterizes these norms and 
other "special structural characteristics of the medical care market" as non market responses to the 
"optimality gap" created by "the nonmarketability of the bearing of suitable risks and the imperfect 
marketability of information." Id. at 947. Arrow contends that these nonmarket responses exem-
plify a general tendency for social institutions to pursue optimality through noncompetitive means 
when the market fails to insure against uncertainty. Id. at 967. 
291. Id. at 950. He notes also that private and public subsidies (philanthropy, tax exemptions, 
and direct government support) decrease nonprofit hospitals' costs, id., but this is not an explanation 
because it says nothing about why philanthropists or governments choose to aid nonprofits. More-
over, we have no empirical basis for believing that the relatively small cost reductions resulting from 
selective private and public subsidization of non profits make a decisive difference for patients or their 
admitting physicians. Indeed, the decreased sensitivity of sick patients to medical care cost differen-
tials, supra text accompanying notes 261-65, would suggest otherwise. 
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costs to the patient [including physicians' fees] more closely."292 Admit-
ting physicians will therefore tend to select nonprofits in order to better 
protect their own incomes. 293 
Arrow leaves this contradiction unexplained. But Henry 
Hansmann, whose general theory of nonprofit enterprise is conceptually 
akin to Arrow's interpretation of doctors' altruistic ethic, 294 points to the 
underlying problem. · The reasons for physicians' altruistic ethic-which 
are, according to Arrow, the patient's vastly inferior technical knowl-
edge, dependence on the doctor as a purchasing agent, and consequent 
preference for assurance that the doctor will act as a fiduciary-do not 
apply to the hospital. 
When a patient enters the hospital, Hansmann notes, he or she 
remains under the care of a physician who is typically not a hospital 
employee. That physician is the patient's major economic nexus to the 
hospital. Acting as the patient's agent, the physician chooses among the 
hospital's technical services and monitors their quality.295 The physi-
cian's role in the purchase of inpatient diagnostic and therapeutic serv-
ices is not different in principle from his or her role as a prescriber of 
medication. Technical knowledge enables the physician to perform this 
role in a discriminating manner that preserves the potential for market 
292. Id. at 951 n.21. 
293. Id. (crediting C. R. Rorem for this idea). This suggestion anticipated (by a decade) Pauly's 
and Redisch's mathematical model of the nonprofit hospital as an entity controlled by staff physi· 
cians and managed to maximize physicians' net incomes. Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not· 
for-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 87 (1973). 
294. Hansmann argues essentially that nonprofit enterprise arises in response to "contract fail· 
ure" -the inability of patrons, be they payers for commercial services or charity-minded donors, to 
ensure market discipline by controlling the use to which their contributions are put. The essential 
feature of nonprofit enterprise-a legal prohibition on the distribution of the enterprise's income 
except as reasonable compensation for services rendered or capital loaned-provides the patron with 
a protection that substitutes for market discipline. Contract failure may have a variety of causes, 
including patrons' lack of sufficient technical knowledge to evaluate goods or services adequately. In 
general, according to Hansmann, nonprofit enterprise will tend to arise where welfare losses from 
weakened market discipline outweigh the efficiency engendered by the profit incentive. Hansmann, 
supra note 276, at 837-45. 
Hansmann observes that mechanisms other than the nonprofit form can constrain the distribu· 
tion of an enterprise's income in excess of "reasonable" compensation for services or capital. Rate· 
of-return regulation and peer monitoring of professional behavior, for example, may provide analo-
gous protection for consumers against contract failure. Id. at 869-70, 885. Arrow's model ofphysi· 
cian commitment to a "collectivity orientation" and an altruistic ethic (expressed in part by 
physicians' self-imposed ethical obligation to charge "reasonable" fees) represents one such substi· 
tute for the nonprofit form. 
295. Other physicians, typically employed by the hospital-such as diagnostic radiologists and 
surgical pathologists-provide some of these inpatient services. But in doing so, they function as 
technicians, acting at the behest of the admitting physician. 
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discipline. 296 "Thus the consumer appears to be no more at the mercy of 
a for-profit hospital than he is at the mercy of a for-profit manufacturer 
of prescription drugs."297 
Even if, as Reiman presumes, for-profit hospitals are more avari-
cious than nonprofits, the physician acting as a fiduciary ought to be able 
to safeguard consumers from exploitation. Far from being a reason to 
fear abuse by for-profit hospitals, the patient's reliance on physician judg-
ment is potentially the best protection against abuse by either for-profit 
or nonprofit providers of hospital services, pharmaceuticals, and other 
clinical needs.298 Reiman's concern about patients' vulnerability to 
exploitation by the "medical-industrial complex" might be better chan-
neled toward enhancing physicians' ability and determination to apply 
their technical knowledge critically, thereby fulfilling their fiduciary 
potential. 299 
296. Patients themselves are able to make discriminating judgments about the nontechnical 
aspects of hospital service-e.g., food, other hotel-like amenities, and the compassion and politeness 
of staff. Patients can communicate these judgments to their admitting physicians. Feelings about 
particular hospitals may even influence some patients' selection of an admitting physician. Informed 
patient choice thus plays some role in ensuring market discipline within the hospital industry. 
297. Hansmann, supra note 276, at 866-67. 
298. See Letter from Uwe Reinhardt to Arnold Reiman (Oct. 16, 1984), repn"nted in INSTITUTE 
OF MEDICINE, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 217, 218-19 (Bradford Grayed., 1986) 
("As long as physicians can keep their noses clean of economic conflicts of interest in their role as 
the patients' agents, they should be able to act as their patients' powerful ombudsmen in dealing with 
investor-owned institutions."). 
299. Reiman discusses the physician's fiduciary role as a force for market discipline, but his 
approach is constrained by his focus on for-profit enterprise as the culprit behind wasteful overuse of 
health services. He limits his concern to the conflict between physicians' fiduciary obligations and 
the lure of private enterprise. On this, he offers a radical proposal: the American Medical Associa-
tion's Principles of Ethics ought to bar physicians from having any "pecuniary association" with for-
profit health care enterprise. Reiman would bar doctors from owning stock, receiving start-up subsi-
dies for their practices, or otherwise deriving any financial gain from corporate enterprise in health 
care. "[P]racticing physicians," he asserts, "should derive no financial benefit from the health-care 
market except from their own professional services." Reiman, supra note 238, at 967. Arguably, 
elimination of the most acute conflicts of interest might be achieved with a less far-reaching restric-
tion. Physicians, for example, might merely be barred from referring patients to facilities (such as 
hospitals, nursing homes, clinical laboratories) in which they have an interest. But the problem 
addressed by Reiman's proposal merits more attention. 
Dismissed or left unaddressed by Reiman are factors that may undermine physicians' effective-
ness as fiduciaries irrespective of whether hospital services are provided by for-profit firms. Fee 
schedules that place much higher valuations on time spent performing procedures than on cognitive 
time (such as time spent taking patients' histories and analyzing their clinical problems) invite physi-
cians to opt for procedures with doubtful marginal clinical utility. Steven A. Schroeder, Medical 
Technology and Academic Medicine: The Doctor-Producers' Dilemma, 56 J. MED. Eouc. 634, 636-37 
(1981). The enormous potential for exploitation is suggested by studies showing that similarly 
trained physicians caring for similar patients in similar settings differ by up to twenty-fold in their 
use of some technologies without an obvious effect on quality of outcome. Id. at 637; see also infra 
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C. ALLEGATIONS OF "CREAM-SKIMMING" BY FOR-PROFIT 
HOSPITALS 
1. Cross-Subsidization and the Potential for Cream-Skimming 
Academic medical centers and other nonprofit hospitals have 
evolved complex pricing structures designed to provide support via cross-
subsidization for a variety of activities. Hospitals sell some clinical serv-
ices at prices much greater than cost300 in order to provide others at 
below cost, 301 or to support unreimbursed activities (for example, 
research, teaching, and indigent care). Different classes of consumers, 
moreover, are often charged at different rates for the same services, 
depending on their insurance coverage. 302 
Another implicit form of price discrimination is average-cost rate 
setting, under which patients who require varying intensities of care are 
placed within the same pricing category. 303 In most hospitals, for exam-
ple, patients with a wide range of illness severity, who place very different 
demands on the nursing staff, are charged at the same per diem rate for 
nursing and other basic services. Under average-cost pricing, less clini-
cally needy patients subsidize sicker, more demanding patients. 
text accompanying notes 354-60 (noting that pro-technology bias pervades reimbursement of both 
doctors and hospitals). 
More insidiously, medical training and socialization may nurture a disinclination to critically 
and independently assess claims made by promoters in the health care marketplace. Clinicians-in-
training are encouraged to learn by emulating charismatic senior doctors or by simply acceding to 
the mores of higher authority, in contrast to the emphasis on critical thinking more characteristic of 
advanced education in law, engineering, and academic fields. See Eric Marcus, The Role of Liaison 
Psychiatry in the Clinical Training of Medical Students, in CONSULTATION·LIAJSON PSYCHIATRY: 
CuRRENT TRENDS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 267 (Jerry B. Finkel ed., 1983) (defending focus on 
uncritical obedience to authority in clinical training). This style oflearning may prepare physicians 
well for pressured clinical situations in which decisiveness and obedience to a leader are critical for a 
good outcome. But it may be poor preparation for the exercise of independent, critical judgment 
amidst myriad promotional claims by drug and equipment manufacturers, hospitals, laboratories, 
and other service suppliers. 
300. Typical examples include inpatient laboratory studies, operating room time, and diagnostic 
imaging. Hyman Joseph, On Interdepartment Pricing of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, Q. REv. EcoN. & 
Bus., Spring 1976, at 33. In general, services sold at rates above cost tend to be (1) well-covered by 
insurance and (2) needed in situations (such as inpatient stays) that make shopping for a better price 
impractical. 
301. Delivery room services are a typical example. Id. Services sold below cost tend to be (1) 
uncovered by health insurance and (2) purchased electively by consumers with ample opportunity to 
shop before buying. 
302. For a discussion of price discrimination, see William D. White, Regulating Competition in 
a Nonprofit Industry: The Problem of For-Profit Hospitals, 16 INQUIRY 50, 52-54 (1979). 
303. Id. at 54-55. In theory, services rendered to each patient could be individually monitored 
and billed for on a marginal cost basis, but in practice the difficulties of such comprehensive, individ-
ualized monitoring are prohibitive. Id. 
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These pricing strategies aim to maximize the revenue obtained from 
clinical services, given the constraints imposed by the hospital's patient 
care commitments-for example, a self-imposed obligation to serve cer-
tain patients who are unable to pay, or to accept patients regardless of 
the severity of their illnesses-and by available third-party and other 
payers. But these strategies create (in theory, at least) economic oppor-
tunities for hospitals that are unburdened by comparable patient care 
commitments or research and teaching programs. 
Conceivably, an avaricious competitor could eliminate services that 
other hospitals price below cost, restrict admission of nonpaying and 
poorly insured patients, attempt to screen out the sickest (and most 
costly) patients, 304 and curtail research and teaching activities. Having 
thereby reduced its losses on activities that are "unprofitable" under pre-
vailing reimbursement schemes, it would be in position to "skim" away 
"profitable" patients305 by setting rates below those of its rivals, or by 
offering attractive frills such as more luxurious accommodations and din-
ing services. 
Critics of the for-profit hospital chains charge that they employ such 
cream-skimming strategies, dumping "unprofitable" patients on volun-
tary and government-owned facilities. 306 By so doing, these critics argue, 
the for-profits undermine the system of cross-subsidization that enables 
nonprofit and publicly-owned facilities to meet their commitments to 
teaching, research, care for the medically indigent, and provision of 
costly services to the sickest patients. 307 These critics call for govern-
ment regulation to limit the growth of the for-profit sector, 308 and they 
reject any ties between academic medicine and the for-profit chains on 
the ground that such relationships encourage the chains' growth by lend-
ing them a dangerous legitimacy. They warn, moreover, that if for-profit 
chains are permitted to buy or lease teaching hospitals, academic pro-
grams and care for the indigent at these hospitals will be directly 
threatened by cream-skimming patient selection practices. 
304. For example, those patients likely to impose the heaviest demands and the highest margi-
nal costs on nursing and other services included in the average cost-based per diem rate. 
305. "Profitable" patients are those whose marginal cost to a hospital is less than what the 
facility can coilect (from third party and other payers) for their care. 
306. See, e.g., Leon Eisenberg, The Case Against For-Profit Hospitals, 35 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PsYCHIATRY 1009, 1011 (1984). 
307. See, e.g., Letter from Arnold Reiman to Uwe Reinhardt (Dec. 3, 1984), reprinted in INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 220, 223 (Bradford Gray ed., 
1986) (arguing that replacement of nonprofit hospitals by investor-owned facilities will diminish 
cross-subsidation of care for the poor). 
308. White, supra note 302. 
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2. Empirical Evidence 
Empirical research does not support the conclusion that for-profit 
hospitals engage in more cream-skimming than do nonprofits. The avail-
able data is insufficient for any ultimate conclusions about the extent of 
cream-skimming behavior in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors or the 
impact of skimming on the ability of teaching centers to support aca-
demic activities through cross-subsidization. But empirical studies of 
comparable for-profit and nonprofit community hospitals have not dis-
cerned significant differences in patient selection patterns. 
One study compared clinical complexity and reimbursement sources 
for patients admitted to investor-owned and nonprofit hospitals matched 
on the basis of production costs, regulatory and reimbursement environ-
ments, medical practice patterns, population demographics, size, and 
services offered. 309 This study found no significant difference in the 
clinical complexity of Medicare patients admitted to for-profits and non-
profits. 310 Nor did it discover significant differences in the ratios of inpa-
tient days paid for by Medicare or Medicaid (which typically pay less 
than private insurers) to total inpatient days.311 
This study did not examine the relative proportions of uncompen-
sated (that is, charity and bad debt) care provided by for-profits and non-
profits. But another study, examining matched investor-owned and 
nonprofit community hospitals in California, 312 found no significant 
309. Watt et al., supra note 134 (examining the activity of eighty matched pairs of investor-
owned chain and nonprofit community hospitals in eight states during 1978 and 1980). 
310. To measure clinical complexity, the authors used the Medicare case-mix indices devised by 
the U.S. Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to assess inpatient costs for the purpose of 
calculating cost-based reimbursement schedules. Mean Medicare case-mix indices for the investor-
owned and non-profit hospitals studied did not differ significantly. Id. at 90, 96. 
311. Id. at 90. 
312. Pattison & Katz, supra note 131. The authors analyzed data collected by the California 
Health Facilities Commission (CHFC), which divides California hospitals into twelve "peer groups" 
based on a number of factors, including size, location, teaching programs, and service-mix complex-
ity. The authors compared for-profits and nonprofits within the two "peer groups" having the high-
est concentrations of investor-owned facilities. Excluded from these groups were major teaching and 
other tertiary care centers, rural and specialty hospitals, and health maintenance organi7.ation hospi-
tals. Id. at 348. See also Frank Sloan & Robert Vracin, Investor-Owned and Not-For-Profit Hospi-
tals: Addressing Some Issues, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1983, at 25 (reporting that matching for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals did not differ significantly in their provision of uncompensated care as a 
percentage of total patient charges). 
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difference in uncompensated care.313 This study also failed to find signifi-
cant differences in treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients.314 
These studies shed no light on whether for-profits are more prone 
than nonprofits to cut clinically needed services that are reimbursed for 
less than cost, or whether for-profits are more likely to spend less on 
research and teaching. The studies' method of comparing hospitals that 
were matched for various qualities-including services offered and the 
absence of research and teaching-precluded an attempt to answer these 
questions. But the studies do support the conclusion that for-profits are 
no more inclined than comparably-situated nonprofits to cream-skim by 
payer class or severity of illness. 
The significance of comparisons between matching for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals has been challenged by some critics of the for-profit 
sector. Such comparisons, they contend, mask large differences between 
the two sectors' commitments to providing free and below-cost care.315 
Comparison of matching hospitals, they argue, factors out variables-
such as hospital size, location, and teaching status-relevant to an analy-
sis of differences between the for-profit and nonprofit forms.316 These 
critics point out that the investor-owned chains have in the past preferred 
to buy or build community (non-teaching) hospitals in areas with low 
populations of uninsured or poorly insured residents. 
This is cream-skimming at a prior stage of corporate planning-
decision making with respect to entry into new markets. Investor-owned 
hospitals appear unlikely to expand aggressively into impoverished areas, 
at least under our current system of health care financing. But cream-
skimming at the market entry stage should not be confiated with cream-
skimming at the stage of patient admitting. The comparable hospital 
studies suggest that existing for-profit hospitals are no more likely than 
matching nonprofits to engage in cream-skimming of the latter sort.317 
For-profit chains may be more likely than nonprofits to engage in cream-
313. Id. at 351. The investor-owned hospitals studied reported as zero their percentage of net 
patient revenues from charity, not significantly different from the nonprofits' minuscule 0.41 percent. 
The authors did not compare bad debt data. Id. 
314. /d. at 350-51 (comparing for-profits' and nonprofits' percentages of net patient revenues 
from Medicare and Medicaid). 
315. LEWIN & AssoCIATES, SETIING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE PROVISION OF UNCOM· 
PENSATED CARE BY NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS§ 2.14 (1988) (monograph commissioned by an 
association of nonprofit hospital trustees). 
316. Id. 
317. There is abundant evidence that both for-profit and nonprofit hosptials, including teaching 
centers, engage in large-scale cream-skimming (including the dumping of medically indigent patients 
in need of emergency care) at the expense of government-owned hospitals. See, e.g., GENERAL 
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skimming of the former sort.318 But this possibility is of dubious rele-
vance to the question of whether a for-profit chain that has already 
decided to enter a market by acquiring a hospital can be expected to 
increase cream-skimming at the patient admitting stage. Evidence from 
studies of the patient selection behavior of comparable hospitals is much 
more pertinent to this question. 
Thus, the claim that for-profit ownership or operation threatens the 
system of cross-subsidies that is so heavily relied upon by academic cen-
ters lacks a substantial basis. Price structures that permit cross-subsidi-
zation of indigent care and academic activities are under mounting 
pressure. 319 But that pressure is a product of the increasingly competi-
tive nature of the hospital industry as a whole, 320 not specifically the for-
profit form. 
3. Cross-Subsidization and Democratic Values 
Even if the for-profit form itself endangered cross-subsidization, the 
threat would not justify opposition to either the growth of the investor-
owned sector in general or its courtship of academic hospitals. However 
sacrosanct cross-subsidies have become in the eyes of teaching center 
administrators, the case for this method of financing medical research, 
teaching, and indigent care is hardly compelling. Cross-subsidies, Robert 
Clark has noted, are in essence taxes, imposed upon users of certain hos-
pital services by private entities acting as "minigovernments."321 The 
"tax rates" reflected in hospital pricing structures are largely the product 
of managers' revenue-maximizing strategies and are generally formulated 
without heed to democratic tax policy ideals of horizontal and vertical 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOSPTIALS: BETIER STANDARDS NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMP· 
TION 21-24 (1990) (reporting that government-owned hospitals bore a highly disproportionate 
uncompensated care burden, relative to total hospital expenses, in four of five states studied); cf. 
HOUSE CoMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EQUAL ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: 
PATIENT DUMPING, H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (reporting on widespread 
transfer of indigent emergency patients from private (nonprofit and for-profit) hospitals to govern-
ment-owned facilities, in violation of federal law forbidding the transfer, for non-medical reasons, of 
patients in need of emergency care). 
318. This proposition has not been empirically demonstrated. The market entry decisions of 
for-profit and nonprofit health care organizations in today's hospital care financing environment 
have not yet been subjected to comparative study. 
319. See supra text accompanying notes 113-19. 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 91-112. 
321. Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1416, 1468 (1980); see a/so P. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE EcONOMICS 268-69 (1979) 
(objecting to cross-subsidization of some hospital activities with revenues from paying patients). 
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equity. 322 Even more troubling is the infringement upon the democratic 
process that cross-subsidies represent. On a billion dollar scale, an 
unelected elite of hospital managers and board members, representing a 
myriad of private organizations, is making legislative judgments-deci-
sions about who must pay for the activities that cross-subsidies support. 
This phenomenon is without parallel in other sectors of American life. 
Clark goes so far as to propose that payers be given a statutory right to 
injunctive relief when a hospital provides a clinical service for a price less 
than that service's average variable cost. 323 
The strongest argument for cross-subsidies is that they are a neces-
sary "second best" in the absence of adequate support from other sources 
for research, teaching, and care of the medically indigent. 324 But suffi-
cient support for these activities through more democratic means may be 
322. Clark, supra note 321, at 1468. Cross-subsidization, Clark says, violates the principle of 
horizontal equity by selecting as taxpayers "those particular wealthy people who get sick and are 
hospitalized rather than ... wealthy people in general." Id. (By the word "wealthy," Clark presum-
ably means insured or self-paying.) Insurance attenuates this violation by spreading the cost of care 
to all policy owners. But insurers rarely cover one hundred percent of costs, and different groups of 
policy owners must pay drastically different insurance rates, based on actuarial estimates of risk. 
Defenders of cross-subsidization offer no ethical rationale for requiring the sickest patients (or those 
in the highest actuarial risk groups) to make the biggest contributions to the financing of research, 
teaching, and indigent care. 
Clark writes that cross-subsidization achieves the vertical equity principle of progressivity (taxa-
tion in accordance with ability to pay) only in the crude sense that "those receiving the subsidy will 
tend to be poorer than those doing the subsidizing." Id. Some additional progressivity probably 
results from the tendency of more afiluent people to buy more costly insurance policies that provide 
hospitals with more generous (e.g., charge-based) reimbursement. But the nexus between "taxation" 
and the purchase of services in a competitive environment severely limits hospitals' (and insurers') 
ability to "tax" at highly progressive rates. Moreover, insurance plans purchased by less afiluent 
consumers often require higher co-payments, rendering cross-subsidies in some cases frankly regres-
sive. 
On the other hand, cross-subsidies occasionally compensate for serious horizontal and vertical 
inequities in insurance coverage. Expensive, nonelective clinical services poorly covered by insur-
ance are sometimes priced below average cost and supported by surplus revenue from well-covered 
services and uninsured "frills" for the afiluent (e.g., private rooms) priced above average cost. For 
patients in need of costly and poorly-insured services priced below average cost, cross-subsidies from 
better-insured services abet loss-spreading (compensating for horizontal inequity). Moreover, sur-
pluses generated from frills and elective services well-covered only by afiluent consumers' more 
beneficent insurance policies support more essential services for those less well off (reducing vertical 
inequity). See Jeffrey E. Harris, Pricing Rules for Hospitals, BELL J. EcoN., Spring 1979, at 224 
(presenting a mathematical model of hospital rate-setting strategy, concluding that goals of social 
welfare maximization and avoidance of financial losses are best achieved via price structures not tied 
to average costs). 
323. Clark, supra note 321, at 1480-83 (urging that payers be given standing to sue hospitals for 
injunctions against provision of services for less than average variable cost). Clark makes average 
variable cost his criterion, instead of average total cost, because of the impracticality of allocating 
hospitals' large shared or fixed costs to particular clinical services. Id. at 1481. 
324. See id. at 1470. 
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attainable if academic centers redirect their political efforts from defense 
of the cross-subsidy system to the development and implementation of 
alternatives. 
In particular, a universal system of comprehensive national health 
insurance would eliminate the need to support some clinical services with 
surplus revenues from others. 325 For teaching centers, universal health 
insurance holds the promise of a lasting solution to the problem of 
financing indigent and underinsured care. A national insurance scheme 
would free the financing of indigent care from vulnerability to the grow-
ing competitive pressure on hospital price structures. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, national health insurance foundered on concerns that it 
would fuel an even greater medical cost explosion. 326 But a new genera-
tion of universal health insurance proposals that incorporate aggressive 
cost-control strategies327 could become the basis for progress toward 
enactment of a viable plan. 
If all patients were adequately insured, providers could bill for each 
service category at its average cost without endangering any patient's 
ability to obtain essential services on a paying basis. Within each cate-
gory, there would still be some implicit cross-subsidization. Some hospi-
talized patients need more care than others, and difficulties in monitoring 
render exact calculations of each patient's costs impossible. 328 Analo-
gously, within a prepaid plan's rate classes, some plan purchasers are 
poorer risks than others. But finely divided categories-such as Diagno-
sis Related Groups (DRGs) for hospitals and stratified actuarial group-
ings for HMOs-could minimize this variation. Distributional 
questions-issues of horizontal and vertical equity-could be dealt with 
325. John Rafferty & Stuart 0. Schweitzer, Comparison of For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals: A 
Re-evaluation, 11 INQUIRY 304, 308 (1974); cf. White, supra note 302, at 53-54 (arguing that com-
prehensive national health insurance would eliminate need for regulation to protect discriminatory 
pricing structures from potential cream-skimming because price discrimination is needed only when 
insurance is inadequate). , 
326. The failure of national health insurance during the late 1970s is a more complex story. 
Widespread fear of inflationary pressures, an impasse between the Carter Administration and Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy on the design of a plan, and the potency of opposing special interests combined 
to ensure a political stalemate despite intense and broad-based interest in the development of an 
insurance scheme. See STARR, supra note 42, at 411-17. 
327. For example, "HealthAmerica" contains cost-control provisions that address the problems 
of unnecessary care and open-ended reimbursement fees. The proposal aims to reduce unnecessary 
care by establishing research programs to determine which care is necesary and then providing phy-
sicians with practice guidelines based on these findings. HealthAmerica would also encourage the 
development of private and public managed care programs aimed at steering patients toward the 
most efficient providers. The plan also calls for regulation of rate-setting negotiations between pur-
chasers and providers to conform with national expenditure goals. 
328. See supra text accompanying note 304. 
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through the political process (at the level of insurance policy design) 
rather than by individual hospitals and prepaid plans (at the rate-setting 
level). 
Direct government support for biomedical research and teaching 
would likewise be more consonant with democratic values than is reli-
ance on vast, hidden subsidies from government spending for clinical 
care. 329 The incremental costs of clinical research and teaching are prob-
ably impossible to measure exactly, but reasonable estimates can be 
developed. 330 Such estimates can form the basis for more informed pub-
lic choices about spending levels for research and education. If private 
sector spending for research and teaching falls below the social optimum, 
as determined by the political process,331 government can intervene with 
explicit subsidies to fill the gap. Instead of defending dubiously legiti-
mate, hidden subsidies, academic medical leaders ought to make their 
case more openly through the political process. 
D. OTHER OBJECTIONS 
1. Quality of Care 
Some opponents of entry by investor-owned hospital chains into the 
academic sector intimate that the for-profit form may jeopardize the 
quality of patient care. 332 Available evidence, though limited, lends little 
support to this fear. Several studies have compared staff physician quali-
fications, accreditation records, and outcome statistics at matched inves-
tor-owned and nonprofit hospitals. No significant differences were found 
329. Enthoven, supra note 270, at 111 (criticizing subsidies for research and teaching hidden 
within Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement). The financing of research, teaching, and care for 
the uninsured through Medicare reimbursment, supra text accompanying notes 99-105, is regressive 
in comparison with financing of these activities from general tax revenues. Medicare reimbursement 
for inpatient services (Part A) is financed through the Social Security payroll tax, and approximately 
twenty-five percent of Medicare payments for outpatient services (Part B) comes from premiums 
paid by beneficiaries (the remainder comes from general tax revenues). HousE COMM. ON WAYS 
AND MEANS, lOOrH CONG., 2D SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE 
JURISDICfiON OF THE CoMMITIEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 136-42 (1988). 
330. See What Are Teaching Hospitals' Costs?, supra note 113 (noting a federally-funded attempt 
by an accounting firm to assess the cost of research and teaching activities at academic medical 
centers). 
331. There are, of course, multitudinous theoretical problems with the notion that our (or any) 
democratic process allocates resources in a socially optimal manner. AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLEC-
TIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970). But the allocative choices generated by democratic 
mechanisms are, in effect, operationally defined as optimal-or legitimate (subject to constitutional 
Iimitations)-by virtue of a society's commitment to the democratic process as its allocative method. 
332. See, e.g., ArnoldS. Reiman, Private Hospitals: Ethics and Profits, Bus. & Soc'Y REv., Fall 
1983, at 28 ("There is no objective evidence" that for-profits' services are "as good as" those pro-
vided by nonprofits.). 
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in these crude measures of quality.333 In 1986, an Institute of Medicine 
committee on for-profit health services conducted a comprehensive 
review of empirical studies comparing clinical outcomes, medical staff 
qualifications, nursing support, and physicians' assessments of quality at 
investor-owned and nonprofit hospitals. 334 The panel concluded that 
available evidence "does not support the fear that for-profit health care is 
incompatible with quality of care.'1335 By most measures, the committee 
found, investor-owned hospitals are similar in quality to nonprofit facili-
ties, and on some measures they are better.336 
Although responsible critics of the chains do not dispute such evi-
dence, these studies have done little to assuage the critics' concern about 
for-profit care's long-term quality implications. 337 And, in a sense, their 
concern has a rational basis. Clinical quality, as traditionally defined, is 
under frontal assault in the newly competitive health care climate. As 
two critics of for-profit care point out, "[t]he judicial as well as the ethi-
cal imperative under which physicians function is that every possible 
diagnostic or therapeutic act that might benefit the patient must be begun 
and continued until or unless it is harmful or can be demonstrated to 
333. Ermann & Gabel, supra note 135, at 59·60 (reviewing results from four empirical studies of 
quality at matched facilities). More recent studies have yielded equivocial results. A comparative 
study of mortality rates at for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, conducted after the Institute of 
Medicine issued its report, discerned a small but statistically significant difference in favor of the 
nonprofit facilities. Arthur Hartz, Henry Krakauer et al., Hospital Characteristics and Mortality 
Rates, 321 NEw ENG. J. MEo. 1720 (1989). However, use of mortality data from individual hospi-
tals (published annually by the Health Care Financing Administration since 1987) to compare hospi-
tals' quality of care has been sharply criticized on the ground that hospital-specific mortality rates 
reflect myriad differences between hospitals' patient populations. E.g., Jesse Green, Leigh Passman, 
Neil Wintfeld, Analyzing Hospital Mortality: The Consequences of Diversity in Patient Mix, 265 
JAMA 1849 (1991). 
Another recent study, based on medical record reviews conducted by coordinated teams of 
physicians in New York State, discerned no significant differences in the incidence of medically 
induced injuries between hospitals of different ownership types. Troyen Brennan, Liesi Hebert et al., 
Hospital Characteristics Associated with Adverse Events and Substandard Care, 265 JAMA 3265 
(1991). But this study found that the percentage of medically induced injuries caused by "negli-
gence" (as judged by the medical record reviewing teams) was much lower in the three for-profit 
hospitals surveyed than in the entire sample (9.5 percent at the for-profits, compared to 24.9 percent 
for the overall sample, which was drawn from more than fifty hospitals). As the authors noted, the 
small number of for-profit facilities studied provides an insufficient basis for generalization about the 
relative incidence of medical negligence by ownership type. 
334. CoMM. ON IMPLICATIONS OF FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, FoR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 127-41 (1986). 
335. /d. at 138. 
336. /d. The committee also observed that hospitals owned by for-profit chains appear to be 
superior to the facilities they have largely replaced-free-standing for-profit hospitals. Id. 
337. See, e.g., Donald 0. Nutter, Access to Care and the Evolution of Corporate, For-Profit 
Medicine, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 917, 919 (1984). 
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have no effect."338 Under cost-plus and charge-based, no-questions-
asked reimbursement, this ethic flourished. Physicians were free-even 
expected-to pursue "quality" as defined technically;339 they were unre-
strained by spending limits that arise from conflicting claims on limited 
resources. 340 But new competitive market conditions are forcing a redefi-
nition of "quality." 
The traditional, technocratic ideal of quality is being challenged by 
alternative conceptions that reflect competing individual and social pri-
orities. 341 The reality that scarcity mandates choices between medical 
care and other wants has emerged into public consciousness. Quality of 
care is being redefined to take greater account of how the recipients of 
care perceive its benefits relative to other paths toward well-being.342 
Through both market and political methods of allocation, individuals 
and society are openly choosing to limit medical spending, in favor of 
other preferences, despite the sacrifice of potential marginal gains in 
clinical outcome.343 This is a radical cultural change. Not surprisingly, 
it has stirred intensely negative feelings among those committed to an 
ideal of clinical quality that permits no compromise with competing pri-
orities. 344 For-profit hospital chains have become lightning rods for 
338. Ernest Saward & Andrew Sorensen, Competition, Profit, and the HMO, 306 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 929, 931 (1982). 
339. The health economist Victor Fuchs has written of some physicians' "monotechnic point of 
view," insensitive to "the claims of competing wants or the divergence of [physicians'] priorities 
from those of other people," and thus creating "a poor guide to social policy." FUCHS, supra note 
69, at 5. 
340. When ethicists, in the 1960s and 1970s, challenged the medical imperative to do everything 
technically possible (and beneficial in a biological sense), their focus was typically on the suffering 
and indignity inflicted by heroic measures, not on the high cost of these measures, relative to the 
clinical gains attained. 
341. Cf. Donald W. Light, Is Competition Bad?, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1315, 1316 (1983) 
(breaking down quality into three dimensions: (1) technical and "clinical quality"-focused on by 
the medical profession; (2) "social quality-the overall quality of care relative to the health needs of 
a society"; and (3) "relative quality," or cost-effectiveness). 
342. "Competition," Light writes, "introduces another kind of quality at the individual level 
that the professional model does not recognize-namely, quality as measured by consumer satisfac-
tion." Id. at 1317. 
343. Purchase of prepaid comprehensive health plans, which provide care within a limited 
budget and must therefore sometimes opt against diagnostic and therapeutic measures with the 
potential to benefit a patient, is an example of a market method. The new Medicare system of 
prospective reimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), which limits what government 
will spend to evaluate and treat a particular clinical problem, is one instance of a political method. 
344. A bitter, highly publicized nationwide controversy ensued in 1984 when Colorado Gover-
nor Richard Lamm suggested that severely ill old people have a "duty to die" rather than consume 
high-cost medical care. Governor Lanm Asserts Elderly, if Very Ill, Have "Duty to Die," N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 29, 1984, at A12; cf. DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL 
PROGRESS (1990) (interpreting public perceptions of a health care delivery "crisis" as due in large 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1112 1991-1992
1112 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1035 
these feelings. 345 The for-profit sector, though, cannot fairly be blamed 
for the new consciousness of scarcity that fs transforming society's con-
ception of clinical quality. 
Nevertheless, prepaid and prospective payment schemes, which are 
now being fashioned in pursuit of a more cost/benefit-oriented ideal of 
quality, create new incentives for exploitation by for-profit and nonprofit 
institutions alike. Instead of profiting from doing more, providers can 
earn more by doing less. The danger exists that they will do less than 
what the buyers of services are paying for.346 They can do so, however, 
only with the active collaboration of the physicians responsible for writ-
ing orders. So long as physicians exercise genuinely independent judg-
ment as their patients' purchasing agents, the kind of exploitation that is 
possible in theory cannot become reality. 
To function adequately as fiduciaries for newly cost-conscious con-
sumers, physicians will need to modify their technically biased concep-
tion of quality along the lines suggested above. But they can do so 
without relinquishing their role as independent judges of the merits of 
available technology. Academic physicians, in particular, can play a 
decisive part in this process by developing a data base on the benefits and 
risks of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in varying clinical situa-
tions. 347 The better the information available on the benefits and risks of 
alternative technologies, the more knowledgeably will physicians be able 
to compare the cost-effectiveness of differing clinical approaches to indi-
vidual patients-and to construct distinctions between cost-effective 
measure to Americans' insistence that all treatment of probable net benefit be provided and their 
reluctance to acknowledge the need to make social choices between beneficial medical treatment and 
other priorities). 
345. By establishing prices, markets make society's allocations of resources among competing 
priorities explicit, thereby "brutally emphasiz[ing]" the reality that choices are being made and that 
no priority is "priceless." CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 235, at 31-34. Thus, hostility to the 
denial of a good's "pricelessness" is likely to be directed at market mechanisms of allocation. (Mar-
kets may, of course, arouse antipathy for other reasons, such as their dependence on the existing 
distribution of wealth. /d. at 32.) As avowedly market-driven institutions, for-profit hospitals are 
high-profile targets for this hostility. 
346. They could in theory reap a windfall by withholding diagnostic and therapeutic measures 
necessary to achieve the level of quality for which consumers are paying (measures with marginal 
probabilities of clinical benefit, relative to cost, lying above the cost-benefit threshold implicit in a 
given prospective payment plan). 
347. Paul M. Ellwood, Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient Experience, 318 NBW 
ENG. J. MBD. 1549 (1988); Arnold S. Reiman, Assessment and Accountability: The Third Revolution 
in Medical Care, 319 NBW ENG. J. MBD. 1220 (1988). In 1989, Congress created a new Public 
Health Service entity, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), to organize and 
fund research into the effectiveness of medical technologies. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, tit. IX, 103 Stat. 2106. 
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clinical restraint and intemperate exploitation of the financial rewards of 
doing less. 348 
Other mechanisms offer additional protection against exploitative 
behavior. The news media's intense interest in medical matters makes 
exploitation a high-risk strategy, especially for investor-owned hospital 
chains concerned with establishing and protecting national brand 
names. 349 The emerging tort doctrine of "corporate negligence," under 
which hospitals can be held liable for failing to prevent negligent treat-
ment by staff physicians, 350 is another reason for hospital managers to 
refrain from pressing doctors to deviate from established standards of 
cost-effective care.351 Internal quality-control programs, designed to pro-
tect corporate reputation, and even disclosure of information in promo-
tional campaigns-especially those targeted at knowledgeable mass-
purchasers of care such as corporate medical directors-provide further 
consumer protection. 
348. Clinical outcomes data alone, however, will not suffice to draw these distinctions. Uncer-
tainty and conflict over definitions of effectiveness (sometimes resulting in conflicting research find-
ings regarding effectiveness), varying patient preferences, and the lack of generally accepted 
standards for the appropriate level of cost-effectiveness are among the problems standing in the way. 
Arnold M. Epstein, The Outcomes Movement-Will it Get Us Where We Want to Go, 323 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 266, 268-69 (1990). However thorough our empirical database on clinical outcomes, 
myriad normative choices will be necessary. 
349. Ditkoff, The Future of Health Care: An Economic Analysis, 41, 44 (Feb. 12, 1985) (unpub-
lished student paper on file with Professor Henry Hansmann at the Yale Law School). The ABC 
news magazine program PrimeTime Live reported on exorbitant prices charged by Humana and 
raised serious questions about the firm's quality control practices. PrimeTime Live (ABC television 
broadcast, Aug. 8, Aug. 15 & Oct. 24, 1991). Evidence that some private psychiatric hospitals have 
hired "bounty hunters" to find patients has also been a focus of media attention. E.g., Milt 
Freudenheim, The Squeeze on Psychiatric Chains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at D17. 
350. See, e.g., Schoening v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 698 P.2d 593 (Cal. 1985) (holding 
that hospital has duty to monitor staff physicians' treatment of patients and to intervene to prevent 
obvious negligence). 
351. We can anticipate an evolution of the concept of standard of care in medical malpractice 
law, away from the "do everything" ethic toward a new cost-benefit consciousness in the creation of 
minimum clinical standards. A detailed study of the likely changes is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, one might predict that physicians as witnesses will increasingly stress cost-benefit 
thinking, supported by data from clinical outcome studies, in explaining why actions at issue were 
not taken, and that finders of fact will show growing awareness of the cost-benefit balance. If physi-
cians continue to insist on defining standards of care exclusively in terms of what is technically 
possible and conceivably beneficial (regardless of cost) we might then see a diminution of judicial 
deference to the profession's standards and a more active judicial role in the definition of clinical 
negligence. 
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2. Overuse of Technology 
Reiman and other academic critics of the investor-owned hospital 
chains allege that the for-profit sector tends to overemphasize technol-
ogy. 352 Their argument is not that the for-profits so overuse technology 
that patients actually suffer clinical harm. Rather, they assert that inves-
tor-owned facilities show a greater tendency than do nonprofits to per-
form costly procedures of insubstantial diagnostic or therapeutic value. 
These critics can point to some supporting evidence. Several studies 
conducted under cost-plus and charge-based reimbursement conditions 
document higher total charges for technology-intensive ancillary services 
at chain-owned, for-profit hospitals than at matched non profits. 353 
Although some of this difference was due to higher charge-to-cost mark-
ups by the for-profits, the absolute number of units ordered per admis-
sion (or per patient-day) for all profitable ancillary services was greater at 
chain-owned for-profits than at matched nonprofits. 354 Operating in a 
retrospective reimbursement environment, managers at investor-owned 
facilities may have successfully encouraged physicians to order profitable 
but unproven tests and procedures that fall within a grey zone of 
accepted clinical discretion. 355 
If so, it is hardly clear that the blame ought to be pinned on the for-
profit form. The aggressive promotional efforts of drug companies at 
least equal those of the investor-owned hospital chains. Yet we generally 
accept such behavior by pharmaceutical firms and we expect physicians 
to prescribe medications based only on their own. and the profession's 
independent, critical assessment of therapeutic claims. Why should we 
expect less of physicians when they make decisions about other hospital-
based therapeutic and diagnostic services? If physicians are to serve 
responsibly as patients' purchasing agents in the medical care market-
place, then any tendency to yield uncritically to the blandishments of 
352. See, e.g., Reiman, supra note 238, at 969; cf. Remarks by D.D. Fedennan on the impact of 
for-profit organization on physicians (1983) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Office of the Dean 
of the Harvard Medical School) (warning that for-profit hospitals will exacerbate pressures on physi-
cians to order unproven but highly profitable diagnostic and therapeutic measures). 
353. See, e.g., Pattison & Katz, supra note 131, at 349-50; Watt et a!., supra note 134, at 93-95. 
354. Pattison & Katz, supra note 131, at 350 (The most "profitable" services at the hospitals 
studied were clinical laboratories and in-patient pharmacies.). 
355. Watt et al., supra note 134, at 95; Arnold S. Reiman, Investor-Owned Hospitals and Health-
Care Costs, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1983). 
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hawkers of hospital-based technology ought to be regarded as a fiduciary 
failure356 and not dismissed as a creation of the for-profit sector.357 
The principal cause of fiduciary failure is the pro-technology bias 
that has pervaded reimbursement of both doctors and hospitals. 358 
Medicare and many private insurers pay much higher fees for physician 
time spent performing technical procedures than for time spent at cogni-
tive clinical tasks. 359 Retrospective reimbursement schedules for hospi-
tals-whether cost-plus or charge-based-~ewise favor technology-
intensive services over labor-intensive, caring services. 
Reform of this perversely skewed payment system promises to 
sharply reduce the problem of fiduciary failure. A basic restructuring is 
already underway. The growth of prospective, diagnosis-based reim-
bursement and prepaid, comprehensive health plans is rapidly reducing 
protechnology financial incentives at both for-profit and nonprofit hospi-
tals. No longer will hospital managers be tempted to pursue better bot-
tom-line results by enticing physicians to order costly services with little 
marginal benefit. Studies that document higher usage of ancillary serv-
ices at for-profit hospitals under retrospective payment conditions have 
little predictive value in the emerging prospective reimbursement 
climate. 
Restructuring of physician reimbursement could provide even 
greater protection against fiduciary failure. Though pro-technology bias 
still pervades doctors' fee structures in private practice, increasing num-
bers of physicians work on a salaried basis, free from financial pressures 
to overuse technology. Prospective reimbursement for private practition-
ers, or radically revised fee-for-service schedules that value cognitive and 
procedural time equivalently would further reduce incentives to deviate 
356. By "fiduciary failure," I mean any gap between physicians' clinical service purchasing 
behavior and society's-or payers' or patients'-q_uality and cost-benefit expectations. How cost-
benefit expectations, or standards, for clinical services should be set (and who should set them) is a 
question of extraordinary moral, political, and economic complexity, far beyond the scope of this 
Article, but in the new era of cost-benefit consciousness, physicians, patients, third-party payers, and 
the courts will be forced to reach some, at least temporary, operational answers. 
357. Academic, tertiary care medical centers have also been accused of overusing technology, 
even to the point of doing more harm than good to some patients. Kg., Steel et al., Iatrogenic Illness 
on a General Medical Service at a University Hospital, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 638 (1981); Steven A. 
Schroeder, The Complications of Coronary Arteriography: A Problem That Won't Go Away, 99 AM. 
HEART J. 139 (1980). Critics of technology use at academic centers point to pro-technology reim-
bursement biases, see infra text accompanying notes 358-60, and the "monotechnic," cost-insensitive 
ideal of quality discussed earlier, supra note 339. 
358. Cf Schroeder, supra note 299, at 636-37 (Pro-technology reimbursement bias is the most 
important influence on use of medical technology.). 
359. Id.; supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
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from the fiduciary role. Recent legislation instructs the HCFA to 
develop a physicians' Medicare fee schedule that incorporates higher-
than-traditional valuations for cognitive time and lower valuations for 
procedural time. This represents an important step toward restructuring 
physician payment to reduce fiduciary failure. 360 
Academic medical centers could play an invaluable educational role 
by encouraging physicians-in-training to adhere to a more cost-conscious 
fiduciary ethic. Greater emphasis on the teaching of statistical and eco-
nomic concepts and new attention to the nurturing of critical habits of 
mind could better prepare future practitioners to assess risks, costs, and 
probabilities of bel!:efit. 361 
In short, a tendency to overuse technology-intensive services is not 
inherent in the for-profit hospital s.ector. The physician as fiduciary bears 
responsibility for the ordering of clinical services. Restructuring reim-
bursement incentives and modifying medical education would promote 
the physician's effectiveness as a fiduciary in his or her dealings with. a 
hospital. 
3. Destabilizing Effects 
The Harvard faculty panel that recommended rejection of HCA's 
bid to purchase McLean Hospital concluded its report with a curious 
warning. Sale of McLean to HCA, the panel said, "would have had seri-
ous destabilizing effects on the six departments of psychiatry at Harvard. 
These departments compete with each other for faculty, trainees and 
research support, and the new resources this proposal would have gener-
ated for McLean would have changed the competitive balance."362 
This warning acknowledged a fear that has not been addressed in 
the published debate about the for-profits. The social structure of aca-
demic medicine today is largely a product of the NIH grant-making pro-
cess and the lucrative clinical programs that have fueled the academic 
sector's extraordinary growth in the last four decades. 363 Mores by 
which opportunity, rank, and privilege are bestowed have developed as 
an integral part of this growth. Effectiveness at tailoring one's work to 
the opportunities and pitfalls of short-term grant making by peer review 
and success in developing new and lucrative clinical services have been 
360. However, the relative value scale that will serve as the basis for this fee schedule retains 
substantial pro-technology bias in its valuations of procedural and cognitive time. 
361. See supra note 299. 
362. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6. 
363. See supra text accompanying notes 47-68. 
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central to the cultivation of an academic career. The current leaders of 
academic medicine climbed to their places within this system's con-
straints. Like most who have committed their lives to success within a 
system's confines, they are wont to believe intensely in the system's legiti-
macy and to expect others to abide by its constraints. 
New opportunities created by an infusion of funds from the for-
profit sector into some academic centers could transform the rules of the 
game. Compliance with current mores and patterns of deference could 
become less important for career advancement. 364 The resulting disrup-
tion of the social structure of academic medicine could become severe. 
Already, tensions exist between fiscally troubled institutions interested in 
improving their academic standing by tapping the for-profits' resources 
and elite centers which are so well supported by conventional resources 
(NIH grants, private philanthropy, and clinical income) that they can 
maintain their prestige while eschewing ties with the for-profits. 365 
Resentment could also brew at financially struggling institutions left 
without for-profit partners. Even at institutions reaping the benefits of 
links with the for-profits, individuals who have succeeded within the 
established system's constraints might perceive their accomplishment as 
devalued and their status as threatened by new paths to achievement. 
If academic medicine is to be valued based on the social utility of its 
output, however conceived, then such protectionist sentiment ought to 
have no place in any weighing of the merits of allowing for-profit firms 
onto campus. The worries of an elite faced with a threat to its preroga-
tives should not be equated with the interests of either the medical pro-
fession as a whole or the larger society. A social hierarchy that unduly 
restrains development of new ideas and opportunities out of deference to 
such an elite ought to be disrupted-in academic medicine no less than at 
364. For example, prolonged apprenticeship with a grant-holding senior researcher is a gener-
ally necessary step along the path to a young academic physician's first research grant in his or her 
own name. First-time NIH Principal Investigators (recipients of research grants in their own 
names) are usually their late thirties or older. Until a researcher receives a grant in his or her own 
name, he or she is subject to a grant-holding senior researcher's authority, which is virtually abso-
lute. The young researcher's future career opportunities depend almost entirely on this supervisor's 
impressions, and his or her research agenda is entirely subject to this supervisor's will. The NIH 
grant system thus engenders a remarkably authoritarian social structure, protective of the preroga-
tives of established individuals and hardly conducive to freedom for young scientists to pursue novel 
ideas. New resources generated from arrangements between academic centers and for-profit firms 
could provide young scientists with the means to pursue their ideas without enduring a long period 
of deference to senior grant-holders. 
365. See, e.g., supra note 20 (A George Washington University official characterizes elite aca-
demic critics' objections to his own institution's talks with the for-profits as contempt by the "haves" 
for the struggles of the "have-nots. "). 
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a faltering industrial corporation. No plausible public policy rationale 
exists for freezing current "competitive balances" between academic cen-
ters or blocking off new routes to individual accomplishment merely to 
preserve the status of an established elite. 366 
4. Altruism and the Nurturing of Community 
Some critics of investor-owned hospital services assert that by pro-
viding a focus for neighborly, altruistic feeling, nonprofit hospitals nur-
ture a sense of community.367 Donations of money and services to a 
community hospital affirm and sustain the community's sense of mutual 
caring. In contrast, by transforming medical care into a service 
exchangeable for economic gain, for-profit hospitals strain this commu-
nal sense. This intuition about the relationship between altruism and 
community has been most fully developed by Richard Titmuss. 368 
Titmuss argues that altruistic experiences, especially those that save lives, 
pull persons together into a community, while market transactions do 
not. 369 Communal solidarity is nurtured when people recognize the 
potential for reciprocity-today's charitable giver may be tomorrow's 
beneficiary. Potentially lifesaving gifts come to represent life itself. In 
contrast, the exchange of lifesaving goods and services for money invites 
potential donors to equate the value of lifesaving gifts with their price 
instead of with life. Communal perceptions of potential reciprocity are 
thereby destroyed, and community solidarity is eroded. 
366. Nevertheless, opposition to frank protectionism should be tempered by awareness that the 
prestige and autonomy of academic medicine's elite can serve an important public purpose as ties 
develop between academic centers and the for-profits. That prestige can be a potent counterweight 
to the power a large, for-profit enterprise will inevitably possess in its relationship with an academic 
center; it can be wielded in sale and leasing negotiations to win safeguards for researchers' work from 
the encumbrances and pressures of the for-profit partner's management. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 532-39. Once a deal is consummated, academic medicine's public prestige is likely to 
weigh heavily in the minds of corporate managers who might otherwise be tempted to infringe upon 
these safeguards. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05. But that prestige rests ultimately upon 
academic medicine's accomplishments, not on anticompetitive behavior. 
367. David Rosner, Heterogenity and Uniformity: Historical Perspectives 011 the Voluntary Hos-
pital, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH 87 (David Seay & Bruce Vladeck eds., 1988); cf. Daniel 
Wikler, The Virtuous Hospital: Do Nonprofit Institutions Have a Distinctive Moral Mission, in IN 
SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH, supra, at 127 (arguing that the history, ideology, habits, and reputation 
of nonprofit hospitals incline them toward altrusim and virtue even if they often fail to achieve it). 
368. RICHARD M. TrrMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL 
POLICY (1971). 
369. /d. at 237-46; cf. Radin, supra note 234, at 1913 (citing Titmuss approvingly in support of 
her argument that goods and services expressing feelings central to personhood should not be "com-
modified" via market transactions). 
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Titmuss's portrayal of the relationship between giving and commu-
nity is affecting. He has captured an aspect of the experience of altruism 
not fully acknowledged by his utilitarian critics. 370 But it has almost no 
relevance to the modem nonprofit hospital. Unlike its nineteenth cen-
tury predecessor, 371 the modem nonprofit hospital is essentially a com-
mercial enterprise. 372 Almost all of its revenues represent payment for 
services rendered. 373 Virtually all of its factors of production-its physi-
cal plant, equipment, supplies, and labor force-are purchased in the 
marketplace from income-seekillg firms and individuals. The long-term 
debt market has supplanted charitable donors as its major capital 
source. 374 Vestiges of altruism remain-blood and organ donors, small 
financial contributions, and some volunteers. But altruism generates 
only a tiny fraction of the modem nonprofit hospital's resources. 
For many Americans, the local nonprofit hospital is no more a place 
for altruistic experience and the nurturing of community than the local 
shopping mall. The average person is a paying customer of each. Acqui-
sition of the hospital by an investor-owned firm would pose only a mini-
mal threat to the community's sense of mutual caring because the local, 
nonprofit hospital makes only a minimal contribution to it. The demise 
of the nonprofit hospital as a community-affirming, charitable institution 
is a loss worth mourning. But insistence that hospitals retain the non-
profit form will not undo this loss. 
In sum, the moral, economic, and other policy concerns reviewed in 
this section are not persuasive as threshold objections to the operation of 
teaching hospitals by investor-owned firms. Allowing investor-owned 
hospitals onto the academic medical campus carries genuine risks, but 
these can be effectively managed through the design and implementation 
of contractual safeguards. 375 If this is done, academic medical centers 
seriously in need of new financial support can reap benefits for them-
selves and society that outweigh the risks of these arrangements. 
370. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 343 (1972). 
371. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS 15-121 (1987). 
372. Hansmann, supra note 276, at 866-67. 
373. G. ANDERSON ET AL., PROVIDING HOSPITAL SERVICES: THE CHANGING FINANCIAL 
ENVIRONMENT 147-48 (1989) (reporting that philanthropy represented less than 1.3 percent of 
funds used for hospital care in 1985). 
374. D. CoHODES & B. KiNKEAD, HOSPITAL CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE 1980s (1984). 
375. See infra text accompanying notes 508-86 (presenting recommendations for the develop-
ment of contractual arrangements that achieve favorable ratios of benefits to risks, viewed from the 
perspectives of both academic medicine and the public interest). 
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VI. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: SOME PRACTICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
In general, no insurmountable legal barrier blocks the acquisition or 
leasing of teaching hospitals by investor-owned corporations. Those who 
design and execute such arrangements, however, must take into account 
myriad regulatory and legal considerations. Many of these concerns are 
hardly unique to takeovers of teaching hospitals by for-profit firms. They 
are, rather, generic to a wide range of ventures376 in the highly regulated 
hospital industry. Two problem areas, however, could pose more partic-
ular pitfalls for teaching centers and for-profit health systems interested 
in purchase or leasing deals. One is the array of tax consequences result-
ing from any such arrangement. The other is the duty of nonprofit cor-
poration trustees to comply with restrictions on the use of gifts, bequests, 
and other donated resources held in trust. After briefly identifying some 
generic regulatory considerations, 377 I will discuss these two problem 
areas in some detail. The following discussion presumes the conclusion 
of the previous section-that threshold policy arguments against the 
operation of teaching hospitals by for-profit firms are not persuasive, and 
that the benefits of such arrangements, if well-designed, outweigh the 
hazards. Accordingly, I review the potential legal obstacles to sale and 
leasing agreements from a perspective favorable to these agreements' suc-
cess. Where ambiguous "black letter" law can be applied so as to either 
facilitate or thwart well-designed arrangements, the weakness of thresh-
old public policy arguments against such arrangements warrants a per-
missive approach. 
The primary purpose of this section is to evaluate the possibility that 
various legal and regulatory requirments will be applied in a non-permis-
sive manner. My limited aim here is to offer a legal and regulatory risk 
assessment for transacting parties (e.g., nonprofit sellers, for-profit pur-
chasers, and affiliated universities); this section is not an exercise in nor-
mative scholarship regarding the myriad issues it addresses. The 
376. Examples include other changes in hospital ownership (especially purchases of nonteach-
ing, community hospitals by the for-profits), corporate or administrative restructuring of nonprofit 
hospitals, development of new clinical services, and new construction programs. 
377. These considerations reflect the complex and intensive state and federal regulatory environ-
ment within which all hospitals mnst operate. A thorough discussion of these regulatory matters 
would require an excursion into broad areas of hospital law, an undertaking far beyond the scope of 
this project. 
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discussion is practical in emphasis and intended to assist transacting par-
ties in appraising and overcoming legal and regulatory obstacles. Read-
ers with little interest in these problems can skim quickly through this 
section or even skip it entirely. 
A. SOME GENERIC REGULATORY CONCERNS 
An array of state, federal, and even private regulatory schemes con-
strains the capital spending and organizational form of nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals. These constraints may bear in varying ways upon 
purchase and leasing agreements between for-profit firms and academic 
medical centers. 
Expansion and facility improvement programs, ranging from con-
struction of a new building to acquisition of a new technology to the 
opening of new clinical services, must in many states be approved by 
regulatory bodies charged with regional coordination of medical services 
and avoidance of overcapacity.378 Construction and capital-improve-
ment programs linked to acquisition or leasing deals between teaching 
centers and the for-profits will need to survive this regulatory scrutiny.379 
378. In states imposing this regulatory requirement, a health services facility must obtain a 
"Certificate of Need" (CON) from a state administrative agency in order to proceed with new con-
struction or certain other capital improvement programs. The vagueness of"need" as a criterion for 
project approval has led to protracted litigation and long delays in the CON process. Agency deci-
sions to grant CONs are frequently challenged in court by the CON recipients' competitors. When 
state regulators deny CONs, they are often challenged in court by the CON applicants. Regulators 
pursue multiple, often conflicting policy objectives under the CON rubric. These include cost-con-
tainment, provision of services to the medically indigent, improved geographic access to care, and 
even the strengthening of competition. James R. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of 
Need Regulation of Health Facilities to State Control, 19 IND. L. REv. 1025 (1986); Sallyanne Payton 
& Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and Certificate-
of-Need, 19 MicH. L. REv. 203 (1980). 
The problems raised by the exercise of broad administrative discretion in the CON context are 
akin to those arising under other regulatory schemes calling for allocation of scarce resources-e.g., 
radio and television broadcasting frequencies, authority to fly commercial air routes-according to a 
general, public interest standard. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 71-95 
(1982) (discussing conflicts between regulators' aspirations to achieve various forms of procedural 
and substantive fairness as well as conflicting public policy objectives). · 
379. A 1984 agreement between Humana and the Chicago Medical School to construct and 
operate a new teaching hospital was ultimately abandoned because Humana failed to obtain the 
necessary state approval-a "Certificate of Need" (CON). The agreement, which called for Humana 
to build, own, and operate a 224 bed tertiary care center near Chicago, met stiff opposition from area 
community hospitals and from critics of investor-owned medical services. A coalition of community 
hospitals (potential competitors of the proposed Humana facility) opposed Humana's 1984 CON 
application and appealed a state health planning board's 1986 decision to grant a CON to Humana. 
After two years oflitigation over a myriad of issues of administrative procedure, the Illinois Supreme 
Court issued a ruling reversing a lower court's dismissal of much of the coalition's complaint and 
remanding the case to the lower court for trial. Condell Hosp. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning 
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These regulatory programs do not openly distinguish between for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals in evaluating proposals for capital improvements. 
But fears about the investor-owned chains' avowedly profit-maldng ori-
entation could inspire members of regulatory bodies to engage in more 
exacting scrutiny of proposals from for-profit facilities. Because per-
ceived capital-improvement needs are often the impetus for academic 
centers to consider links with the for-profits, teaching center managers 
would do well to explore regulators' attitudes toward for-profit operation 
of their facilities. Informal contacts with regulatory personnel as well as 
observations of past behavior patterns in response to submissions by non-
profit and for-profit community hospitals could provide useful informa-
tion in this regard. 
In addition, state licensing agencies (generally state departments of 
health) typically prescribe a variety of organizational requirements for all 
inpatient facilities. 380 Moreover, the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO), a "private" body whose accred-
itation is in practice essential for continued hospital operations, has 
established detailed organizational standards for hospital managers and 
directors.38 I At the federal level, Medicare's "Conditions of Participa-
tion" require that inpatient facilities reimbursed by Medicare possess "an 
effective governing body legally responsible for the conduct of the hospi-
tal as an institution."382 The JCAHO and licensing regulations in many 
states likewise mandate such a governing body for each individual 
hospital. 383 
These organizational requirements have in practice posed little prac-
tical difficulty for the investor-owned hospital chains. At hundreds of 
nonteaching, community hospitals operated by the chains, management 
Bd., 124 Ill. 2d 341 (1988). Faced with the prospect of years of further litigation to finalize its CON, 
Humana abandoned the project. Interview with Wendell Potter, Senior Public Affairs Manager, 
Humana Inc. (Nov. 1990). 
380. John F. Horty & Daniel M. Mulholland III, Legal Differences Between Investor-Owned and 
Nonprofit Health Care Institutions, in THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPI· 
TALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 17, 19 {Bradford H. Grayed., 1983). 
381. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS, ACCREDI· 
TATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1982) (hereinafter JCAHO]. 
382. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1021. 
383. JCAHO, supra note 381, at 51; Horty & Mulholland, supra note 380, at 22. As Horty and 
Mulholland observe, the significance of a hospital governing body's legal responsibility has been 
made real during the last few decades by a series of court decisions holding these bodies responsible 
for hospitals' quality of care (even when care is provided by non-employed physicians permitted to 
practice in a hospital), see, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 
(Ill. 1965), and fiscal integrity, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch. of Deaconesses & 
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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has been able to fashion administrative arrangements acceptable to state 
regulators, the JCAHO, and Medicare. In particular, the for-profits have 
adopted the practice of delegating broad management responsibilities to 
semi-autonomous, local governing boards at each hospital, composed of 
physicians, community representatives, and corporate officials. Though 
not ultimately responsible in a legal sense for capital investment and 
other management decisions, these boards exercise authority over profes-
sional matters such as the conferring of admitting privileges and the 
organization of clinical support services. Chain officials claim these bod-
ies also have considerable say in the preparation of operating budgets, the 
planning of capital expenditures, and even the selection of hospital 
administrators. 384 Their authority has been deemed sufficient by the 
JCAHO and other regulatory entities. Similar organizational arrange-
ments at chain-operated teaching hospitals (including provisions for sub-
stantial medical school faculty and administration representation on the 
governing boards385) should suffice to meet the requirements of these reg-
ulatory bodies. 386 
Nevertheless, local regulatory considerations may in some cases rule 
out the sale or leasing of a teaching hospital to an investor-owned firm. 
Some states have regulatory barriers to market entry that make it 
extremely difficult in practice for investor-owned firms to acquire hospi-
tals. 387 Activists in some other states have been pressing for legislation to 
freeze or restrict further hospital acquisitions by the for-profits. Some 
384. See, e.g., Remarks of John Bedrosian, President of National Medical Enterprises (NME), 
in Reiman-Bedrosian Debate, supra note 237, at 34-35. According to Bedrosian, members of an 
NME hospital's medical staff typically constitute two thirds of the hospital's board, and medical staff 
rules, regulations, and credential requirements are established solely by members of the staff. New 
hospital administrators are selected by the board from a list of two to four candidates submitted by 
NME. ld. A study of four nonteaching hospitals recently sold to investor-owned chains found a 
generally high level of satisfaction among physicians as to their role in management decisions and on 
the local board at three of the four hospitals. Jessica Townsend, supra note 189, at 61-62. 
385. For example, in its talks with George Washington University about a possible purchase or 
lease of the George Washington University Hospital, American Medical International, Inc. proposed 
a seven person governing board that would have included four senior university officials. See AMI 
Letter, supra note 210, app. I. 
386. The organizational requirements imposed by these regulatory entities do not differ signifi-
cantly for teaching and nonteaching hospitals. In formulating governance mechanisms at investor-
owned (or leased) teaching centers, however, corporate and academic officials will also need to con-
sider the requirements of the clinical specialty and subspecialty bodies that accredit particular resi-
dency and fellowship programs. 
387. For example, a New York statute requires investor-owned chains to overcome a variety of 
difficult obstacles to obtain the discretionary approval of an administrative entity that regulates hos-
pital incorporation, establishment, and ownership. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW§ 2808-a (McKinney 
1985). 
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state universities, moreover, may not be able to sell or lease their hospi-
tals to private parties without obtaining authorization from the state leg-
islature, the executive, or an administrative agency.388 Before starting 
talks with a for-profit chain, the managers of an academic center actually 
or potentially affected by such restrictions ought to assess carefully the 
legal and political options, including the inclinations of political actors 
with the power to permit or prevent a deal. 
A more speculative regulatory concern is the growing antitrust 
activism of the courts and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the 
health care field. 389 Aggressive antitrust enforcement could complicate 
the for-profits' strategic plans to make teaching centers into regional 
hubs within comprehensive, vertically integrated health care networks. 
The U.S. Supreme Court opened the way for application of federal anti-
trust law to the hospital industry in 1976 when it held that hospital oper-
ations have a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce and are thus 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. 39° For prospective pur-
chasers of teaching hospitals, the federal antitrust statute of primary con-
cern is section 7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribes acquisitions that 
"may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a 
monopoly."391 Neither this nor any other antitrust provision has been 
applied thus far to an acquisition of a teaching institution by a for-profit 
hospital chain. However, the courts and the FTC have recently invoked 
section 7 to thwart mergers between chains as well a8 chain acquisitions 
388. Cf Howard Waitzkin et al., Deciding Against Corporate Management of a State-Supported 
Academic Medical Center, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1299 (1986) (presenting a plan by AMI and 
University of California at Irvine for AMI to build, own, and manage a new teaching hospital 
rejected by University of California system's central administration after state legislators and Orange 
County officials, among others, expressed opposition). 
389. See generally Michael R. Pollard, The Essential Role of Antitrust in a Competitive Market 
for Health Services, 59 MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND Q. 256 (1981) (briefly reviewing the application 
of antitrust principles to health care providers and arguing for discriminating antitrust activism 
where professional self-regulation has been abused in pursuit of economic self-interest); Clark C. 
Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Services Industry: What Does It All Mean?, 58 
MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND Q. 89 (1980) (more extensively surveying antitrust activity in the 
health field and arguing for broad "antitrust attack on the medical citadel" in lieu of reliance on 
provider self-regulation). 
390. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744-46 (1976) (holding a pro-
prietarY hospital to be within flow of interstate commerce because it purchased medicines and sup-
plies and received insurance reimbursement from out-of-state sources, paid a management fee to an 
out-of-state parent corporation, and was a potential recipient of out-of-state financing). 
391. 15 U.S. C. § 18 (1983). The jurisdictional requirement under this provision is identical to 
that under the Sherman Act. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 148 
n.4 (2d ed. 1984). 
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of freestanding community hospitals. 392 The focus in these cases has 
been on the hazards of horizontal consolidation. But vertical integration 
could become a locus of attention in section 7 litigation. 
Section 7 actions may be brought by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
the FTC, 393 state attorneys general, 394 or any private party allegedly 
injured or-where injunctive relief is sought-threatened with harm395 
by a violation. Analysis under section 7 begins with definition of the 
"relevant market" in both geographic and product-group terms. When 
addressing the lawfulness of mergers and acquisitions in the hospital 
industry, the FTC and the courts have eschewed consideration of 
national market shares in favor of a local approach to the geographic 
definition of relevant markets. Guided by regional patient-flow data, 396 
they have designated cities or other local areas as relevant market 
392. See, e.g., United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 63,721 
(E.D. La. 1980) (blocking a merger of psychiatric hospital chains because it would have created a 
firm with monopoly shares of psychiatric beds and patient days in the relevant market in violation of 
section 7); American Medical Int'l, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 11 22,170 (1984) (FTC finding 
that acquisition of single facility by a hospital chain substantially lessened competition in the rele-
vant market, in violation of section 7; the FrC ordered divestiture). 
393. HEALTH LAW CENTER, II HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL Antitrust, 11 11-2 (Dec. 1984) [here-
inafter HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL]. The FrC may petition the courts for a temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction. /d. 
394. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988); see also HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 393, Antitrust, 11 11-
3 (discussing the enforcement of state and federal antitrust law by state attorneys general against 
health-related enterprises). 
395. To establish standing to assert a claim, a private plaintiff must show injury to its business 
or property. Moreover, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal relationship between the injury and 
the alleged violation. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); see also HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL, supra note 393, 
Antitrust 11 11-4 (discussing requirements for a showing of injury to a private party). Where injunc-
tive relief is sought to prevent an acquisition, proof of threatened loss or damage may suffice for the 
injury prerequisite. /d. 
Thus many who might object to a for-profit's acquisition of a teaching hospital-e.g., medical 
school faculty members, civic leaders, and politicians-will lack the direct economic nexus necessary 
to formulate an attack under federal antitrust law. 
396. Courts and the FrC have studied data on, inter alia, the geographic distribution of patients 
and physicians who use particular hospitals within a region and the hospital choices of patients and 
physicians from particular areas within a region. 
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regions. 397 They have defined the relevant product group as acute gen-
eral hospital services. 398 It is possible, however, that in a section 7 chal-
lenge to the acquisition of a teaching hospital, the product group could 
be more narrowly defined as tertiary care services. 399 
The next analytic step is to quantitatively assess concentration in the 
relevant market before and after the acquisition at issue. The market 
shares of significant competitors, including those involved in the chal-
lenged acquisition, are figured from available industry data.400 The 
courts and the FTC have refrained from establishing strict numerical cri-
teria for illegal increases in market concentration.401 The Department of 
Justice, though, has developed general guidelines based upon a simple 
mathematical formula for estimating the impact of concentration on 
397. See, e.g., American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984) (designating the relevant mar-
ket as a city); United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 63,721 
(E.D. La. 1980) (designating planning regions, known as Health Systems Agency areas, established 
pursuant to the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300k-3001 (1988)); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Pa. 1977) 
(designating the relevant market as Health Systems Agency Areas). The 1984 merger guidelines 
issued by the U.S. Department of Justice define the relevant geographic market or markets as the 
smallest area(s) "for which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a 'small but significant 
and nontransitory' increase in price." U.S. DEPT. OF JUSfiCE MERGER GUIDELINES Guideline 
2.11, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1!13,103 (No. 655 Part II) (June 14, 1984} [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES]. 
398. See, e.g., American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 589, 597-98 (E.D. Pa. 
1977); American Medical Int'l, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1!22,170 (1984). 
399. Courts have articulated a so-called "reasonable interchangeability" standard for specifica-
tion of the relevant product group in Clayton and Sherman Act antitrust actions. "The essential test 
for ascertaining the relevant product market involves the identification of those products or services 
that are either (1) identical to or (2) available substitutes for the defendant's product or service." 
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1983). This 
standard offers little real guidance to courts faced with the task of drawing a line between reasonable 
and unreasonable interchangeability in a complex marketplace of imperfect substitutes like hospital 
services. The Justice Department's 1984 merger guidelines are one attempt to provide some addi-
tional guidance. They define the relevant product group as the most narrowly circumscribed group 
of substitutes "for which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a 'small but significant 
and nontransitory' increase in price." GUIDELINES, supra note 397. Under this definition, it is 
arguable that hospital-based tertiary care services-a grouping more circumscribed (and more highly 
priced) than all general hospital services-ought to constitute the relevant product group in the 
hypothetical case of a Clayton Act section 7 action to block the purchase of a teaching center by a 
for-profit chain. 
400. In the hospital industry shares of the relevant market's total of beds and inpatient days are 
typically calculated. See, e.g., United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 1J 63,721, at 77,853 (E.D. La. Oct. 9, 1980). 
401. However, where a merger of hospital chains gave the acquiring firm a 72.9 percent share of 
the psychiatric beds and a 72.3 percent share of the patient days in a relevant market (roughly 
doubling the firm's market share) a court found these shares to be of "monopoly proportions" in 
violation of section 7. Id. 
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competition in a market.402 The FfC recently adhered to these guide-
lines in ordering a hospital chain to divest itself of a newly acquired 
facility. 403 
The final step is to consider the market concentration before and 
after the challenged acquisition along with a number of qualitative fac-
tors to determine whether the acquisition "substantially lessens competi-
tion" or "tends to create a monopoly" in violation of section 7. These 
factors include barriers to market entry (such as regulatory and financial 
requirements),404 overall industry trends toward concentration, and the 
acquisition's impact on nonprice405 and potential406 competition. The 
efficiency gains that result from an acquisition may be found to offset 
other, anticompetitive effects.407 
402. The formula, known as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), is the summation of the 
square of each competitor's share in the relevant market. GUIDELINES, supra note 397, Guideline 
3.1. The squaring feature models the premise that anticompetitive behavior by a market participant 
becomes much more likely as its market share increases. Under the Justice Department's guidelines, 
acquisitions resulting in an HHI below 1000 are unlikely to be challenged. Where the post-acquisi-
tion HHI is in the 1000 to 1800 range, a challenge is unlikely if the HHI increase resulting from the 
acquisition is less than one hundred, but is more likely (depending on other factors) if the increase is 
more than one hundred. Where the post-acquisition HHI is greater than 1800 and the acquisition-
related increase is more than one hundred, a challenge is likely. However, if the increase is in the 
fifty to one hundred range, a decision to challenge will depend on other factors, and if the increase is 
less than fifty a challenge is unlikely. /d. 
403. American Medical Int'l, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 22,170 (1984). The Commission 
found that the post-acquisition Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the relevant market, see 
supra note 402, was well above 1800 and had risen by more than one hundred as a result of the 
acquisition. These figures met the Justice Department's HHI thresholds for a likely challenge to an 
acquisition. See GUIDELINES, supra note 397, Guideline 3.11. 
404. The requirement in many states of a Certificate of Need (CON), see supra note 378, for 
expansion of an existing hospital or construction of a new facility is the principal regulatory obstacle 
to entry. The CON barrier has been cited by the FrC as an important qualitative indicator that a 
hospital acquisition may lessen competition. American Medical Int'l, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 22,170, at 23,044 (1984). 
405. The FrC has cited efforts to attract medical staff as one form of nonprice competition 
reduced by a hospital chain'11 acquisition of a free-standing facility. Id. at 23,047-48. 
406. The FrC has indicated in dictum that the possible emergence of a market for group hospi-
tal service contracts, sought out by independent, prepaid health plans, represents one area of poten-
tial competition deserving of consideration in an assessment of an acquisition's lawfulness under 
section 7. Id. at 23,048-51 (citing the predicted development of demand by health maintenance and 
preferred provider organizations for group hospital contracts but concluding that the acquisition at 
issue did not reduce potential competition to meet this demand because there was no evidence that 
such prepaid plans had established a significant presence in the relevant market). 
407. The Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that efficiency gains achieved through a 
merger of relatively small competitors may enhance competition in a market dominated by a larger 
firm. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966). The Justice Department's 
1984 Merger Guidelines go further by suggesting that efficiency gains, if shown by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence and not achievable by other means, may in themselves justify a decision not to 
challenge a merger or acquisition. GUIDELINES, supra note 397, Guideline 3.5. The FrC has 
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The significance of hospital chains' vertical integration for Section 7 
analysis has not yet been squarely addressed by the FTC or the courts. 
But the general principles animating antitrust analysis of vertical integra-
tion in other industries ought to be similarly applicable to health care 
delivery. In assessing vertical consolidation, the courts have focused 
principally on its horizontal effect-its impact on competition in "rele-
vant markets." Specific factors cited by courts as relevant to evaluation 
of this impact include the shares of upstream and downstream markets 
rendered inaccessible to competitors because of intrafirm supply links, 
the degree of concentration in these upstream and downstream markets, 
industry trends toward vertical integration, and offsetting efficiency 
gains.40s 
The many factors to be weighed in section 7 analysis and the wide 
range of conceivable fact situations involving teaching hospitals make it 
impossible to state general rules about the outcome of a section 7 chal-
lenge. However, where the would-be purchaser already owns a substan-
tial share of the hospital beds in a metropolitan area and quantitative 
estimates of pre- and postacquisition concentration in the relevant mar-
ket meet the Justice Department's criteria for a probable challenge,409 
those involved in planning a deal ought to anticipate the prospect of a 
successful challenge, given the industry's high regulatory barriers to 
entry and trends toward horizontal and vertical consolidation. 410 On the 
other hand, if the would-be buyer can show that acquiring a hospital is 
necessary to avert the facility's impending financial collapse, judicial 
approval is likely under the so-called failing company defense.411 
employed the Justice Department's approach in assessing the lawfulness of a hospital acquisition. 
See American Medicallnt'l, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1f22, 170, at 23,055 (1984) (failing to find 
"clear and convincing" evidence of efficiencies outweighing the acquisition's anticompetitive 
impact). 
The lack of reported, empirical evidence that the for-profit hospital chains achieve greater oper-
ating efficiencies than do nonprofit hospitals, see supra text accompanying notes 134-38, suggests that 
gains in operating efficiency are unlikely, in general, to be seen as an offset against anticompetitive 
effects in section 7 actions against the chains. However, the chains' demonstrated advantage over 
non-profits in the capital markets, see supra text accompanying notes 138-41, could be viewed by the 
FTC and the courts as a competition enhancing efficiency in section 7 cases, particularly where the 
acquired hospital is a teaching center beset by unmet capital needs. 
408. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970). 
409. See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text. 
410. Under such circumstances, a successful challenge would be even more likely if the acquir-
ing firm also had a substantial position in the "downstream" prepaid health plan market. 
411. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (holding that the failing 
company defense is applicable only if the acquired firm probably would have been unable, in the 
near-term future, either to meet its financial obligations on its own or to reorganize successfully). 
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B. SOME TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
Federal and state tax considerations pose no insurmountable barri-
ers to purchase or lease arrangements of the type considered herein. 
However, prospective for-profit and nonprofit parties to such arrange-
ments must carefully assess the tax consequences of alternative institu-
tional designs in order to plan effectively. By virtue of their substantial 
influence upon the financial attractions of alternative transaction struc-
tures, income and property tax liabilities and exemptions are likely to 
weigh significantly in the parties' development of negotiating strategies. 
A thorough tax analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, but I will 
identify some key issues. 
1. Federal Income Tax 
Federal income tax liability is probably the most important tax con-
sideration for prospective parties to hospital purchase or leasing agree-
ments.412 Without question, teaching hospital operations sold or leased 
to a for-profit firm will lose their exempt status.413 They will become 
liable for corporate income tax, will not be able to issue tax-exempt 
bonds, and will no longer qualify for tax-deductible contributions.414 But 
the federal tax consequences are less clear-cut for nonprofit sellers or les-
sors and for private academic institutions conducting educational and 
research activities at teaching hospitals owned or leased by for-profit 
fi.rms.4ts 
A sale or lease itself should not endanger the seller or lessor organi-
zation's exemption from corporate income tax or eligibility for deductible 
contributions, provided that the organization, after giving up its hospital 
operations, pursues another purpose that is statutorily permissible in the 
412. Determination of exemption from state income taxation will in general closely follow the 
federal finding. D. WARREN, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 314 (3d ed. 1978). 
413. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988) (exemption for "charitable" institutions). Since 1969 the IRS 
has construed the word "charitable" to apply to all hospitals organized as non profits, so long as they 
(1) do not discriminate among paying patients and (2) operate emergency departments open to all 
without regard to ability to pay, irrespective of whether they provide below cost inpatient care to the 
medically indigent. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. This stretched construction has won judicial 
approval. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1974), 
vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
414. I.R.C. § 170 (1988) (Contributions to qualifying nonprofit organizations may be deducted 
from an individual's income before figuring his federal income tax.). 
415. If, however, the seller or lessor (or the institution conducting teaching or research at the 
hospital after a deal) were a government-owned entity-for example, a state university-it would 
thereby be automatically exempted. 
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Internal Revenue Service's view.416 This restriction imposes few real 
limits on what the organization may do.417 If the seller or lessor is a 
private university, its ongoing educational and research activities will of 
course qualify it for continued exemption and receipt of deductible con-
tributions. If it is a religious, fraternal, or social service organization, it 
should qualify by virtue of other ongoing activities in service of its mis-
sion. Even a nonprofit firm that exists prior to a sale or lease only for the 
purpose of operating a hospital should have no difficulty qualifying 
should it choose to continue in another incarnation-for example, as a 
foundation for the support of medical education, research, or other 
health-related activities. 418 
The Internal Revenue Service, however, may scrutinize a lease 
agreement to determine whether the rent paid by the for-profit firm is 
sufficient to satisfy the statutory proscription against inurement of a tax-
exempt entity's "net earnings" to the benefit of private interests.419 If an 
agreement failed to survive this scrutiny, the lessor would be forced to 
choose between maintaining its tax-exempt status and preserving the 
agreement. In practice, IRS scrutiny is likely to entail an assessment of 
whether the rent constitutes reasonable compensation to the nonprofit 
for the leased hospital's commercial value.420 Because a teaching hospi-
tal is hardly a frequently traded asset with a value discernible by looking 
to an established market, such an assessment will inevitably be subjective 
and hard to predict, fraught with difficult-to-quantify factors such as the 
commercial values of a teaching center's current prestige and future 
potential for medical innovation. The lessor's strongest arguments to the 
416. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988) exempts nonprofit entities "operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." The set of nonprof-
its eligible for tax-deductible contributions under I.R.C. § 170 is approximately coextensive with 
section 501(c)(3). 
417. As Henry Hansmann has observed, "repeated and unreflective reinterpretation" of the lan-
guage ofi.R.C. § 501(c) "to accommodate new forms of nonprofit activity ... has kept the scope of 
the exemption roughly congruent with the outlines of the nonprofit sector as a whole." Henry 
Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 
91 YALE L.J. 54, 57-58 (1981). Thus a nonprofit firm, having unburdened itself of its hospital opera-
tions, has virtually unlimited freedom to pursue purposes of its choosing without endangering its 
federal tax exemption, so long as it adheres to section 501(c) proscriptions against "propaganda," 
lobbying, political campaigning, or inurement of net earnings to private interests. 
418. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (independent owners of university-affiliated non-
profit hospitals weigh selling their hospitals and using the proceeds to create foundations for the 
support of health-related activities). 
419. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988) ("No part of the net earnings" of an exempt organization "inures 
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual .... "). 
420. See, e.g., Boman v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957) (Earnings of a nonprofit 
clinic were found not to inure to private interests where a partnership of practicing physicians paid 
an adequate rent for the lease of the clinic's building and equipment.). 
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IRS on this issue will probably be (1) the arm's-length nature of negotia-
tions leading to such agreements and (2) the lessor's obvious incentive to 
negotiate the best deal possible. 
Even if the lessor can preserve its exempt status, its income from a 
leasing arrangement will be taxable as "unrelated business income"421 
unless it can persuade the IRS that the leasing agreement is "substan-
tially related" to the furtherance of its exempt purposes.422 The "unre-
lated business" income tax applies even to state universities.423 The 
Treasury Department has construed the statutory "substantially related" 
test to require a "causal relationship," aside from the generation of 
income, between a non-profit firm's "trade or business" activities and its 
advancement of exempt purposes.424 This approach, which hardly draws 
a bright line between taxable and exempt leasing income, may yield vary-
ing, sometimes unpredictable results for different leasing arrangements. 
For example, if the lessor is a fraternal body without other health 
care programs, it will probably have difficulty convincing the IRS that 
leasing its hospital to a for-profit firm bears a causal relationship to fur-
therance of its purposes. If, on the other hand, the lessor is a university 
that conducts medical teaching and research activities in the leased hos-
pital, it should be able to make a strong case for a causal relationship 
between its hospital business and its educational and scientific purposes. 
421. See I.R.C. § 511 (1991) (Unrelated business income of exempt organizations is taxable.). 
422. See I.R.C. § 513 (West 1991) (defining an unrelated business as "any trade or business the 
conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of [an exempt organization] for 
income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by such 
organization of its charitable, educational, or other [exempt] purpose or function."). The regulations 
implementing this provision establish a three-part formula for determining whether a particular 
income stream is taxable: (1) the income must come from a "trade or business," Treas. Reg.§ 1.513-
1(b) (as amended in 1983); (2) the trade or business must be "regularly carried on," as evinced by 
"frequency and continuity" and a manner "generally similar to comparable commercial activities of 
non-exempt organizations," Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c) (as amended in 1983); and (3) activity of the 
trade or business must not be "substantially related" to the organization's exempt function(s), Treas. 
Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1) (as amended in 1983). 
Long-term leasing of real property satisfies the first and second parts of this test: it qualifies as a 
"trade or business" that is "regularly carried on." Therefore, whether a nonprofit organization's 
earnings from the lease of its hospital to a for-profit firm qualify as "unrelated business income" 
hinges on whether the lease arrangement is "substantially related" to the nonprofit's exempt 
purposes. 
423. See I.R.C. § 511 (1991). 
424. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983) (stating that activity is "substantially 
related" if it "contributes importantly" to an exempt purpose). Thus, for example, a nonprofit hos-
pital's leasing of an adjacent building to its staff physicians for use as office space for seeing private 
patients was held to be a related business where the lessees provided all clinical care at the hospital. 
Rev. Rul. 69-463, 1969-2 C.B. 131. 
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An independent nonprofit firm that leases out its university-affiliated hos-
pital and then uses the proceeds to support other health-related activities 
may find itself in an ambiguous position with respect to the "substan-
tially related" requirement. The IRS's position will depend on an indi-
vidualized assessment of the leased hospital's role in the nonprofit's other 
health-related work. 
Once a for-profit firm buys or leases a teaching hospital, research 
and teaching activities conducted at the hospital by a nonprofit institu-
tion will have to satisfy the statutory proscription against inurement of 
"net earnings" to private interests.425 In evaluating an affiliation 
arrangement between a university and a for-profit teaching hospital, the 
IRS is likely to focus on whether (1) the for-profit firm is deriving any 
benefit from the university for less than commercially reasonable com-
pensation, and (2) the governance mechanisms for university programs at 
the hospital create incentives and opportunities for distribution of pro-
gram benefits-beyond those contracted for at reasonable fees-to the 
for-profit firm.426 
Thus, the university should make sure that services provided by the 
hospital to support academic activities, as well as services made available 
to the hospital by the university, 427 are contracted for at arm's length and 
compensated at commercially reasonable levels. Moreover, the univer-
sity ought to insist on governance mechanisms that insure its control 
over the administration of academic activities at the hospital.428 Individ-
uals with academic positions at the university probably should not also 
hold hospital appointments as officers or employees, and no hospital 
officer or employee should exercise budgetary or policy-making authority 
425. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1991). 
426. No published IRS or court decisions apply the proscription against private benefit to uni· 
versities affiliated with for-profit hospitals. However, management contracts between nonprofit hos-
pitals and for-profit firms provide a plausible, albeit imperfect analogy to such affiliations. To satisfy 
the proscription against private benefit, a nonprofit hospital that contracts with a for-profit firm for 
management services must ensure that the contract is negotiated at arm's length and that its own 
governing board retains ultimate control over matters of policy. Moreover, the manager's compen-
sation must not depend on the hospital's earnings; otherwise the IRS may view the contract as a 
device for distributing profits to the manager. 5 HOSPITAL CoNTRACI'S MANUAL 41-42. 
The principle underlying these restrictions seeks to assure not only that "net earnings" (benefits 
in excess of reasonable compensation for goods or services) are not actually distributed, but also that 
contractual arrangements between for-profit and nonprofit firms preclude even the potential for dis-
tribution of net earnings to a for-profit firm. This potential could take the form of a conflict of 
interest at the negotiating stage, control by agents of a for-profit firm over policy-making aspects of a 
nonprofit's operations, or opportunities and incentives built into the contract. 
427. For example, unusual or experimental clinical tests performed in academic laboratories. 
428. In practice, the intermingling of patient care, clinical research, and teaching in academic 
medical centers makes it exceedingly difficult to draw clear lines between clinical and academic 
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over a university program. These restrictions could occasionally make 
collaboration between the hospital and the university's teaching and 
research programs cumbersome. But they may provide the university 
with added protection against exploitative behavior by a for-profit firm 
after a sale or lease takes effect. 
2. Property Tax 
Property tax liability is another important consideration for all par-
ties to the sale or lease of a teaching hospital to a for-profit firm. Sale to a 
for-profit firm, of course, terminates a hospital's property tax exemption, 
rendering the for-profit liable for state and local levies on the facility's 
real property.429 The property tax consequences of a leasing arrange-
ment are less clear-cut. So long as the nonprofit lessor, after ceasing its 
involvement in hospital operations, maintains another accepted charita-
ble or educational purpose, it will continue to qualify, as an organization, 
for property tax exemption. However, property owned by an exempt 
entity and leased, for a commercial rate, to a nonexempt organization is 
generally taxable. 430 
programs. Many clinical services are provided by trainees who learn by doing, and research proto-
cols draw their subjects from the hospital's patient base. Lines of hospital and university administra-
tive authority are thereby so intertwined that to entirely eliminate hospital management's influence 
from the administration of hospital-based academic programs would be impossible. 
What sort of line the IRS might attempt to draw between acceptable indirect leverage (e.g., 
hypothetically, some role in decisions about the number and salaries of interns and residents) and 
intolerable influence (e.g., hypothetically, power to exert pressure on faculty or trainees to change 
patterns of clinical practice that affect a hospital's revenues) is not possible to predict. But in negoti-
ating agreements with for-profit firms, universities can use this uncertainty to strengthen their hand 
on issues of hospital versus university control over operational matters. 
429. See WARREN, supra note 412, at 304. By selling its hospital, a nonprofit organization does 
not jeopardize the exempt status of its other properties, so long as (1) it continues to qualify for 
exemptions by virtue of its other charitable or educational purposes, and (2) the other properties 
meet the requirement, extant in most jurisdictions, that their use be reasonably necessary for the 
organization's charitable or educational work. Id. at 305, 307. 
430. HEALTH LAW CENTER, THE HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL Taxation 1[ 3-3 (1982). Determi-
nation of whether a particular property is exempt involves a two-step process. First, the owner of 
the property must qualify for exemption by virtue of its purposes and form of organization. Second, 
the property itself must meet a state's criteria for "ownership" by the exempt entity and "exclusive 
use" for exempt purposes. Id. at 1[1[ 3-1, 3-2. The "exclusive use" requirement, usually the key 
factor in an exemption determination, varies widely in application among the states. Id. at 1[ 3-2. 
But in most states, this requirement is considered to be met by a showing that a property's use is 
"reasonably necessary" to further the owner's exempt purpose or purposes. WARREN, supra note 
412, at 307. The property itself, not the income it produces, must survive "exclusive use" scrutiny. 
Thus, in general, property used commercially is not exempt. EDITH L. FiscH, DORIS J. FREED & 
EsTHER R. SCHACTE.R, CHARmES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 616-17 (1974) (hereinafter 
CHARmES]. 
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In some states, rent or income producing property is automatically 
barred by statute from exemption.431 In these states, the lease of a hospi-
tal to a for-profit firm would unavoidably subject the nonprofit lessor to 
state and local levies on the property. But in most states, income produc-
ing property can retain its exemption upon a showing that use of the 
property itself (as opposed to the income it generates) is "reasonably nec-
essary" to advance the owner's exempt purposes.432 Thus, for example, 
office space rented out to private physicians by nonprofit hospitals has 
occasionally been found exempt on the ground that the physical presence 
of staff doctors in or near the hospital for most of the working day facili-
tates quality inpatient care. 433 
A university that leased its teaching hospital to a for-profit firm 
would be well positioned to argue that this use, albeit unconventional, is 
"reasonably necessary" for education and research. If a state or munici-
pality were to challenge the leased facility's exemption, the university 
could (1) explain the essential role of teaching hospitals in medical train-
ing and research, and (2) cite the financial hazards and demands of hos-
pital operation434 as sound reasons for turning over its teaching hospital 
to a private firm. This line of reasoning ought to suffice to defeat a 
challenge. 
Nonuniversity lessors, however, would be in weaker position. A 
nonprofit entity-for example, a fraternal body-without other health-
related programs would probably not be able to make a convincing show-
ing that teaching hospitallessorship is "reasonably necessary" to achieve 
its exempt aims. Even a nonprofit with other health programs might find 
its position problematic, depending on the nexus between these programs 
and operation of a teaching hospital. Determination of a leased hospi-
tal's eligibility for property tax exemption will depend on an individual-
ized assessment of the facility's importance to the nonprofit's other 
431. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 617. 
432. See supra note 430. 
433. WARREN, supra note 412, at 308. Likewise, hospital property rented out as housing for 
hospital employees or used for cafeterias, gift shops, or pharmacies is frequently found exempt on the 
ground that these uses further the hospital's "charitable" purpose and only "incidently" produce 
income. Id. at 309-10. But cf. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Town of Philipstown, 
368 N.Y.S. 2d 852 (1975) (holding that hospital property rented to physicians who use the property 
exclusively for their own private gain is not exempt from taxation). 
434. See supra text accompanying notes 91-119. 
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exempt activities.435 The outcome may in some cases be difficult to 
predict. 
C. DONORS' REsTRICTIONS ON CHARITABLE GIFfS 
Though private philanthropy today supports a shrinking proportion 
of the operating budgets of academic medical centers, major teaching 
hospitals and medical schools typically hold millions of dollars in gifts, 
bequests, and other donated resources. Myriad restrictions imposed by 
donors govern the use of these holdings. The purchase or lease of teach-
ing hospitals by for-profit firms, and medical schools' affiliations with 
these hospitals subsequent to such transactions, may come into conflict 
with some of these restrictions.436 I will briefly consider here the kinds of 
conflicts that could result, the potential legal consequences of violating 
such restrictions, and the legal and other options available to administra-
tors of medical schools or other nonprofit entities facing possible 
violations. 
1. Potential Violations Resulting From the Purchase or Leasing of 
Teaching Hospitals by For-Profit Firms 
The extraordinary range of restrictions imposed by charitable 
donors defies any attempt to characterize them summarily. Typical limi-
tations include requirements that a gift be applied to the construction or 
purchase of some physical asset (such as a hospital or laboratory building 
or some novel clinical or research instrument) or to support a particular 
clinical, research, or educational activity. Also common are institutional 
qualifications for the use of a gift (for example, the user must be a hospi-
tal that is owned or operated by a particular nonprofit organization). 
The possibilities are as limitless as the spectrum of human idiosyncracy. 
Trustees and officers of nonprofits that hold charitable contributions 
have a common law duty to comply with donors' restrictions.437 
'-
For the purpose of analyzing potential conflicts between such 
restrictions and for-profit ownership or leasing of teaching hospitals, 
435. The problem is akin to determining whether a nonprofit's income from a leasing arrange-
ment is subject to the federal tax on exempt organizations' "unrelated business income." See supra 
text accompanying notes 421-25. 
436. Purchase and leasing arrangements, as well as the for-profit teaching hospital's subsequent 
affiliation with a medical school, may also violate the terms of an affected nonprofit organization's 
charter or certificate of incorporation. However, this should in general pose little difficulty because 
in most states a nonprofit organization has statutory authority to modify its ~?harter or certificate of 
incorporation. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 406. 
437. Id. at 402. 
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assets donated to nonprofit teaching hospitals and medical schools may 
be separated into three broad groupings. These categories are based on 
changes in asset application that would accompany a teaching hospital's 
shift to for-profit operation. They are as follows: (a) physical assets 
(land, plant, and equipment) held by a hospital; (b) hospital endowment 
funds (used to support of various hospital activities); and (c) medical 
school endowment funds used to support teaching and research activities 
conducted at or in conjunction with the hospital. I will consider how the 
application of assets in each of these groupings would be changed by the 
sale or lease of a teaching hospital to a for-profit firm and how these 
changes might violate some typical donors' restrictions on the use of 
these assets. 
a. Physical assets held by teaching hospitals: Purchase of a teach-
ing hospital by a for-profit firm would in effect convert donated resources 
originally dedicated to physical assets into an endowment corpus avail-
able to the seller for other uses.438 For universities and other nonprofits 
that wish to promote medical education and research but are wary of the 
risks and burdens of teaching hospital ownership, such a conversion may 
be intensely attractive. Managers of a nonprofit organization are, in gen-
eral, empowered to sell its real and personal property for adequate con-
sideration439 if the sale plausibly furthers the organization's purposes. 440 
This power, however, is subject to donors' restrictions.441 The require-
ment, for example, that a donated parcel of land occupied by the hospital 
not be sold would stand in the way of a sale to a for-profit firm. So would 
a proviso that a gift used by a hospital's management to acquire some 
physical asset be employed only for the actual operation of a hospital by 
438. The seller, such as a university or a separate nonprofit entity with interests in the health 
field, might wish to apply income or principal from this corpus toward the support of clinical, educa-
tional, or research activities. See, e.g., supra note 19 and accompanying text (Independent, nonprofit 
owners of university-affiliated hospitals are considering selling their hospital operations and using 
the proceeds to establish foundations for the support of health services, education, and research.). 
Some sellers might wish to preserve the sale proceeds (and perhaps a proportion of the subsequent 
income from these proceeds) for possible exercise of a "buy-back" option built into the sale 
agreement. 
439. See, e.g., New York Medical College v. Dieffenbach, 211 N.Y.S. 799 (1925). 
440. See, e.g., Bennett v. Attorney Gen., 96 S.E.2d 46 (N.C. 1957) (holding that the trustee of a 
will may rent or sell property ifimpractical to maintain); Bossen v. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library 
Ass'n, 225 S.W.2d 336 (Ark. 1949) (holding that a trustee of a charitable trust may sell trust prop-
erty unless expressly forbidden). 
441. See Hendrix College v. Arkansas Townsite Co., 108 S.W. 514 (Ark. 1908). Nonprofit man-
agers must observe restrictions imposed by donors of eith.er the property itself or the funds used to 
acquire (or construct) it. 
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the donee. Even if only a small proportion of a nonprofit hospital's phys-
ical assets were acquired through charitable gifts subject to such restric-
tions, these limitations could pose serious legal barriers to a sale442 unless 
the would-be seller could find some way to circumvent them. 
The lease of a teaching hospital to a for-profit firm would not alter 
the form of donated resources originally dedicated to physical assets-
they would remain invested in real and personal property owned by the 
donee. A lease, however, would change the use of these assets, from sup-
port for hospital operations to generation of a revenue stream (leasing 
fees) for the support of other activities. Managers of a nonprofit entity 
are generally empowered to lease real and personal property unless spe-
cifically proscribed from doing so in the instrument conveying either the 
property443 or the resources used to acquire the property. Thus a proviso 
that donated real property not be sold or that a cash contribution be used 
only to build or acquire some physical asset would pose no obstacle to 
leasing a hospital unless the donative instrument also explicitly barred 
leasing. However, if a donor imposed a condition that the donee may 
employ a gift of physical assets, or of funds to be used for the acquisition 
of physical assets, only for the support of its own, nonprofit hospital 
operations, a leasing arrangement would clearly violate the condition. 
b. Hospital endowment funds: Sale or lease of a teaching hospital 
to a for-profit corporation would leave donated hospital endowment 
funds in the hands of the seller, lessor, or a successor nonprofit entity 
(such as a foundation444). No longer necessary for the support of hospi-
tal operations, these funds could be applied, within the limits imposed by 
donors' restrictions, to the support of other clinical, teaching, or research 
activities. Thus, for example, income from a gift subject only to the 
requirement that the donee apply it toward clinical training or research 
within a particular subspecialty could be used to provide grants for train-
ing or research to academic institutions or faculty members. However, a 
gift restricted by the proviso that it be applied only to support some 
activity at a donee-operated hospital could not be expended except in 
violation of the donor's conditions. 
442. Violation of these restrictions would constitute a breach of duty on the part of the seller's 
trustees, exposing them to possible enforcement actions by the state attorney general. See infra text 
accompanying notes 449-64. 
443. See, e.g., Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. New Canaan Historical Soc'y, 54 A.2d 696 
(Conn. 1947). But cf. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW§ 510 (McKinney 1986) (requiring court 
approval of the lease of all or substantially all assets of a charitable corporation). 
444. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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In contrast to donors' restrictions on the disposition of gifts of or for 
physical assets (which could pose legal barriers to a sale or lease445), 
donors' limits on the use of endowment funds could not, in themselves, 
erect a legal impediment to a sale or lease. But these limits could render 
such funds legally unavailable to the donee once it executes a sale or 
lease, unless the donee were able to devise a legal strategy to avoid them. 
c. Medical school endowment funds: The purchase or lease of a 
teaching hospital by a for-profit firm would not affect the ownership of 
medical school endowment funds used to support teaching and research 
activities conducted-at or in conjunction with the hospital.446 Nor would 
it change their application, except in the sense that monies paid to the 
hospital for space and for clinical and support services447 would accrue 
as income to a for-profit enterprise. This change should pose no obstacle 
to continued use of donated funds to support academic programs at or in 
conjunction with the hospital, unless conditions attached to a particular 
gift proscribe its use within a for-profit hospital setting. 448 
2. Enforcement of Donors' Restrictions 
Only the state attorney general, as a rule, can initiate legal action 
against the managers of a nonprofit organization to enjoin or redress the 
violation of a donor's restrictions on the use of a charitable gift.449 The 
445. See supra text accompanying notes 438-44. 
446. The analysis for medical school endowment funds applies also to donated funds held by 
private research institutes or other separate entities that conduct academic activities at or in conjunc-
tion with a for-profit teaching hospital. 
447. See, e.g., clinical laboratory tests for patients admitted to the hospital as part of a medical 
school research protocol. 
448. However, the use of donated funds to purchase space or services from a for-profit hospital 
could subject the medical school's managers to closer judicial scrutiny for violations of their duty to 
administer charitable gifts faithfully, and not for the benefit of other interests. Medical school man-
agers, in theory, are bound by this duty even when conducting affairs with other charitable corpora-
tions, including affiliated, nonprofit teaching hospitals. See Conway v. Emeny, 96 A.2d 221 (Conn. 
1953) (holding that charitable trustees may not act in manner that furthers interests of contingent 
beneficiary under donor's will even if the beneficiary is another charitable organization). But when a 
medical school engages in transactions with a for-profit teaching hospital administered by a semi-
autonomous local governing board that includes medical school representatives (see supra text 
accompanying notes 381-86 and infra text accompanying notes 530-35), the potential antagonism of 
interests may invite closer judicial examination. Cf. Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'! Training Sch., 
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.D.C. 1974) (Charitable managers may deposit the charity's funds in a 
bank having an interlocking directorate with the charity, but "such transactions will be subjected to 
the closest scrutiny to determine whether or not the duty of loyalty has been violated."). 
449. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 553, 554-556 (The attorney general's enforcement power is 
derived either from common law or statute.). There are some infrequent exceptions to this rule: 
charitable trustees and directors may bring suit against co-trustees and co-directors to enjoin or 
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attorney general may act either on his or her own initiative or upon a 
complaint from a third party-typically a donor, or heir, or a would-be 
beneficiary, though the complaining party need not have a special inter-
est in the matter.450 Donors and their heirs, in general, may neither initi-
ate nor intervene in such an enforcement proceeding; their role is limited 
to that of a complainant, or "relator," in an action begun by the attorney 
general.451 With few exceptions, the same applies to potential benefi-
ciaries.452 The attorney general, moreover, has virtually unreviewable 
discretion to initiate or withhold enforcement action.453 In practice, 
action by state attorneys general has been exceedingly rare.454 Observers 
have attributed this to resource constraints and the low political appeal 
of aggressive enforcement of law governing management of charities.455 
However, the specter of a teaching hospital's conversion to for-profit 
operation invites public attention, which could kindle a new enforcement 
activism among state attorneys general. Because he or she must be sensi-
tive to public perceptions of academic medical centers as vital commu-
nity resources (and to doubts about the propriety of for-profit hospitals), 
redress breaches of trust, and successor trustees may bring similar actions against predecessor trust-
ees. Directors of a charitable corporation, moreover, may institute a stockholder's derivative suit 
against the corporation. Id. at 560-61. Even more rarely, individuals or institutions clearly desig-
nated as beneficiaries in a gift's governing instrument or by the managers of a charitable entity may 
bring an action to compel receipt of benefits. See id. at 562. These exceptions, however, are unlikely 
to come into play for the transactions discussed herein, so long as trustees and directors of the 
involved hospitals, universities, or other nonprofit entities forge a consensus before taking any action 
that could conceivably involve a breach of duty. 
450. Id. at 556. 
451. Id. at 559. The usual rationale for this rule is that once a gift has been made, the donor 
possesses neither legal nor equitable title-only a sentimental interest, not sufficient to confer stand-
ing to sue or intervene. However, a tiny minority of jurisdictions do permit the donor or the donor's 
heirs to bring an enforcement action. Moreover, if a gift instrument reserves the power to revoke or 
modify the disposition, a donor or heir may sue for damages or recovery. Id. at 559-60. 
452. !d. at 563-64. The much-disparaged rationale for denying potential beneficiaries standing 
to sue is that their interest is represented by the attorney general. Id. at 564, 569 (criticizing this 
reasoning on the ground that "the attorney general represents the public interest in a charity and not 
necessarily the interests of any particular class of potential ... beneficiaries"). 
453. Id. at 557-58. Except for a statutory requirement that the attorney general bring suit if 
certain conditions are met, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.09 (West 1977) (attorney general must 
initiate suit upon complaint of any citizen or member of a charitable corporation who comes forward 
with prima facie proof of his allegation and enough money to cover litigation expenses), judicial 
review of the attorney general's decision not to commence an action has been held to violate the 
constitutional separation of powers. Ames v. Attorney Gen., 124 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Mass. 1955). 
454. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 567-68. 
455. Id. at 566-69 (citing insufficient staff, appropriations, and available data on charities, as 
well as reluctance of state officials to pursue allegations that respected institutions and individuals 
are in breach of their duties). 
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an attorney general who is aware of an impending sale or leasing arrange-
ment might rummage through the moribund law of charitable gift 
enforcement in search of some way to block a deal. 
The enforcement remedies456 available to an attorney general vary 
widely, depending upon the peculiarities of each case. Where a sale or 
lease itself would allegedly violate some restriction on the use of donated 
property,457 the attorney general can ask the court for an injunction pro-
scribing the sale or lease-or even rescinding it if it has already been 
executed.458 If unable to block a deal in this manner, the attorney gen-
eral might still be able to apply indirect leverage by identifying restric-
tions on the use of donated funds that arguably render them legally 
unavailable to the donee once the sale or lease takes effect, 459 then asking 
the court to enjoin the donee's use of these funds in the event of a sale or 
lease.460 After a violation of a restriction has already occurred, the attor-
ney general, in theory, could also petition the court for removal of the 
responsible trustees, directors, or corporate officers.461 This drastic rem-
edy, however, appears to have been ordered only in cases of nonfeasance 
or malfeasance with the potential to result in loss of charitable 
property. 462 
3. Alternatives for Coping with Donors' Restrictions 
If a donor's restriction appears to pose an obstacle to the sale or 
lease of a teaching hospital to a for-profit firm-or to the use of endow-
ment funds after a sale or lease takes effect-two general approaches are 
open to the donee's managers. They could adopt an activist, litigation-
456. Absent a proviso in the gift instrument calling for forfeiture if the donor's restrictions are 
violated, such a breach of trust is not grounds for judicial termination of a gift. The proper (and 
only) legal remedy is enforcement of the gift's terms. /d. at 505-506. The only exceptions to this 
rule have been occasioned by inter vivos dispositions, which have sometimes been judicially returned 
to the original donor upon violation of the donor's restrictions. /d. at 506-507. 
457. Eg., a requirement that a donated parcel of land occupied by the hospital not be sold 
would proscribe its purchase by a for-profit. See supra text accompanying notes 441-42. 
458. See CHARITIES, supra note 430, at 549 (available enforcement remedies include enjoining 
wrongful conduct and rescinding transfers of property). 
459. See supra text accompanying notes 446-48. 
460. The attorney general could exercise similar leverage by merely making it known to would-
be sellers or lessors that it might file suit against the donee after execution of a sale or lease to enjoin 
use of these funds or, if they have already been improperly applied, to compel the donee to replenish 
them. 
461. See CHARmES, supra note 430, at 550-53 (summarizing grounds for judicial removal of 
directors, trustees, and officers). 
462. /d. at 552 (stating that to justify removal, lack of managerial capacity or fidelity must 
imperil ownership of the charitable property); cf e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Olson, 191 N.E.2d 132 
(Mass. 1963) (overturning lower court's removal ordered for failure to file annual accounting), 
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oriented strategy, petitioning the courts for permission to violate the 
restriction. Courts may grant such permission in certain circumstances 
under the equitable doctrines of "deviation" and "cy pres."463 Alterna-
tively, the donee's managers could opt for a "low profile" strategy, qui-
etly taking steps that might violate the donor's conditions and gambling 
that the attorney general's disinclination to aggressively superintend 
restrictions on charitable gifts464 will suffice to avert an enforcement 
action. During the planning process preceding a sale or lease agreement, 
they could informally consult with the attorney general, exploring areas 
of concern, adapting their plans accordingly, and negotiating for com-
mitments not to bring potential enforcement actions. 
a. The activist strategy: "Deviation, and "cy pres'~· The equitable 
doctrines of deviation and cy pres empower courts to permit the use of 
donated resources in ways that depart from donors' restrictions. Though 
these doctrines overlap broadly in their application, each has different 
prerequisites. In practice, the prerequisites for deviation are more easily 
met, making it a more flexible doctrinal tool than cy pres for countenanc-
ing violations of donors' conditions. But the vaguely stated prerequisites 
for both deviation and cy pres relief allow ample room for result-oriented 
rulings on whether particular sets of facts warrant the application of 
either doctrine. Jurisdictions vary widely in their application of these 
doctrines. 
i. Deviation: The doctrine of deviation allows courts to author-
ize the breach of an "administrative" restriction on a charitable disposi-
tion upon a finding that either (1) compliance with the restriction is 
"impossible or illegal"; or (2) owing to "circumstances not known or 
foreseen" by the donor, compliance "would defeat or substantially 
impair the accomplishment of the intended ... purpose" of the gift.465 
463. The state attorney general may also, as a rule, institute a cy pres application for court 
permission to violate a donor's restriction. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 458-60. If the attorney 
general is amenable, commencement of an action by the donor-either alone or conjointly with the 
donee-might in some cases give the request a greater aura of legitimacy than would initiation of 
action by the donee alone. 
A cy pres petition tyPically takes the form of a request that the court apply the doctrine in 
accordance with a contract entered into by a nonprofit organization for sale or lease of assets. Pro-
spective cy pres beneficiaries wishing to contest the disposition requested by the donee or the attor-
ney general may intervene in the proceedings at the court's discretion. However, they have no 
standing either to initiate a cy pres action or to intervene as a matter of right, and courts are gener-
ally reluctant to permit their intervention. Only charitable trustees or directors or the attorney 
general may commence a cy pres proceeding. Id. at 458-60, 462. 
464. See supra text accompanying notes 453-56. 
465. 15 AM. JUR. 20 Charities § 164 (1976). 
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Thus, where a restriction can be plausibly characterized as "administra-
tive," deviation gives the courts sweeping power to permit donees to 
ignore it. In recent decades, courts have applied the doctrine with 
increasing liberality to circumvent restrictions that impede the efficient 
use of donated resources. 466 
In a 1966 Connecticut case, for example, the deed of trust for a par-
cel of land occupied by a nonprofit hospital required that the land be 
used "for no other purpose whatsoever" than as the site of a general 
hospital or a nursing school. The hospital obtained a declaratory judg-
ment allowing it to erect and operate a doctors' office building on this 
land. Observing that nonprofit hospitals typically rent private office 
space to medical staff, the court stated that "reasonable deviations" were 
necessary "to keep pace with changes in recognized concepts of the 
proper sphere of general hospital operations., The building, the court 
concluded, would "aid plaintiff in more efficiently carrying out" the gift's 
purpose-the operation of a hospital.467 In a 1965 Ohio case, a college 
was allowed to transfer land and other assets to a state university and to 
convert itself into a foundation for the support of educational, literary, 
scientific, and other charitable activities. The court reasoned that these 
changes were administrative-and thus allowable under the doctrine of 
deviation-because they enhanced the educational effectiveness of 
resources donated for the purpose of advancing education without mate-
rially altering the donors' charitable aims. 468 
In short, if a court is willing to characterize a donor's condition as 
delimiting means (administration) rather than ends (charitable pur-
pose),469 deviation permits a nonprofit hospital to justify waiver of the 
restriction by invoking efficiency arguments. Thus, arguments drawing 
on the economic changes that have prompted teaching hospital owners to 
consider selling or leasing hospital operations and finding other means to 
advance medical research and teaching470 are likely to be received favor-
ably in deviation proceedings. 
466. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 407. 
467. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp. v. Mulvey, 225 A.2d 495 (Conn. 1966). 
468. Fenn College v. Nance, 210 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio 1965). 
469. Other stipulations in a gift instrument may limit a court's flexibility to characterize a 
restriction as merely administrative. These include provisos for reverter or for an alternative disposi-
tion in the event that the donee violates the restriction. CHARITIES, supra note 430, at 409-10. Such 
provisions in effect establish compliance with the restriction at issue as an essential element in the 
gift's purpose. 
470. See supra text accompanying notes 91-158. 
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In a petition for deviation from a restriction that would bar a sale or 
lease, courts should give considerable weight to the argument that inten-
sified competitive pressures in the hospital industry are "circumstances 
not . . . foreseen" by a donor and would render a gift more effective in 
advancing medical research or teaching if applied to some activity other 
than hospital operations. For example, a proscription against the sale of 
donated land occupied by a teaching hospital should not, as a rule, sur-
vive an action for deviation brought by the donee (and supported by eco-
nomic arguments) in anticipation of the hospital's purchase by a for-
profit firm.471 Similarly, a proviso that donated property be used by the 
donee only for hospital operations should not survive a deviation petition 
brought to clear the way for a sale or lease and for use of the proceeds in 
an alternate manner. 
Donors' restrictions that render endowment funds unavailable for 
use after a sale or lease has taken effect472 should be easily modifiable 
through application for deviation so long as the court characterizes them 
as administrative. Compliance with such restrictions is obviously impos-
sible or illegal, and deviation is therefore appropriate to save these funds. 
ii. Cy pres: The requirements for approval of an application for 
cy pres relief are, in practice, considerably more restrictive than for 
deviation. Technically, cy pres, unlike deviation, permits the use of a gift 
for a purpose different from, albeit "as near as possible to," the "precise 
objective of the donor."473 But to invoke cy pres, a court must make two 
findings: (1) that it is "impossible, impractical, or illegal" to effect the 
donor's "precise objective,"474 and (2) that, in addition to his precise 
objective, the donor evinced a "general charitable intent extending 
beyond the specific one which is impossible, impractical, or illegal."475 
Deviation doctrine enables a court to circumvent the prerequisite of gen-
eral charitable intent by characterizing a restriction as merely adminis-
trative, that is, without bearing on "purpose."476 Moreover, deviation 
471. In many situations, courts have applied the doctrine of deviation to permit the sale of 
charitable realty in breach of donors' restrictions. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 408-409 (citing 
numerous cases presenting a wide range of circumstances). Strictly speaking, court authorization of 
the sale of charitable realty and the use of sale proceeds for something other than the purchase of an 
alternate site may be more properly cognizable as an application of the doctrine of cy pres. But in 
practice, many courts have preferred to take such action under the less restrictive rubric of deviation. 
Id. at 410-12. 
472. See supra text accompanying notes 444-48. 
473. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 414. 
474. Id. at 413-14, 434-37, 442-45. 
475. Id. at 437-42. 
476. Id. at 411-12. 
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allows more room for efficiency-oriented arguments against the survival 
of restrictions by providing for relief in circumstances where, owing to 
circumstances unforeseen by the donor, compliance with a restriction 
would "substantially impair" accomplishment of a gift's purpose.477 
The cy pres requirement of impossibility, impracticality, or illegality 
has been construed with varying degrees of restrictiveness. Before the 
turn of the century, strict deference to the donor's wishes led courts to 
reject cy pres applications without regard for welfare-maximizing consid-
erations, so long as the donor's original design could be carried out. 478 
More recently, most jurisdictions have evinced a willingness to take 
social utility into account in assessing donors' restrictions for impracti-
cality.479 The role of social utility considerations in determining imprac-
ticality is at present ill defined. But the impossibility, impracticality, or 
illegality prerequisite has not yet evolved into a frank utility-maximiza-
tion standard. 
Thus, in their effort to prove impracticality, would-be sellers or les-
sors of teaching hospitals could cite mounting economic pressures and 
argue that they can best foster medical research and education by reapp-
lying their assets to other activities. However such reasoning is, in gen-
eral, likely to carry less weight than it would under deviation doctrine. 480 
Where failure to allow a sale or lease could trigger an impending finan-
cial crisis-for example, bankruptcy or large-scale diversion of funds 
from other valued programs to meet a hospital's operating deficit-and 
lead to gross squandering of resources, evidence of the economic waste-
fulness of the restriction at issue should prove decisive.481 But where no 
immediate crisis looms-where a sale or lease is not necessary to insure 
the hospital's short-term survival, save it from sharp decline, or preserve 
other programs endangered by diversions of funds to cover the hospital's 
deficit-welfare-maximizing rationale is less likely to suffice to prove 
impracticality. 
477. See supra text accompanying notes 465-71 (success of efficiency-oriented reasoning in 
deviation cases). 
478. CHARIDES, supra note 430, at 443-44. 
479. Id at 444 (citing cases importing a concern for social utility into the "impracticality" 
element of the traditional "impossibility, impracticality, or illegality" prerequisite for cy pres). 
480. See supra text accompanying notes 465-71 (success of efficiency-oriented arguments in 
deviation cases). 
481. Cf. In re Neher's Will, 18 N.E.2d 625 (N.Y. 1939) (Real property donated for use as a 
hospital was applied by cy pres to another use because a new hospital in a nearby village was 
believed to serve the region's needs adequately, making the opening of another hospital wasteful.). 
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Restrictions that render endowment funds unavailable for use after 
a sale or lease has taken effect482 will, on their face, meet the impossibil-
ity, impracticality, or illegality prerequisite. But a barrier would arise if 
a court found that the donee, in executing the sale or lease, created a 
condition of impossibility, impracticality, or illegality in order to satisfy 
its own convenience.483 
In addition to assessing the impossibility, impracticality, or illegality 
of a restriction, a court considering a cy pres application must, at least in 
theory, look carefully for indicia of general charitable intent. Frequently 
criticized as a thin veil for the arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion, 
general charitable intent has been defined as "a desire to benefit a charita-
ble purpose or objective rather than any particular object or institu-
tion."484 Evidence of general intent may be discerned in the gift 
instrument itself or from surrounding circumstances. 485 
Courts have created no hard-and-fast rules for the identification of 
general charitable intent, but they have developed guidelines for infer-
ence.486 General charitable intent is probably lacking where a provision 
in the donative instrument calls for forfeiture, failure, or reversion if the 
gift cannot be effected in the specified manner. The absence of such a 
provision invites more permissive construction. Gifts in perpetuity are 
usually interpreted as manifesting general intent, even when the donative 
instrument is quite specific as to application, because courts assume that 
donors expect changing conditions. Other potential indicia include the 
character of a testator's other bequests, the donee's avowed purposes and 
commonly known activities, and even evidence of the donor's personal 
interests and aspirations.487 The judicial inclination to sustain charitable 
dispositions is so strong that courts sometimes strain the limits of plausi-
ble inference to find a general charitable intent. 488 
482. See supra text accompanying notes 444-48. 
483. C.f. Connecticut College v. United States, 276 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (A gift was made 
for construction of a memorial building on a particular site at the U.S. Military Academy but the 
academy contended this site had been reserved for another facility and brought cy pres action for 
permission to apply gift toward construction of the building on another site; permission was denied 
on the ground that impossibility had been created by the donee for its own convenience). 
484. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 438. 
485. See, e.g., In re Syracuse Univ., 148 N.E.2d 671 (N.Y. 1958) (denying cy pres approval for 
transfer of gift to state university, after the state took over Syracuse University's medical college, 
where, based on the language of the will and all the known surrounding facts, the testator intended 
to benefit humanity through the field of medicine but only via Syracuse's medical college). 
486. See 15 AM. JUR. 20 Charities § 163 (1976) (indicia of intention). 
487. Id. 
488. See, e.g., CHARmES, supra note 430, at 442 (citing cases construing donors' provisions that 
property be devoted to a particular purpose "forever'' or to a designated purpose and no other as 
HeinOnline -- 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1146 1991-1992
1146 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:1035 
When approving departures from gift restrictions, courts in some 
jurisdictions have avoided cy pres by characterizing donors' precise 
objectives in terms sufficiently broad to encompass the modifications. By 
accordingly conceptualizing departures from donors' restrictions as 
changes in means rather than shifts in purpose, they have averted the 
need to apply the cy pres "impossible, impractical, or illegal" stan-
dard, 489 and thereby availed themselves of the greater discretion allowed 
under the doctrine of deviation.490 This creative reinterpretation of the 
cy pres concept of precise objective collapses the traditional cy pres dis-
tinction between precise objective and general charitable intent. 
Where courts avoid cy pres by characterizing gift objectives in broad 
terms so that departures from donors' restrictions can be construed as 
changes in means,491 they are unlikely to invoke cy pres to modify 
restrictions on gifts to medical institutions. For most such gifts, courts 
ought to be able to discern an intent to advance !lledical care, research, 
or education492-an intent inclusive enough to allow modifications 
through application of the more permissive deviation doctrine.493 But 
where language in a gift instrument constrains a court to characterize the 
donor's objective in terms so limiting that a proposed modification would 
alter the objective494-or where courts insist on the traditional cy pres 
distinction between the donor's precise objective and general charitable 
intent495-application of cy pres doctrine will be determinative for uni-
versities and current (or former) teaching hospital owners seeking court 
permission to breach donors' restrictions. 
merely indicating the donor's wish that the gift be used for the designated purpose as long as possible 
or practical). 
489. /d. at 445, 467 (giving an example of a gift to a hospital for construction of an operating 
room; if the gift is too small for this purpose and the hospital wishes to apply it toward construction 
of additional patient rooms, the court can authorize this without invoking cy pres by finding that 
donor's purpose was to promote health-a purpose just as weii served by building patient rooms). 
490. See supra text accompanying notes 476-77. 
491. See supra text accompanying notes 488-90. 
492. See, e.g., Beii v. Shannon, 367 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1963) (The donor's objective was said to 
have been carried out where a bequest to found a new hospital was reapplied by the court, without 
invocation of cy pres, to construct a new wing for an existing hospital). 
493. See supra text accompanying notes 465-71 (discussing prerequisites and application of 
deviation doctrine). 
494. For example, the instrument accompanying a gift ofland to a fraternal organization might 
require (1) that the land be used only for operation of a hospital by the organization, and (2) that the 
land revert to the donor or his estate if it ceases to be used in such a manner. Just as this reverter 
provision would make it difficult for a court to find the "general charitable intent" required for cy 
pres, see supra text accompanying notes 483-85, the reverter clause would render implausible the 
conclusion that operation of a hospital by the donee was not essential to the donor's purpose. 
495. See supra text accompanying notes 476, 484-88. 
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b. The "low-profile'; strategy: Faced with donors' restrictions that 
might proscribe a sale, lease, or the subsequent use of endowment funds, 
a nonprofit's managers could opt, in the alternative, for a litigation-
avoiding, low-profile strategy. The disinclination of state attorneys gen-
eral to enforce restrictions on charitable gifts-especially gifts to non-
profit entities highly respected in their communities496-is an open 
invitation to managers to act in violation of donors' conditions without 
first obtaining court authorization. Especially where the dollar value of a 
restricted gift is small and opposition to the involvement of a for-profit 
firm is minimal, the likelihood of enforcement action should, in general, 
be small. 
A case in point is the 1984 sale of the Creighton University College 
of Medicine's primary teaching hospital to American Medical Interna-
tional, Inc. (AMn. Planning for this transaction was complicated by the 
fact that an unknown amount (thought to be less than one million dol-
lars), which had been contributed in the mid-1970s toward construction 
of a new hospital complex, had been pledged by its donors to the 
independent, nonprofit corporation that owned the hospital.497 These 
funds represented only a fraction of the total contributed to a capital 
campaign conducted jointly by the corporation and Creighton Univer-
sity; the balance had been pledged to the university.498 Funds contrib-
uted to Creighton and applied toward the new hospital complex were 
loaned by the university to the corporation, which was the sole owner of 
the hospital. 
This loan arrangement posed no obstacle to AMI's purchase of the 
hospital a decade later; AMI simply supplanted the seller as Creighton's 
debtor. But the amount pledged to the corporation was more problem-
atic. It was believed that because these funds had been pledged for con-
struction purposes, the proportion of hospital assets representing this 
corpus could not be included in the sale and then applied (with other sale 
proceeds) to endow the foundation that was to succeed the hospital. 
496. See supra notes 454-55 and accompanying text. 
497. Telephone interview, on condition of anonymity, with a former official of the Creighton-
Omaha Regional Healthcare Corporation, which owned the hospital before the deal with AMI (Nov. 
1986). 
498. I d. According to this source, records of whether funds contributed during this campaign 
had been pledged to the university or to the independent corporation owning the hospital were not 
kept by the individual who administered the campaign. 
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Rather than apply to a court for a deviation or cy pres remedy, corpora-
tion and university managers decided to treat these funds as contribu-
tions to Creighton, subsequently loaned to the corporation.499 Mter the 
sale, AMI assumed this liability. The arrangement clearly violated the 
pledge conditions. 500 But the public did not object, and the state attor-
ney general did not bring an enforcement action. 
The relatively small sum of money involved and the placid attitude 
of donors, the public, political leaders, and the medical center commu-
nity toward AMI's purchase of the hospital facilitated this approach in 
the Creighton example. But where some members of these constituencies 
actively oppose a sale or lease, violating restrictions without first 
obtaining court approval could become problematic. Influential oppo-
nents could bring pressure to bear on the attorney general, either pri-
vately or through public activism. However reluctant to intervene, an 
attorney general might feel compelled to bring an enforcement action in 
order to avoid appearing to sanction a breach of trust. To minimize the 
likelihood of enforcement proceedings, a nonprofit faced with donors' 
conditions that could stand in the way of a sale or lease should consult 
informally with the attorney general's office during the planning process 
preceding a sale or lease agreement. 501 
If they are uncertain about whether a restriction bars a sale, lease, or 
subsequent use of donated funds, managers of institutions with an educa-
tional mission should, in general, take a broad view of their lawful discre-
tion to act without first obtaining court approval. A leading case in this 
area suggests that if a donor's conditions can be construed with even 
strained plausibility to permit a particular measure, the measure is within 
the scope of managers' lawful discretion if it furthers an educational 
institution's overall welfare. In Attorney General v. President of Harvard 
College, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Harvard's 
decision to relocate a botany research facility to its Cambridge campus 
499. Id. This was facilitated by the lack of pledge records. See supra note 498. 
500. This was privately acknowledged by corporation and university officials. Id. 
501. In such consultations, the nonprofit's representatives could sound out the attorney gen-
eral's position on troublesome restrictions and negotiate for commitments not to bring potential 
enforcement actions. Early consultation with (and genuine responsiveness to) all interested parties 
who might actively oppose either for-profit involvement in general or deviation from a particular gift 
restriction could reduce the prospect that they might subsequently try to persuade the attorney 
general to bring an enforcement action. 
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did not constitute a breach of trust even though provisions of the charita-
ble trust that supported the facility seemed on their face to proscribe 
such a move. 502 
The court stated that charitable trusts held by educational institu-
tions should "be so managed under the particular trust provisions as to 
be of maximum usefulness, thus serving to the greatest possible extent 
the public as the ultimate beneficiary."503 Managers of an educational 
institution, the court said, have a duty to consider the institution's "over-
all welfare" and "ultimate purposes" when construing the provisions of a 
charitable trust.504 "Resolution of possibly divergent interests," the 
court added, "is inherent in the holding and management by a single 
institution of a number of public trusts for independent, related or over-
lapping purposes."505 The practical implication of this holding and rea-
soning is that institutions have broad discretion to construe donors' 
restrictions as consistent with the institutions' strategic decisions, 506 
including the decision to place teaching hospital operations in the hands 
of a for-profit firm. 507 
Even where there can be no doubt that a donor's restriction bars the 
sale or lease of a hospital, or the subsequent use of a gift, it appears that a 
nonprofit may, without prior judicial approval, lawfully proceed with the 
sale, lease, or subsequent use so long as a court would have permitted the 
502. 213 N.E.2d 840 (Mass. 1966). The case involved a charitable trust given to Harvard in 
1872 for the stated purpose of establishing and maintaining an arboretum, to be named the "Arnold 
Arboretum," on a designated off-campus site. Harvard complied with these instructions and eventu-
ally applied income from the trust to support a library and herbarium at the Arboretum. In 1953, 
however, the university relocated most of the library and herbarium to its Cambridge campus. 
Harvard's botany research program benefited greatly, but reputation of the Arnold Arboretum suf-
fered. The Massachusetts Attorney General brought an information against Harvard alleging 
breach of trust. The attorney general contended that because the trust indenture of 1872limited the 
gift's use to establishment and maintenance of the Arnold Arboretum, trust-supported facilities at 
the arboretum could not be moved to another site. But the court's strained construction of the 
indenture permitted Harvard to apply the trust so as to maximize its benefit to the university's 
botany program as a whole. Id. 
503. Id. at 847. 
504. Id. at 848. 
505. Id. 
506. Although the ruling on its face applies only to educational institutions, the need for "reso-
lution of .•. divergent interests" in order to advance an institution's "overall welfare" is equally 
great for other institutions supported by multiple charitable gifts. Thus, even if a court were reluc-
tant to characterize non-university owned teaching hospitals as educational institutions, the Massa-
chusetts high court's holding and reasoning should still apply. 
507. Nevertheless, an important caveat should be kept in mind: the virtual absence of analo-
gous cases means that there is no guarantee that other jurisdictions would follow the Massachusetts 
high court's permissive approach to such situations. This uncertainty reflects the rarity of recent 
charitable enforcement litigation. 
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deviation. Decisions in several states support the proposition that a 
departure from a restriction on a charitable trust will not be set aside or 
annulled if a court would have approved it on proper application. 508 
Thus, deviation and cy pres relief can, in effect, be granted retroactively. 
If a nonprofit's managers are confident about their case for deviation or 
cy pres and willing to chance an enforcement proceeding, they may opt 
to act in violation of a restriction without first applying to a court. 
VII. APPROACHES TO AGREEMENT 
The prospect of investor-owned firms assuming responsibility for 
hospital operations at academic medical centers is something novel in the 
recent history of American medicine. Yet the mutual interest in such 
arrangements on the part of for-profit hospital chains and some academic 
centers is a logical outgrowth of developments years in the making in 
both the academic sector and the hospital industry as a whole. I have 
sought in this Article to explore these developments with an eye toward 
understanding the interests and objectives, both mutual and antagonistic, 
that have prompted teaching centers and for-profit firms to consider sale 
and lease arrangements. I have also examined the objections raised by 
critics of the for-profit operation of teaching hospitals, and I have sur-
veyed some potential regulatory and legal obstacles to the execution of 
sale and lease agreements. My conclusion is that such arrangments (1) 
have considerate potential to result in mutual benefit for academic cen-
ters and for-profit firms, (2) are not objectionable in principle on public 
policy grounds, and (3) are, within certain limits and perhaps with some 
exceptions, not barred by established regulatory and legal constraints. 
New financial support for research and teaching, an influx of capital for 
academic and clincial needs, and sounder fiscal footing for hospital oper-
ations are among the possible advantages for academic centers. Viewed 
from the perspective of both academic medicine and the public interest, 
these arrangements offer potential benefits that outweigh their risks. 
Nevertheless, there are substantial hazards for both academic cen-
ters and their prospective for-profit partners. For the latter, the risk is 
exclusively financial: arrangements of the kind considered in this Article 
require the commitment of large amounts of capital, the assumption of 
responsibility for potential operating losses, the sharing of operating 
508. CHARmES, supra note 430, at 461 (citing cases from Arkansas, California, Illinois, Ken· 
tucky, and Ohio). 
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authority with academic administrators who are uncommitted to protect-
ing the corporate bottom line, and toleration of the uncertainty of even-
tual payoff (whether from profitability of the teaching hospital itself, 
increased utilization of other hospitals as a result of the prestige of an 
academic affiliation, or the success of a vertically integrated system built 
around the teaching center). For academic medical centers, the greatest 
hazards may be noneconomic. By entrusting hospital operations to an 
investor-owned firm, an educational institution risks attenuation of its 
authority over clinical teaching and research. Moreover, it renders itself 
potentially vulnerable, financially and otherwise, to the changing busi-
ness strategies and fortunes of a firm operating in a volatile industry. 
To maximize the potential benefits and to secure adequate protec-
tion against the hazards, careful prenegotiation planning by nonprofit 
managers is essential. I will conclude this Article by briefly considering 
the major issues that merit attention in talks regarding sale and lease 
arrangements and the terms of subsequent affiliations between acquired 
or leased hospitals and academic institutions. Though I will address 
these issues from the perspective of the academic institutions (and other 
nonprofit sellers and lessors) involved, I will try to be sensitive to the 
interests of prospective for-profit partners. By remaining attentive to the 
concerns and priorities of their opponents, academic and other nonprofit 
negotiators can better discern ways to further mutual interests and can 
more effectively bargain for their own objectives (and the public inter-
est)509 where interests conflict. 
First, however, I will make some recommendations regarding the 
process by which an academic medical center might weigh the option of 
509. The interests of academic medicine are hardly synonymous with the public interest, how-
ever one understands this latter, uncertain concept. The discussion, earlier in this Article, of aca-
demic physicians' keen responsiveness to economic incentives generated by a highly imperfect 
medical marketplace illustrates the potential for divergence between the interests of academic 
medicine and society as a whole. On the other hand, it may be reasonable to view academic medical 
leaders as rough surrogates for the public interest when academic institutions enter into cooperative 
arrangements with investor-owned hospital !inns. To the extent that the academic medical commu-
nity's skepticism about for-profit hospital care is driven by public-regarding concerns (as opposed to 
narrow self-interest), the notion that academic leaders function as surrogates for the public interest 
becomes more plausible. In deferring to academic leaders' concerns and to private contractual 
arrangements, I herein presume the rough validity of this notion. 
Should my presumption be unwarranted, then deference to academic medical leaders' concerns 
(and to contractual arrangements between academic institutions and investor-owned chains) would 
amount to abandonment of public-regarding concerns. A comprehensive appraisal of the extent to 
which the academic medical community functions as an acceptable surrogate for the public interest 
with respect to health policy issues would be of immense value. Such a project is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
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a hospital sale or lease before proceeding to serious negotiations with a 
for-profit firm. 
A. THE DECISION TO PROCEED 
A critical lesson from the abortive McLean Hospital/HCA sale 
negotiations, which foundered on the opposition of astonished faculty 
members after HCA'~ purchase offer became public knowledge, 510 is that 
process matters. Any gains in bargaining efficiency and flexibility that 
resulted from the secrecy that enshrouded the Massachusetts General 
Hospital trustees' consideration of a sale were lost as a result of the 
faculty resentment that ensued when the deal was publicly presented as a 
virtual fait accompli. Several MGH and McLean officials who played 
key roles in developing the plan and negotiating with HCA attributed the 
plan's collapse to the MGH trustees' failure to involve faculty from the 
early stages of its formulation. 511 These officials suggested that faculty 
hostility reflected negative feelings about their exclusion from the process 
rather than dispassionate analysis of the plan's benefits and risks. 512 
The McLean experience illustrates the danger of failing to involve 
an academic medical center's constituencies in the making of a decision 
so pivotal as the sale or lease of hospital operations to a for-profit firm. 
An academic medical community is hardly a strictly hierarchical social 
system. Influential subgroups that are disturbed by a portentous institu-
tional change may be able to marshal the political strength513 to resist it. 
The early involvement of major constituencies in the decision-making 
process could be decisive in winning their support. Moreover, such 
involvement may improve the quality of the decisions reached. Repre-
sentatives of constituencies that are directly affected may be better situ-
ated than trustees and administrators to identify problems and 
advantages inherent in particular options, suggest revisions, and develop 
entirely new approaches. In addition, once a decision to enter serious 
510. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9. 
511. Interview with Francis Burr, Chairman of the MGH Board of Trustees (June 1986); Inter-
view with Francis deMarneffe, M.D., General Director of McLean Hospital (Nov. 1985); Interviews 
with other officials, on condition of anonymity (Nov. 1985). 
512. /d.; c.f. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6 (report by Harvard faculty panel 
to the Dean of Harvard Medical School, giving the HCA purchase proposal a generally favorable 
review on the merits but urging the Dean to take steps to block a deal because of entrenched faculty 
opposition). 
513. Such strength may come either from within the academic center (e.g., the widespread nega-
tive feelings about for-profit hospitals among Harvard faculty) or outside (e.g., the Massachusetts 
Attorney General's reported willingness to take legal action to prevent the sale of McLean to HCA, 
see supra text accompanying notes 4-5). 
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negotiations with a for-profit firm has been reached, trustees and admin-
istrators armed with input from a participatory decision process are 
likely to go to the bargaining table with a better grasp of their constituen-
cies' interests and priorities. 
A useful model is the process by which the administration and 
board oftrustees of George Washington University elected to begin nego-
tiations with AMI about a possible purchase or leasing deal. In 1983, the 
board authorized a study, to be conducted jointly with AMI, into the 
option of selling or leasing the university's hospital to a for-profit firm in 
order to insure the long-term availability of sufficient capital to maintain 
the hospital at a state-of-the-art levet.514 The administration then formed 
a steering committee and four specialized "working groups" to carry out 
the study. sis Representatives of multiple constituencies (including full-
time and voluntary faculty, interns and residents, medical students, and 
nursing staff) participated, as did several AMI officials. s16 
As the study proceeded, the problems of capital formation and 
maintenance of fiscal stability received heightened attention within the 
medical center's constituencies. The shortcomings of alternative solu-
tions-for example, philanthropy, debt financing, and university-spon-
sored for-profit ventures-became more widely known.s17 In late 1984, 
after nearly a year of discussions, the steering committee and working 
groups submitted a report recommending that the university begin for-
mal sale or lease negotiations with a for-profit hospital chain. The report 
set forth some minimum requirements for an agreement and identified 
other issues for negotiation.s18 In 1985 the university invited formal 
purchase and leasing proposals from for-profit chains. Although some at 
George Washington expressed misgivings about the prospect of such an 
arrangement, there was nothing comparable to the active opposition that 
greeted public disclosure of HCA's bid to purchase McLean.s19 
514. Report of the joint George Washington University and American Medical Int'l study into 
the feasibility of a relationship between the George Washington University Medical Center 
(GWUMC) and an investor-owned health care delivery system (Nov. 20, 1984) (on file at the 
GWUMC Office of the Dean for Administrative Affairs) [hereinafter GW Report]. 
515. Id. (The working groups focused on education and research, clinical affairs, hospital opera-
tions, and fiscal implications.). 
516. Id. 
517. Interview with Philip Birnbaum, George Washington University Medical Center Dean for 
Administrative Affairs, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1985) [hereinafter Birnbaum Interview]. 
518. GW Report, supra note 514. 
519. Birnbaum Interview, supra note 517. Another example of a decision process that was 
opened to the relevant constituencies, albeit in a less formal manner than at George Washington, is 
that which preceded AMI's 1984 acquisition of the St. Joseph Hospital in Omaha, Nebraska, the 
main teaching hospital of the Creighton University School of Medicine. An initial expression of 
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Ideally, the involvement of representatives of a medical center's con-
stituencies should begin with a communal effort to specify the problems 
and objectives that have led to consideration of a deal with a for-profit 
firm. The process should then proceed to the development and evalua-
tion of alternative approaches to these problems and objectives. It might 
be helpful at this stage to separate the creative work of inventing alterna-
tives from the critical processes of assessing and deciding among them. 520 
To foster a sense of shared purpose and to improve the analytic quality of 
discussions, a simple rule might be invoked during the critical phase: 
Criticism of an alternative should be accompanied by either a suggested 
revision to reduce the identified problem or an argument about how 
another alternative lessens the problem. Should this process result in a 
decision to enter serious negotiations with a for-profit firm, the process 
participants' perception of this decision as a collective achievement could 
strengthen community support. 
B. ISSUES FOR NEGOTIATION 
The major issues that merit attention before and during sale or lease 
negotiations fall into four closely linked categories-financial questions, 
the delineation of spheres of authority, the development of new program 
opportunities, and the design of safeguards for all parties (including dis-
pute resolution mechanisms and provisions for termination of an agree-
ment). In briefly addressing these issues, I will propose some bottom line 
conditions that prospective sellers or lessors ought to insist upon to pro-
tect essential interests. I will also make some suggestions about how pro-
spective sellers or lessors might maximize the benefits and protections 
afforded by an agreement, taking into account the interests of for-profit 
negotiators. 521 
interest by AMI in late 1983 led to informal talks between AMI and officials of Creighton and the 
independent nonprofit corporation that owned St. Joseph. AMI then submitted a purchase proposal, 
and at this point it was widely communicated that negotiations were underway. The subject was 
discussed in faculty and medical staff meetings, gatherings of the university's council of deans, and 
other university fora. Moreover, since St. Joseph had been operated as a Catholic hospital, the 
Archbishop of Omaha was consulted and the matter was addressed by the Archdiocesan Priests' 
Senate. These discussions engendered broad support for a sale, provided that certain conditions 
were met, and they supplied some guidance in formal negotiations. Richard L. O'Brien, The Deci· 
sion-making Process, in THE INVESTOR-RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL 
EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN CoURTSHIP 192, 194-95 (1986). 
520. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 62-64 (1981) (urging negotiators to "separate inventing from deciding" so as 
not to inhibit creativity in prenegotiation planning). 
521. At least two agreements, as a rule, are likely to be involved-the sale or lease contract itself 
and the accompanying affiliation agreement between the hospital and the associated medical school. 
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1. Financial Questions 
The financial arrangements between the parties should be negotiated 
as a package, with an emphasis on optimizing the benefits accruing to the 
seller or lessor (and to the affiliated medical school) from a given aggre-
gate expenditure by the for-profit firm. Major items include the sale 
price or leasing fee, corporate support for capital improvements and aca-
demic programs, funding for indigent care, and allocation of shared oper-
ating expenses between hospital and medical school. Distributional 
conflicts between separate nonprofit beneficiaries of an agreement-for 
example, a medical school and an independent nonprofit hospital owner 
with plans to create a foundation from sale proceeds522-should be dealt 
with in parallel talks while bargaining between the for-profit and the hos-
pital's owner is underway. Moreover, the parties to an agreement should 
make the necessary institutional arrangements to ensure continued access 
to federal grants and private, tax-deductible, and tax-exempt 
contributions. 523 
The sale price or leasing fee should reflect not only the hospital's 
potential to generate income, but also the buyer's or lessee's improved 
access to tertiary care expertise and the economic goodwill value of an 
academic affiliation. The substantive value of an academic center's 
expertise and the goodwill value of academic prestige should be 
appraised in terms of both their projected impact on the competitiveness 
of other hospitals operated by the buyer or lessee and their potential util-
ity in the development of a vertically integrated health care system. 
Negotiators for the seller or lessor (and the affiliated medical school 
if the seller or lessor is a separate entity) should seek a commitment from 
the buyer or lessee to make desired capital improvements to the hospital. 
The capital needs that occasioned consideration of for-profit involvement 
In some cases-for example where government agencies contract with a teaching hospital for the 
provision of indigent care, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 530-additional agreements with 
other parties may be necessary. The following discussion addresses issues that may arise in negotia-
tions on any of these agreements. 
522. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
523. This will require the transfer of all corporate responsibility for the administration of aca-
demic programs supported by federal or philanthropic grants from the hospital to the medical school 
or to another nonprofit entity. Tax experts should be consulted about the administrative arrange-
ments necessary to insure eligibility for deductible and exempt contributions. A model arrangement 
was developed in talks on HCA's unsuccessful attempt to purchase McLean Hospital from the Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital. This plan called for Harvard Medical School to act as the grantee for 
all research conducted at McLean, to become responsible for negotiating indirect cost rates, and to 
negotiate with McLean for space and support services. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra 
note 6, app. B. 
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should be stipulated in the sale or lease agreement, along with the for-
profit firm's plan to meet them.524 The agreement should also specify, in 
dollar or programmatic terms, the for-profit's commitment to support 
research and education. Potential approaches include the creation of 
permanent endowments to support faculty salaries525 and other research 
and teaching activities,526 annual subsidies for research and teaching527 
(including faculty and house staff salaries528), and gifts for new academic 
facilities. In addition, the for-profit operator's indigent care obligation 
524. An example is the agreement governing AMI's acquisition of the St. Joseph Hospital, the 
Creighton University School of Medicine's primary teaching hospital, from an independent, non· 
profit firm. AMI agreed to spend at least $10 million, beyond that required for routine plant mainte· 
nance and replacement, for the purchase of new land and equipment and the development of parking 
facilities. In addition, the corporation committed itself to construction of a new psychiatric facility 
after obtaining the necessary regulatory approvals. O'Brien, supra note 519, at 198. In the negotia· 
tions leading up to HCA's formal offer to purchase McLean Hospital, HCA agreed to pay an esti· 
mated $35 million for a renovation and expansion program covered by a recently received Certificate 
of Need. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B. 
525. An example is HCA's commitment, in its McLean Hospital purchase offer, to endow five 
Harvard Medical School faculty positions. HCA would have contributed $6.25 million for this pur-
pose ($1.25 million per professorship). Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B. 
526. In acquiring the St. Joseph Hospital, AMI agreed to contribute $3 miilion to the "Health 
Future Foundation," an entity created by the seller (out of sale proceeds) for the support of aca-
demic programs in the health sciences at Creighton University. O'Brien, supra note 519, at 198. 
During its joint "study" with George Washington University into the possibility of acquiring or 
leasing the university's hospital, AMI indicated its willingness to establish endowments for educa-
tion and research. AMI Letter, supra note 210, app. III at 24. 
As part of its agreement with the University of Louisville School of Medicine regarding the 
long-term lease of the school's principal teaching hospital, Humana contributed $4.5 million to the 
university, to be held in escrow for five years (with interest accruing to the medical school for the 
support of research and teaching programs) before reverting entirely to the medical school for its 
unrestricted use. Rollo, supra note 205, at 124-25. 
527. In its proposal to purchase McLean Hospital, HCA offered to guarantee continued cross-
subsidization of educational programs from clinical revenues at a rate equal to the pre-acquisition 
rate (i.e., HCA indicated it would use the last pre-sale cross-subsidy as a base and increase this 
amount annually by a percentage equal to each year's rise in patient revenues). Faculty Advisory 
Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B. In its agreement with the University of Louisville School 
of Medicine regarding the long-term lease of the school's teaching hospital, Humana assigned twenty 
percent of the hospital's pre-tax profits to the school's dean for the support of research and educa-
tional programs. Rollo, supra note 205, at 124. When AMI acquired the St. Joseph Hospital, the 
firm pledged $200,000 per year for ten years to Creighton University to support a Center for the 
Study of Health Policy and Ethics. O'Brien, supra note 519, at 198. 
528. Humana's agreement with the University of Louisville School of Medicine, for example, 
included a commitment to pay the salaries of clinical service chiefs and 174 of the university's 
approximately 400 interns and residents. Rollo, supra note 205, at 125-26. In a report on its joint 
"study," with AMI, of the option of selling or leasing its hospital to a for-profit firm, a George 
Washington University panel indicated that any affiliation agreement with a for-profit would have to 
specify the support to be provided for faculty salaries. GW Report, supra note 514. AMI indicated, 
in general terms, a willingness to provide some support for faculty participating in patient care, 
research, and teaching at the hospital. AMI Letter, supra note 210, app. III at 24. 
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should be specified, either in the sale or lease agreement or in the affilia-
tion accord between the hospital and the medical school. 529 
Sale or lease negotiations between a for-profit firm and nonprofit 
parties may in some cases present opportunities for creative, mutually 
advantageous solutions to the problem of the medically indigent. An 
outstanding example is the indigent care reimbursement fund established 
by Humana and state, county, and city officials in conjunction with 
Humana's long-term lease of the University of Louisville's principal 
teaching hospital. The state, county, and city governments made contri-
butions to the fund based on estimates of the region's indigent care needs. 
Humana agreed to cover any indigent care expenses in excess of these 
contributions. 530 In the absence of a comprehensive national health 
insurance program, the parties to a sale or lease agreement might also 
consider working with other private hospitals to develop regional and 
state-wide cost-spreading approaches to the financing of care for the 
medically indigent. 531 
In negotiating economic issues, nonprofit representatives ought to be 
mindful that different elements in a package arrangement may present 
different problems and advantages to a for-profit firm. Tax considera-
tions may make it advantageous for a firm to commit resources in a par-
ticular manner-for example, to capital improvements-and more costly 
to apply equivalent resources in another way. Similar dollar amounts 
529. For example, when AMI acquired St. Joseph Hospital (the biggest provider of unpaid care 
in Omaha, Nebraska), the corporation agreed to continue the indigent care policies jointly estab-
lished by Creighton University and the hospital's previous, nonprofit management. O'Brien, supra 
note 519, at 197. HCA's offer to purchase McLean Hospital included a commitment to continue 
uncompensated care at the same low rate-only 2.6 percent of gross revenues-supported by 
McLean under nonprofit management. The Harvard faculty panel that urged rejection of HCA's 
purchase offer indicated it would have recommended an increase in this percentage had it endorsed a 
sale to HCA. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6. 
530. Rollo, supra note 205, at 123. The state county and city contributions totaled nineteen 
million dollars during the first year of the agreement. The government contributions increase annu-
ally according to an inflationary factor. Kmetz, supra note 227, at 176. During the first sixteen 
months of the agreement, indigent care billing exceeded government contributions by $6.6 million. 
This difference was absorbed by Humana. Rollo, supra note 205, at 124. After the agreement's first 
five years, university officials gave it glowing reviews. Indigent persons, they concluded, were receiv-
ing higher quality care than at city hospitals, with "fewer inefficiencies related to bureaucratized and 
politicized health care." Joel Kupersmith, Joseph C. Allegra & Donald R. Kmetz, For-Profit Man-
agement of a University Hospital, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1402 (1988). 
531. See Alexander Williams, Bearing the Burden of Indigent Care, in THE INVESTOR-
RELATED ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER AND MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN UNCERTAIN COURTSHIP 
76, 82 (1986) (urging development of state-wide, cost-spreading approaches including insurer-
financed "all-payer" systems and hospital-funded charity care pools). 
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committed in various ways may have very different effects on the appear-
ance of corporate balance sheets-an important consideration for any 
publicly-held firm. Additionally, the benefits a firm derives from a con-
tribution may be greater if the contribution is presented as a charitable 
gift rather than as compensation for something provided to the firm. By 
sensitizing themselves to such considerations and tailoring strategies 
accordingly, nonprofit negotiators will better serve their own constituen-
cies' interests. 
2. Authority 
The misgivings of many academic physicians about involvement 
with for-profit hospital chains reflect, in large measure, fears about loss of 
authority over an array of academic, clinical, and other matters. 532 In 
the coming years, some diminution of physician autonomy may be inevi-
table-not as a consequence of the for-profit form specifically, but rather 
a result of the high capital intensity, mounting bureaucratic complexity, 
and growing pressure for cost control that now characterize the health 
services industry. Yet a well-drafted agreement between a for-profit 
buyer or lessor and a medicat school can assure academic administrators 
and faculty of as much authority over academic programs and clinical 
matters as they might have if they were dealing with a nonprofit hospital. 
In negotiating the terms of a sale or lease and a subsequent affilia-
tion, medical school representatives ought to insist on a number of mini-
mum requirements. The most important of these pertain to the authority 
and composition of the hospital's governing board. To ensure that ulti-
mate legal responsibility for the hospital's operations remains vested in 
its board and does not shift to the for-profit chain's board of directors, 
the hospital ought to be incorporated separately from its for-profit par-
ent. 533 Under such an arrangement, the hospital board's power will still 
532. See, e.g., GW Report, supra note 514 (During George Washington University's study of 
possible for-profit involvement, "undifferentiated anxiety" about the investor-owned chains was 
"refined" into concern about who would have control over a wide range of academic and clinical 
matters.). 
533. If individual facilities in a multihospital system (whether for-profit or nonprofit) are not 
separately incorporated, legal responsibility for the operations of each faculty rests with the system's 
board of directors. Horty & Mulholland, supra note 380, at 23. The significance of this responsibil-
ity has been heightened in recent years by court decisions holding hospital boards accountable for 
lapses in the quality of care. See supra note 383. 
For-profit chains have indicated a willingness to operate teaching hospitals as separate corpora-
tions. In its proposal to purchase McLean Hospital, for example, HCA said it would create a wholly 
owned subsidiary corporation (with a separate board) to assume McLean's assets and liabilities. 
Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B. 
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be circumscribed to some degree by the parent corporation's ultimate 
authority over the hospital's budget, but the hospital board's legal 
responsibility for operational matters should enhance its ability to act 
effectively in a supervisory role. 
This role should be made plain by provisions in the sale, lease, or 
affiliation agreement specifying the board's authority. The specifications 
accepted by HCA in its proposal to purchase McLean Hospital are a 
useful model. HCA indicated it would give McLean's governing board 
"full authority" over all operational matters except "final approval" of 
the patient care budget. 534 This authority was to include "general 
authority" to "oversee" patient care, teaching, and research. 535 Pro-
posed capital improvements (other than those specified in the purchase 
agreement) would have required approval by both the board and RCA's 
management. In addition, the appointment of the hospital's director and 
all M.D. and Ph.D. staff was to be subject to the board's approval. 536 
To ensure that the governing board remains an effective mechanism 
for the maintenance of academic authority over teaching, research, and 
clinical care, medical school officials ought to have power to appoint a 
majority of the board's membership. 537 Representatives of the for-profit 
owner or lessor should also sit on the board in order to communicate 
management's concerns and convey academic and community concerns 
back to corporate headquarters and the firm's on-site managers. Other-
wise, the board's composition should depend on the individual circum-
stances of each case. Some community representation may be 
534. Id. at app. A. 
535. Id. at app. B. Administration of the "teaching and educational budget" was to be "under 
the jurisdiction" of the board, with the budget's size to be specified in the purchase agreement itself. 
!d. 
536. Id. 
537. During the joint George Washington University-AMI "study" of possible AMI operation 
of the university's hospital, the university proposed, and AMI agreed, that the hospital's governing 
board would be composed of four senior medical school officials and three representatives of AMI. 
George Washington's senior health sciences official (the vice president for medical affairs) was to be 
the chairman. GW Report, supra note 514, exhibit 10; AMI Letter, supra note 210, app. I. In its 
proposal to purchase McLean Hospital, HCA agreed to a governing board, or "committee," consist-
ing of the hospital director (appointed by HCA with the board's approval), three members named by 
the dean of the Harvard Medical School, three appointed by the chairman of the Harvard-affiliated 
Massachusetts General Hospital, and two named by the chairman ofHCA. Thus the medical school 
and an allied institution (MGH) were to have had at least a six to three majority. Faculty Advisory 
Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B. 
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appropriate, particularly for teaching hospitals with substantial commit-
ments to indigent care or other charitable service. 538 
Besides specifying the authority and composition of the governing 
board, an agreement ought to stipulate that academic personnel mat-
ters-including appointments (except for final approval by the hospital's 
governing board), tenure decisions, faculty compensation policies, and 
rules governing outside activities-remain under medical school con-
trol. 539 Such a provision would further insulate research and education 
from the economic pressures that the governing board, including its aca-
demic members, will inevitably experience as it exercises its supervisory 
responsibilities. 540 In order to provide additional insulation from busi-
ness pressures, corporate responsibility for the administration of all 
research programs (whether supported by outside grants or by contribu-
tions from the for-profit chain) should be transferred from the hospital to 
the medical school or a separate nonprofit entity.541 
An agreement should also make plain that neither hospital manage-
ment nor corporate headquarters may restrict publication or other dis-
semination of results from research conducted at the hospital or funded 
by the owner or lessor. 542 Moreover, an agreement ought to proscribe 
the use of research results in corporate advertising and publicity material 
without permission from participating faculty members in order to shield 
peer review of clinical innovations from interference by corporate promo-
tional activity. Similarly, corporate financial support for research pro-
grams should not be contingent on faculty consent to the use of research 
results for promotional purposes. Medical school and corporate officials 
may also wish to negotiate provisions for determining patent rights and 
538. The governing board of the Creighton University-affiliated St. Joseph Hospital, acquired by 
AMI in 1984, includes members from the community and the Omaha-based Boys Town National 
Institute, an affiliate of St. Joseph. O'Brien, supra note 519, at 199. 
539. Cf Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B (HCA's proposal for 
purchase of McLean Hospital stipulated that academic personnel policies would remain as they were 
before the sale). 
540. But cf GW Report, supra note 514 (plan developed in joint George Washington-AMI 
study of possible for-profit ownership or lease of the university's hospital placed ultimate authority 
over academic personnel policies in the hands of the hospital governing board controlled by medical 
school administration). 
541. Such a transfer would also be necessary to enable faculty to continue receiving federal and 
private grants for research conducted at the hospital. See supra note 523. 
542. A danger inherent in any collaborative relationship between academia and the for-profit 
sector is that incentives to keep some knowledge proprietary could compromise the free exchange of 
scientific information and ideas. See, e.g., A. Bartlett Giamatti, Free Market and Free Inquiry: The 
University, Industry, and Cooperative Research, in PARTNERS IN THE RESEARCH ENTERPRISE 3 
(Tomas W. Langfitt, Sheldon Hackney, Alfred P. Fishman, & Albert V. Glowasky eds., 1983). 
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allocating potential licensing income from applications of research 
funded by the corporation or conducted at the hospital. 543 
Other contractual protections for education and research might 
include the following: (1) an express statement that all patients admitted 
to the hospital or seen in outpatient clinics are available, at faculty dis-
cretion, to students and house staff for teaching purposes;544 (2) a provi-
sion barring hospital management from anything more than an advisory 
role in the design and administration of teaching programs; (3) a guaran-
tee of faculty authority to specify procedures and to make decisions 
regarding the kinds of patients to be admitted545 (in order to ensure 
clinical diversity for teaching purposes and faculty access to clinical 
groupings needed for research protocols); and (4) a statement of faculty 
authority to decide what clinical services will be provided546 and how 
many residents will be trained in each specialty program. These provi-
sions, however, are not vital so long as the hospital governing board has 
clear authority over these matters and is controlled by a medical-school-
appointed majority. 
An essential link in the logic justifying the existence of for-profit 
hospitals is the physician's independence as a clinical "purchasing 
agent."547 Protection for this independence should be an indispensable 
part of any affiliation arrangement between a medical school and a for-
profit teaching hospital. To shield physician judgment from hospital 
management's economic leverage, an agreement should state clearly that 
no physician with any patient care responsibilities may be employed or 
otherwise compensated individually by the hospital. 548 This principle 
543. See generally OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NAT'L SCIENCE FOUND., REPORT ON 
A NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION WORKSHOP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INDUS-
TRY-UNIVERSITY REsEARCH RELATIONSHIPS: SELECTED STUDIES (1982) (discussing the allocation 
of patent rights and income from commercial applications of research). 
544. The medical school/hospital affiliation agreement accompanying Humana's long-term 
lease of the University of Louisville's principal teaching hospital specifies that all inpatients are avail-
able for teaching. Kmetz, supra note 227, at 175. 
545. See GW Report, supra note 514, exhibit 7 (indicating that George Washington University 
would require such a provision as a prerequisite for sale or lease of its hospital to a for-profit). 
546. See id. 
547. See supra text accompanying notes 290-97, 356-60. 
548. See, e.g., Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B (HCA's purchase offer 
for McLean Hospital included the proviso that no McLean staff physician would be "employed 
directly" by HCA). 
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could be implemented through creation of a separate, nonprofit corpora" 
tion to negotiate and administer compensation for faculty"provided inpa" 
tient and outpatient physician services at the hospital. 549 Alternatively, 
the medical school itself could n·egotiate physicians' fees with the hospital 
and administer compensation for clinical services. Physicians not partie" 
ipating in a collective faculty compensation plan-for example, gratis 
faculty and other community practitioners-could continue to receive 
fee-for-service reimbursement from patients or third party payers. 550 
Additional protection for the independence of physicians' clinical 
judgment should be secured by contractual language that preserves the 
self-governing authority of the hospital's medical staff with respect to 
membership and clinical privileges (e.g., admitting and operating privi" 
leges).551 A requirement that staff privileges be conditioned on a faculty 
appointment552 would provide further protection, in the form of a coun" 
tervailing institutional alliance, against the risk of management interfer" 
ence in physicians' clinical judgment. It may, moreover, be attractive to 
the for-profit buyer or lessor as a visible indicator of high quality clinical 
care. However, at teaching hospitals with substantial numbers of 
nonfaculty, community practitioners on staff, insistence on such a con-
tractual requirement may not be worth the cost in divisiveness. 
Finally, a nonprofit party to a sale, lease, or affiliation agreement 
may want contractual assurance that new management will continue the 
hospital's commitment to a particular mission. The seller or lessor of a 
hospital with a religious mission could negotiate for a provision that 
mandates adherence to a denomination's principles of medical ethics553 
549. The tenns of HCA's offer to purchase McLean Hospital included creation of an independ· 
ent faculty practice plan, established as a nonprofit corporation chaired by McLean's Harvard-desig-
nated psychiatrist-in-chief, to administer physician compensation for all hospital-based patient care. 
A faculty appointment would have remained a requirement for privileges at McLean. Professional 
fees were to have been set in negotiations between the practice plan and hospital management. HCA 
was to make payments to the practice plan at an amount based on pre-acquisition staff salaries and 
adjusted annually for inflation and changes in total patient care hours. /d. 
550. Likewise, physicians employed by independent HMOs or other prepaid plans could con-
tinue to draw salaries from their employers for taking care of patients admitted to a for-profit teach-
ing hospital. 
551. See GW Report, supra note 514 (stating that a commitment by a for-profit finn to preserve 
Hospital Medical Staff Organization's structure, function, by-laws, rules, and regulations was a pre-
requisite for the sale or lease of George Washington University's hospital). 
552. See Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B (HCA plan for acquisition 
of McLean Hospital included the requirement that all physicians granted privileges at McLean hold 
Harvard faculty appointment.). 
553. See, E.g., O'Brien, supra note 519, at 196-97 (In acquiring the St. Joseph Hospital, which 
was founded by a Roman Catholic order and operated as a Catholic facility by subsequent owners, 
AMI committed itself by contract to administering St. Joseph in accordance with Catholic medical 
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and perhaps even designates some religious authority as the arbiter of 
compliance. Similarly, a party wishing to see a teaching hospital main-
tain a commitment to research and treatment for a particular disorder 
could press for contractual language explicitly stating and defining that 
commitment. 
3. New Program Opportunities 
The new program opportunities open to an academic medical center 
operating in partnership with a for-profit hospital chain should be 
another focus of negotiations. For teaching centers, these opportunities 
have considerable financial and academic allure. They also pose substan-
tial risks. To maximize potential benefits and guard against the hazards, 
academic negotiators should seek commitments to desired programs and 
insist on effective medical school control over new ventures involving 
teaching center personnel and resources. 
The financial attractions are several. New income streams for aca-
demic departments could flow from the marketing of educational pro-
grams to other hospitals operated by the for-profit buyer or lessor and to 
practicing physicians affiliated with these hospitals. 554 The development 
by the for-profit chain of a regional, vertically integrated medical care 
system with the academic center as its hub555 may hold even greater 
income-producing potential for academic departments. Corporate com-
mitment to developing the center as its tertiary care "flagship" could 
bring a new influx of capital for the acquisition of advanced technology, 
greatly enhancing academic clinicians' income-producing potential. New 
opportunities could include consultation requests from community prac-
titioners affiliated with the chain's other facilities, 556 additional inpatient 
tertiary care referrals, and the chance to staff chain-operated ambulatory 
surgery centers and other satellite facilities. Alluring academic prospects 
include a more diverse array of training sites, additional state-of-the-art 
technology for clinical research, access by investigators to the chain's 
systemwide clinical data base, and vastly increased numbers of patients 
for research protocols. 557 
ethics). Such a provision could specify particular procedures-e.g., abortion and in vitro fertiliza-
tion-not to be performed in the hospital because they are proscribed by religious doctrine. 
554. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
555. See supra text accompanying notes 193-201 (discussing Humana's plans to develop 
regional, vertically-integrated medical service systems). 
556. See supra text accompanying note 154. 
557. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58. 
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The principal hazard, on the other hand, is that the unrestrained 
pursuit of revenue opportunities could eclipse academic priorities. In the 
face of uncontrolled incentives to act as entrepreneurs, faculty commit-
ment to research and teaching could suffer severely. 558 Another danger 
is that new clinical ventures initiated by the for-profit firm, perhaps even 
with the aid of some faculty, could draw patients away from preexisting 
programs operated by the medical school or its faculty practice plan. 559 
This could result in a loss of teaching and research opportunities as well 
as revenue. 
Moreover, sale or lease of a teaching hospital to a for-profit chain 
will not in itself assure the resulting investor-related academic medical 
center of access to the new financial and academic opportunities alluded 
to above. Humana's long-term lease arrangement with the University of 
Louisville is a case in point. The signing of an agreement in 1983 had 
occasioned hopes for a networking of Humana facilities in the Louisville 
area, with the university hospital as Humana's regional tertiary care 
"flagship." However, to the chagrin of university officials, Humana pro-
ceeded to establish major tertiary care programs at its other area hospi-
tals. 560 Instead of emerging as the central element in a vertically 
integrated system, the university hospital became just another entry in a 
"fierce . . . internal corporate competition" between Humana's facili-
ties. 561 The university's medical school consequently lost out on much of 
the new programmatic potential of a partnership with the for-profit 
sector. 
To secure access to this potential and to guard against the hazards, a 
medical school should seek contractual provisions guaranteeing its teach-
ing hospital a regional flagship role562 and permitting centralized aca-
demic control over new ventures. An attractive model was developed by 
AMI and George Washington University during their joint study of 
teaching hospital sale and lease options. 563 AMI offered to commit itself 
to developing a vertically integrated health services network in the Wash-
ington, D.C. area, with the George Washington University Hospital as 
558. O'Leary, supra note 154, at 96, 102; cf. Cluff, supra note 67, at 2932 (The growing obliga· 
tion of full-time clinical faculty to generate income from professional fees is eroding faculty commit· 
ment to research and teaching at non-profit hospitals.). 
559. GW Report, supra note 514. 
560. Kmetz, supra note 227, at 178-79 (citing, as examples, nuclear magnetic resonance imaging 
technology and Humann's artificial heart program). 
561. Id. at 179. 
562. Id. 
563. GW Report, supra note 514. 
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its tertiary care hub. 564 The corporation said it would delegate authority 
over the entire system to the university hospital•s governing board, to be 
composed of four medical school officials and three AMI representa-
tives. 565 This would have enabled academic leaders to secure for their 
institution the "flagship, role that eluded the University of Louisville 
and to exercise effective veto power over new ventures believed to endan-
ger academic priorities or existing income sources. In addition, AMI 
made a number of more specific promises relating to the faculty•s and the 
university hospitai•s role in a vertically integrated network and to faculty 
and trainee access to new program opportunities. 566 The university 
expressed great interest in AMI's proposals. But medical school officials 
indicated they would insist on a detailed contractual definition of the 
hospital's role in an integrated system and on limits upon the establish-
ment of services potentially competitive with the faculty practice plan. 567 
Prospective buyers and lessees may not be so willing in all cases to 
make an academic medical center the nucleus of a regional, vertically 
integrated network and to delegate authority over the entire system to a 
medical-school-controlled governing body. But where the interested 
nonprofit parties believe that a sale or lease is in a teaching center•s best 
interest for other reasons, their negotiators need not insist on full-fledged 
flagship status. They should, however, make sure that any commitments 
by the for-profit firm to particular relationships or ventures involving the 
teaching center are contractually defined in precise terms. Moreover, to 
protect academic priorities (and existing income sources) they should 
insist on veto power for medical school officials over new initiatives 
involving the hospital, the medical school, or individual faculty 
members. 
4. Conflict Resolution and Safeguards 
A sale or lease contract and any related affiliation agreements 
should also contain mechanisms for resolving differences between parties 
564. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13. 
565. See supra note 214 and accompanying text; supra note 529. 
566. The corporation promised, inter alia, to make its area hospitals and other facilities avail-
able for teaching, AMI Letter, supra note 210, app. III at 11; to promote inpatient and outpatient 
tertiary care referrals to the university hospital and its faculty from other AMI facilities and their 
medical staffs, id. at 10, 22; to give the university's faculty practice plan the right of first refusal to 
staff AMI ambulatory care centers, id. at 22; and to involve faculty in corporation-sponsored contin-
uing education programs for physicians at AMI hospitals throughout the mid-Atlantic region, id. 
567. GW Report, supra note 514, at 10. 
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and coping with future developments not otherwise anticipated by con-
tract language. 568 Conflicts could arise out of almost any operating mat-
ter. But more serious disputes are likely to involve alleged breaches of 
contract, other disagreements about contract interpretation, and corpo-
rate actions that are not contractually proscribed but are believed by 
medical school administrators to endanger academic interests. Future 
developments arousing concern might include acquisition of the for-
profit owner or lessee by another corporation, deterioration of the 
owner's or lessee's financial condition, or regulatory events with an 
adverse impact upon the owner or lessee. While recognizing the inevita-
bility of compromise and risk, the medical school and other nonprofit 
parties should make sure that contractual mechanisms of problem resolu-
tion suffice to safeguard their essential interests. 
The hospital governing board can serve as an adequate forum for the 
resolution of most problems. If it is set up as I have urged herein, with 
an academic majority and governing authority specified by contract (but-
tressed by legal responsibility for hospital operations),569 the board 
should be able to resolve, in a manner acceptable to academic leaders, all 
matters pertaining to hospital operations. 570 Moreover, the presence of 
corporate representatives on the board571 renders it useful as a forum for 
dialogue between academic officials and corporate management regard-
ing problems beyond the scope of the board's authority. 
For such problems, however, additional mechanisms are necessary 
to reduce the vulnerability of academic interests to corporate fiat. One 
promising measure, proposed by George Washington University and 
agreed to by AMI in their joint study of sale and lease options, is a con-
tractual guarantee of direct access by senior medical school officials to 
568. Provisions that facilitate mutual adjustment by contracting parties to unanticipated devel· 
opments are vital to the success of long-term relational agreements. Contractual specification of 
reasonable resolutions for all possible contingencies is not possible because the human capacity to 
anticipate contingencies is limited. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957) (terming this 
cognitive limitation "bounded rationality"). The more immense the range of future contingencies, 
the more costly it is (to the point of impossibility) to resolve them in advance. See Oliver E. Wil-
liamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 
BELL J. EcoN. 250 (1975) (discussing implications of the inevitability of incomplete advance specifi-
cation of contingencies and their resolution in employment contracts). Governance mechanisms are 
a practical substitute for detailed specification of terms in such agreements. Victor P. Goldberg, 
Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 337 (1980). 
569. See supra text accompanying notes 533-40. 
570. The board's authority in fiscal matters will be limited, however, by the corporation's con-
trol over the size of the hospital's patient care budget. See supra text accompanying notes 534-35. 
571. See supra text accompanying notes 537-38. 
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top executives of the corporation. 572 Such a provision would at least 
assure academic officials of the institutional capacity to make top corpo-
rate management aware of academic concerns. The corporation's inter-
est in remaining on good terms with its academic affiliate in order to reap 
the relationship's full benefits should make this line of access a useful 
instrument for protecting academic interests. 
For disputes involving the interpretation or application of contrac-
tual language and not resolvable either at the governing board level or 
through informal communication between senior medical school and cor-
porate officials, a more structured process is desirable. A contractual 
provision that empowers each party to convene formal negotiations in 
the event of a conflict over an agreement's terms would prevent dispute 
resolution by unilateral fiat in disregard of vital academic concerns. Such 
a provision would have added force if accompanied by a clause requiring 
that matters not settled in negotiations be submitted to binding 
arbitration. 573 
The ultimate safeguard against an agreement gone sour is contrac-
tual provision for termination-that is, cancellation of the lease or repur-
chase of the hospital by the original seller or some other nonprofit entity. 
From the perspective of the medical school and other involved nonprofit 
parties, a termination clause allowing cancellation or repurchase for any 
reason (thereby ensuring maximum flexibility to respond to changing 
conditions) might at first glance seem desirable. But because even a lease 
agreement would require a considerable initial outlay of corporate 
resources, 574 for-profit negotiators are likely to look with disfavor upon 
proposals for permissive termination provisions. 575 Some contractual 
protection for the investor-owned firm's reliance interest576 may be nec-
essary to coax it into making the capital investment and other commit-
ments desired by the medical school and other parties. Such protection, 
572. GW Report, supra note 514, at 9-10; AMI Letter, supra note 210, app. III at 9. 
573. The procedure for selecting arbitrators should somehow ensure that those chosen be sensi-
tive to the interests and values of medical academia. One option might be a two-step approach, 
entailing (1) nomination of a candidate (or panel) by the medical school administration or the hospi-
tal governing board, and (2) corporate approval or rejection of this selection. 
574. See supra text accompanying notes 523-28 (discussing up-front commitment of corporate 
resources, under both leasing and acquisition arrangements, toward capital improvements and 
endowments for academic activities). 
575. To the degree that a producing firm must invest in long-lived, illiquid capital goods at the 
outset of a contract, it has a reliance interest in a subsequent right to serve. Victor P. Goldberg, 
Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. EcoN. 426, 432-36 (1976). It can therefore be 
expected to bargain for a restrictive termination clause. 
576. Id. 
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in the form of restrictions on the right to terminate the arrangement, may 
therefore be in these parties' best interests. 577 
The initial corporate commitment would probably be smaller for a 
lease than for an acquisition. A less restrictive termination clause should 
therefore be easier to obtain for a lessor than a seller; indeed, from the 
perspective of the nonprofit parties, ease of exit from a relationship with 
a for-profit firm may be the single greatest practical difference between a 
lease and a sale. The University of Louisville's long-term leasing agree-
ment with Humana permits either party to cancel without cause by giv-
ing three years' notice. 578 This permissive provision preserves maximum 
flexibility for the university, albeit at the cost of chronic uncertainty 
about Humana's continuing commitment. 579 
In acquisition negotiations, on the other hand, for-profit chains have 
insisted on more restrictive termination provisions. During its joint 
study with AMI of hospital sale and lease options, George Washington 
University said it viewed a "no fault" termination clause as a prerequisite 
for entry into either kind of arrangement.580 But AMI proposed to make 
the availability of a repurchase option contingent on a decision by AMI 
"to sell or otherwise not operate [the hospital] in the future."581 HCA's 
bid to acquire McLean Hospital contained a comparable buy-back 
option, exercisable only in the event that the firm's directors "deter-
mine[d] that [HCA was] either unable or unwilling to operate the hospi-
tal" as called for in the purchase agreement. 582 The acquisition 
agreements finalized thus far contain similarly restrictive repurchase 
clauses. For example, the contract governing AMI's 1984 acquisition of 
the Creighton University-affiliated St. Joseph Hospital provides for a 
repurchase option only if AMI (1) breaches the agreement, (2) is itself 
acquired by another corporation, or (3) subsequently decides to sell St. 
Joseph.583 Given the for-profits' demonstrated aversion to open-ended 
577. Cf. i'd. at 433 (in long-term producer-consumer contracts, optimal protection for produ-
cers' reliance interest is that at which expected marginal benefits for consumers of increased contract 
durability are just offset by expected marginal costs of decreased flexibility). Goldberg gives exam-
ples of such protection in long· term commercial leases and producer-consumer contracts. High cap-
ital-to-output ratios and long-lived, immobile capital are characteristics that make such protection 
attractive to contracting parties. /d. at 433-34. 
578. Kmetz, supra note 227, at 175. 
579. /d. at 178 (Vulnerability to cancellation by Humana obliges university officials to engage 
unceasingly in contingency planning.). 
580. GW Report, supra note 514, executive summary. 
581. AMI Letter, supra note 210, app. II at 5. 
582. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B. 
583. The repurchase option may be exercised by the original seller (an independent nonprofit 
entity), its designee, or Creighton University. In the event that AMI receives other bids for St. 
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buy-back provisions, nonprofit negotiators would do well to anticipate 
potential conflicts and other developments likely to make repurchase 
desirable and to bargain for explicit mention of each as a buy-back clause 
trigger. 
To ensure that repurchase remains feasible, the nonprofit seller (or 
any other party designated in a buy-back clause) should secure adequate 
financing arrangements. Sufficient capital-for example, a portion of sale 
proceeds-should be set aside by the seller for potential use as a down 
payment. 584 As a safeguard against the uncertainty of future borrowing 
conditions, favorable financing terms for a repurchase should be made 
part of the sale agreement. 585 Finally, the sale contract should specify a 
valuation process for setting the repurchase price. 586 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The transfer of teaching hospital operations to for-profit firms by 
sale or lease is not a national panacea for the financial problems affiicting 
academic medical centers. Sale and lease arrangements pose significant 
risks, as well as legal and regulatory difficulties. Moreover, interest by 
investor-owned health services systems in acquiring or leasing major 
teaching hospitals is unlikely to encompass more than a few or several 
major teaching centers in each region of the country. 
Nevertheless, sale and lease arrangements of the sort discussed 
herein deserve a place in the repertoire of strategies available to academic 
medical centers for coping with an austere economic environment. 
Mounting competitive pressures are eroding teaching centers' ability to 
support academic programs via cross-subsidization from clinical revenue. 
A major increase in government support is unlikely in the near term, and 
Joseph, the original seller, its designee, and Creighton have the right of first refusal. O'Brien, supra 
note 519, at 199, 206. 
584. GW Report, supra note 514, executive summary. At least some of the income from this 
capital reserve could continue to be applied toward academic or other activities, so long as inflation 
remained within reasonable limits. 
585. Id. The buy-back clause in the agreement governing AMI's purchase of the St. Joseph 
Hospital guarantees that AMI will offer financing for eighty percent of the repurchase price at the 
then-current prime interest rate. O'Brien, supra note 519, at 199. 
586. GW Report, supra note 514, executive summary. The agreement governing AMI's 
purchase of the St. Joseph Hospital sets the buy-back price equal to the hospital's value as deter-
mined by depreciation on AMI's federal tax returns, unless another entity submits a purchase offer. 
In this event, the sum offered would become the price, with the organizations designated in the buy-
back clause having the right of first refusal. O'Brien, supra note 519, at 206. Similarly, the repur-
chase option contained in HCA's unsuccessful offer for McLean Hospital set the facility's depreci-
ated book value as the buy-back price. Faculty Advisory Committee Report, supra note 6, app. B. 
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the sheer size of academic medical enterprise now outstrips the capacity 
of private philanthropy to play more than a tiny role. Moreover, the 
debt capacity of nonprofit teaching centers is not sufficient to meet their 
massi'Ve capital needs. Academic leaders must become creative in adapt-
ing to this difficult environment. If prudently designed to secure the ben-
efits and protect against the risks, hospital sale and lease agreements with 
the major for-profit chains have a legitimate role in the creative effort. 
To those who insist on a vision of medicine in general, and academic 
medicine in particular, as separable from the exigencies of economic 
choice, such arrangements seem inherently distasteful. The very pres-
ence of the for-profit form in the health services field demonstrates that 
economic preferences and opportunities influence institutional behavior. 
But a keen responsiveness to economic opportunities has played an inte-
gral, albeit often unacknowledged role in the phenomenal growth of aca-
demic medical institutions over the last four decades. Tension between 
entrepreneurial incentives and the ideal of "pure" scientific inquiry 
uncontaminated by economic influences is hardly a new development. 
Ironically, in making entrepreneurship more visible, contractual arrange-
ments between academic centers and the for-profit health services sector 
could provide increased protection for academic priorities by facilitating 
closer management of industry responses to economic incentives. 
